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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation is primarily concerned with describing a hermeneutic theory of 
composition pedagogy for the purpose of developing socially engaged, self-reflective, 
and critically conscious citizens of a democracy. This work examines the intersection of 
higher education and civic responsibility that has been the foundational motive of 
academics since the first schools were opened by Isocrates and Plato. The question now, 
as it has been since the days of Plato, is how to educate new citizens to become informed, 
engaged critics of their environments for the purpose of maintaining a healthy self 
governance and preserving the democratic ideals of equality, justice, and freedom.  
 The foundational theorists for this work are John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, and 
Paul Ricoeur. Their hermeneutic understanding of human learning development and 
motivation towards action are crucial for understanding how to help students become 
self-reflective, socially engaged members of a free society. While each of these theorists 
and their views on educational pedagogies have been studied in depth, there has not been 
a study that examines the common heuristic of these three philosophers and the 
implications of a combined theory of hermeneutics for composition pedagogy.  
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“To teach students to read, to comprehend, and to contemplate what has been read; to 
instill a desire to educate themselves further and use that education to improve the lives 
of those around them is the ultimate goal and humble task of those who call themselves 
teacher.”  -- Curtis Haley, Texas educator, principle, and activist. 
 
 
Chapter 1: Critical Democracy 
Introduction 
This dissertation intends to present a hermeneutic pedagogy of composition for 
first-year writing students using the philosophies of John Dewey, Hannah Arendt, and 
Paul Ricoeur to guide its development. The goal of this study is to demonstrate how 
effective, progressive writing programs that embrace students’ multicultural and 
multisocial experiences in the development of critically conscious, democratically 
engaged discourse can help students achieve success both in the modern academy and in 
their communities beyond the academy as well.  The key difference between the idea of a 
“hermeneutic” pedagogy and the traditional rhetorical approach is one of perspective.  
Where traditional rhetorical approaches focus on structure, content, and delivery of 
information to students, a hermeneutic approach is more concerned with the experiences, 
opinions, and comprehension on the part of the students themselves. This is not to argue 
that rhetoric has no place in composition pedagogy; on the contrary, rhetoric is the 
primary mechanism by which teachers convey new information. Nevertheless, rhetoric is 
only half of the process of educating students. How those students comprehend and 
engage in the classroom based on that rhetoric is the hermeneutic counterpart to rhetoric, 
and this dissertation intends to focus primarily on that half of the equation.  
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The overall goal of a hermeneutic pedagogy is to help students develop the 
understanding and critical thinking skills necessary for functional democratic engagement 
in their immediate communities and in society as a whole while still gaining the writing 
skills composition programs are intended to develop. That’s the exigence for a 
hermeneutic pedagogy of composition, grounded firmly in current Rhetoric and 
Composition theory and building on the work of other scholars in the field focused on 
issues of civic literacy, community engagement, and writing across communities. 
Learning to see knowledge making as a discursive, renewable, and engaged process 
rather than a deliverable commodity is the key to improving student success in the 
composition classroom, across the academy, and in their lives beyond the academy too.  
The motivation for this work comes from an experience I had in the fall of 2010, 
while teaching a class at the University of New Mexico on The Rhetoric of Fear. I was 
discussing the changes to American democracy and personal freedoms wrought by the 
political reaction to the September 11attacks. Shortly after the attacks, as part of the 
federal government’s proposed new anti-terrorism policies, the Bush Administration 
attempted to initiate a program called TIPS, which would have effectively deputized 
millions of civilians – delivery truck drivers, utility and cable-TV company employees, 
postal employees, mass-transit employees, etc. – to report “suspicious activity” in and 
around homes they visited in the course of their work. Considering how much Americans 
value personal privacy and being concerned for  the safety of the men and women in 
these jobs, the postal workers and other government employees logically rejected this 
idea and, as a group, managed to keep it from becoming law. At the time, it was one of 
the few instances of effective public organization and public political impact against what 
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many saw as the erosion of our civil liberties. When I asked my students if any of them 
remembered the public criticism of the Patriot Act when it was passed, one student raised 
her hand and said, “Professor, I was only nine.” 
That sudden moment of realization that the class before me had no real 
understanding of a world before September 11, 2001, forever changed my perception of 
writing students in the 21st Century. For students today, in their experiences and 
understanding of their world, the style of zero-sum, partisan, political rhetoric and 
ideology politics of the first part of this century is the way our democracy has always 
been. It’s all they know. Thus, when we as educators talk about helping our students 
understand and engage in critical, reasoned discourse in their writing, we are starting with 
an expectation of understanding that the majority of our audience simply doesn't 
have. We talk about returning to a time of reasoned political discourse while our students 
can only imagine it as something new that must be created and shaped for their own 
future needs, and those are two very different things. 
This dilemma of miscommunication and misunderstanding between teachers and 
their students has been examined by scholars for generations. I.A. Richards, for example, 
discusses the “proper meaning superstition” and “interanimation” of language in his 
canonical text The Meaning of Meaning, and Jurgen Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action examines the “lifeworld” of the individual vs. the external viewpoint of the 
“system” (Richards; Habermas). From a purely hermeneutic perspective, however, 
Kenneth Burke’s examination of terministic screens are most applicable for 
understanding the how individual student phenomenologies affect their comprehension of 
classroom discussions (Burke). Terministic screens are the mechanisms by which we 
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filter out information that our cultural and personal experiences don’t allow us to 
comprehend. The “terministic” descriptor introduced by Burke, however, has always 
seemed to me too rhetorically focused, since it suggests these screens can’t be eliminated 
or altered. They can be. I would venture to argue that as composition educators, that’s 
precisely what our job actually is. A more accurate descriptor for these screens perhaps is 
the word “cultural,” since they are basically conditioned results formed by previous 
cultural experiences.   
These cultural screens are present in every person regardless of education or 
background. They represent perhaps the greatest impediment to educational success, and 
they heavily restrict teachers’ abilities to connect effectively with their students. What’s 
worse, the nature of cultural screens makes them extremely difficult to overcome. Thus, 
our educational systems in the academy and elsewhere have either been ignorant of or 
ignored this important concept and sought to bridge the cultural divide between teachers 
and students by placing the burden primarily upon the students to participate in and 
accept the cultural expectations of the establishment. But this raises an important 
question that a hermeneutic pedagogy of composition hopes to address: If engaging 
cultural screens is too challenging for the institution, how are we to expect our students to 
achieve the feat?  
The evidence is apparent that too many of our students fail at this task regardless 
of their potential or their innate intelligence and thus never complete their education. A 
recent study by the Educational Trust Foundation shows that only 54% of students who 
enroll in American colleges complete their coursework; and while the reasons for this 
vary, it is a dismally low rate (Marklein). For teachers of composition, as well as the 
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academy as a whole, this low success rate represents a gross disservice to our students, 
our ideals of economic and social equality, and our democracy.  
George Kuh and other scholars at Indiana University have been attempting to 
address this disconnect between students and the academy through the National Survey of 
Student Engagement (NSSE). This wide-ranging project attempts to measure student 
engagement in educationally purposeful activities that are more likely factors in long-
term student success than traditional measurements of university resources, reputation, 
student grades, etc. What Kuh and his colleagues have discovered through this ambitious 
effort supports many of the arguments developed in this dissertation and particularly the 
potential benefits outlined herein regarding a hermeneutic pedagogical system, where 
hermeneutic pedagogy is defined as one focusing on student learning processes, 
comprehension, motivations, and critical consciousness.  
Though this dissertation is particularly focused on the composition classroom 
while the NSSE measures broader effects across all disciplines, the findings of Kuh, et al. 
support one of the primary propositions of a hermeneutic pedagogy that social 
engagement in the classroom “is positively related to academic outcomes as represented 
by first-year student grades and by persistence between the first and second year of 
college” (Kuh 555). Furthermore, exposure to the kinds of purposeful engagement 
practices such as classroom discussion, learning communities, self-reflection, interpretive 
reading, service-learning courses, and other forms of discourse skill development 
discussed in this dissertation has a “compensatory effect on first year grades” for all 
students with effects that “are even greater for lower ability students and students of 
color” (Kuh 555). 
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Pedagogies designed to teach critical consciousness and composition to new 
students based on hermeneutic underpinnings are supported by NSSE research that 
concludes that outcomes should be focused on the backgrounds and needs of the students 
rather than supporting or defending systems that are convenient for the institution. The 
composition classroom, as a foundational course in virtually all American universities, 
offers an ideal opportunity to implement these kinds of student engagement activities 
through a hermeneutic pedagogy of writing.  
Hermeneutics, is after all, named for the Greek God Hermes, the god of writers 
and communication. It’s value, however, runs deeper than simple mythology. Plato 
referenced hermeneutic understanding as a contrast to sophia and the practice of philo-
sophia. Where sophia is knowledge of the basic truth about an utterance or idea 
(wisdom), hermeneutics is the revelation of knowledge and the process of interpretation 
necessary for knowledge development.  
As a general philosophy, hermeneutics has largely been relegated to teleological 
studies among theologians due to its focus on interpretation and its application for 
interpreting scripture. St. Augustine, for example, adopted hermeneutics for the Catholic 
Church in his argument that the “inner word” of God that one feels has more validity than 
the “outer word” of the bible that one interprets. In a more traditional philosophical sense, 
hermeneutic thought was partially advanced during the renaissance by Peter Ramus and 
Rene Descartes for the development of systems of inquiry from individual perspectives. 
However, the greatest development of hermeneutic philosophy occurred during the 
Enlightenment with John Locke’s theory of the tabula rasa and Immanuel Kant’s a priori 
epistemology. The field of hermeneutic theory as it is explored today began in the late 
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18th and early 19th centuries when philosophers began trying to understand the 
mechanisms that existed between our a priori knowledge and our understanding of the 
world around us. These explorations would have the strongest support in Germany, of 
which Kant was a native, and were developed by Schleiermacher, Hegel, Dilthey, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer over the next two centuries. In fact, it can be argued that all 
modern hermeneutical theory is fundamentally German with further refinement by 
French philosophers Paul Ricouer and Jaques Derrida in the mid-20th century, and, more 
recently, with new critical thought by theorists like John Dewey (American pragmatism), 
Hannah Arendt, and Jurgen Habermas.   
What all of these theorists are focused on, from John Locke forward to Dewey, 
Arendt, and Ricoeur, is understanding how the world is revealed to and comprehended by 
the human mind. Unlike epistemic rhetoric as it was defined by Robert L. Scott that is 
focused on the end relationship between rhetoric and knowledge, hermeneutics is more 
concerned with the actual process of acquisition of knowledge and how one interprets 
and understands it than it is with the final result of that process (Scott). This is important 
for teachers of writing to understand, because ultimately, that is what writing does. It 
actively unfolds and reveals the world to an audience through its author’s eyes and is 
itself an interpretive act that uses the signs, symbols, and language constructed for the 
purpose of interpreting the world around us. Writing is the conduit of meaning-making, 
and as teachers of writing, we should have a better understanding of how meaning-
making occurs through the process of interpretation if we expect to instill the skills of 
critical thinking in our students and help them find success across the academic 
environment.  
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The Modern Academy and the Composition Classroom 
As educators, we are tasked with communicating and transferring knowledge and 
critical thinking skills to our students, and as all rhetoricians know, understanding the 
motivations and expectations of our audience is key to achieving those goals. The 
problem, however, in today’s world of constant technological development and change, is 
that our audience is increasingly pluralistic and adaptive, and those two factors are 
accelerating at an extraordinary rate. The tools we use as teachers of writing are often the 
tools we learned with, and a century ago the tools of teachers were the exact same tools 
used by students – books and pens. Today, the tools we know and use as teachers for 
accessing, processing, and disseminating knowledge are constantly being altered and 
advanced in ways that give our students a completely different set of tools for those same 
purposes every few years.  
For example, when I started my graduate work in 2005 and taught my first core 
writing class, YouTube didn’t exist, but by 2009 it had become a ubiquitous form of 
media dissemination. When I completed my Masters degree and started work on my 
Ph.D. in 2007, there were no smartphones, but as I complete my dissertation in 2013, 
virtually all of  my students carry cell phones capable of accessing the Internet and 
transmitting text, voice, and video communication instantly. In just eight semesters, the 
methods my students used to gather and process new information and knowledge 
changed dramatically, and that rate of change is not slowing down.  
How are we expected to educate and train effective writing teachers in specific, 
research-based pedagogical systems when the processes and tools of knowledge-making 
that those pedagogies depend on become obsolete in the time between starting a graduate 
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program and completing it?  As academics and teachers alike, we have avoided 
considering the possibility that we simply can no longer use old paradigms to educate an 
educator who will likely be less effective at the end of her graduate program than new 
writing students require. The course of pedagogical development over the past 30 years 
has tried to accommodate these increasingly diverse, technologically advanced, 
commercially-focused college students through increasingly adaptive pedagogies that try 
to encompass as much of our audiences’ backgrounds, identities, and needs as possible.  
These multimodal pedagogies take advantage of new media systems in 
developing student writing and are often effective at capturing new ways in which 
students conceptualize writing through the adoption of new media systems including 
video, wikis, texts, websites, and other forms of digital media (Ball, Hawasher, Horner, 
Katz, C. Selfe). While these are useful composition pedagogies for students in the digital 
age,  they are still universally constructed systems that rely on the understanding and 
adoption of forms and parameters controlled almost exclusively by the teachers and 
administrators who are communicating to a rapidly evolving, technologically savvy 
audience with different experiences and expectations of the world than we have ever 
imagined.  
Thomas Kent was among the first to challenge the idea of universal pedagogies of 
composition in Paralogic Hermeneutics by arguing that any such system, “presupposes 
that discourse production can be reduced to a process that represents, duplicates, or 
models” existing structures (Kent 299).  Heavily influenced by the work of Donald 
Davidson and Mikhail Bakhtin, Kent presents two issues working against the idea of a 
universal pedagogy in his critique. The first issue is that for students of the modern age, 
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there are no existing structures of discourse production that effectively navigate modern 
media systems whose models are usually focused on narrowly defined target audiences 
with similar points of view. Any discussion of an ideal discourse system automatically 
limits such a system in the establishment of its parameters. While such systems may have 
value for focused communities, there is no “system” capable of full transcultural 
discourse.   
The second issue we are facing in this increasingly disparate cultural environment 
is that existing pedagogical structures, in American university environments, are built 
mostly on a foundation of white Protestant, Eurocentric philosophies developed in large 
part to prepare middle-class workers to support an industrial infrastructure. Paolo Freire 
frames this pedagogical approach in terms of banking, wherein teachers serve as 
depositors into students who are vessels of receiving institutionalized knowledge as well 
as expected cultural outcomes (Freire). Regardless that higher education has been 
successful for the past century at training workers, engineers, scientists, and business 
leaders in support of an industrial society does not mitigate the need for those support 
groups to also be engaged in the self-governance envisioned by our society’s framers. On 
the contrary, the need for critical consciousness may be even greater for these specialized 
groups to overcome dominant but ineffective paradigms in education, economic, and 
cultural consciousness that limit the development of a more egalitarian society.   
We can see that the trend for the past few decades, and moving forward into the 
21st century, is that all writing programs, regardless of pedagogical focus, are faced with 
an increasingly culturally divergent student population with drastically different 
perceptions of educational value, discourse, economics, science, politics, and even 
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narrative frames. Our students don’t just see different opportunities for themselves or 
have differing expectations about the role higher education should play in their lives, 
though they have those as well, rather, our students today perceive the entire world 
through highly individualized, differing lenses of reality – lenses they are now shaping 
for themselves through an increasingly divergent, and increasingly profligate, culture of 
instant media.  
As teachers of writing, the cognition gap that exists between our own 
understanding of the world around us and our students’ understanding of that same world 
has never been greater. Even for relatively young graduate students teaching core writing 
classes for the first time, their students who are more than five years different in age 
increasingly have different concepts of educational purpose, knowledge, and values than 
their teachers, and this creates a significant challenge for new teaching assistants, as well 
as established teachers of composition, in connecting to and communicating with these 
students. This cognition gap forms a kind of perceptual classroom dissonance between 
teachers and students that is growing faster with the increasingly rapid rate of 
technological development and the rise of global markets. Furthermore, this dissonance is 
exacerbated by the university community’s own semantic incongruities regarding 
“critical thought” and “public discourse” that are occurring as a result of what 
Gildersleeve, Kuntz, Pasque, and Carducci call the “conservative modernization” of 
higher education:  
Conceptually, conservative modernization signifies a hegemonic bloc of 
social forces that collude to effect conservative changes in education. 
Effectively, this hegemonic bloc forms a movement to sustain the 
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dominant power structure and exacerbate social inequalities, under the 
guise of rhetoric that espouses “freedom” and purports the values of 
meritocracy. Temporarily, conservative modernization represents a 
contemporary condition of education wherein conservative agendas rule 
and progressive agendas are illegitimate (Gildersleeve 88). 
 
This critique of the academy’s shift toward commercial and corporate interests and the 
dangers it presents to democratic rule has been echoed by scholars from across the 
disciplines including distinguished professors and educational theorists such as Michael 
Apple, Gloria Ladsen-Billings, Philip Altbach, and Nancy Cantor among others. This 
devaluing of public interests in favor of private interests is manifested in a modern 
ideological agenda that views “anything that is public as ‘bad’ and anything that is 
private as ‘good.’ And anyone that works in these public institutions must be seen as 
inefficient and in need of the sobering facts of competition so they work longer and 
harder” (Apple 15).  
This devaluation of the public sector and the perceptual dissonance that has 
developed between educators and their students regarding the purpose and value of 
higher education has, according to Linda Adler-Kassner, placed pressure on Rhetoric and 
Composition programs to produce liberal arts-like skills such as writing, communication, 
and critical thinking focused primarily on career readiness, with the ultimate purpose of 
writing education being economic competition for employment (Companies). This 
undermines the very nature of liberal education and the value of developing critically 
conscious citizens of a democracy. As Adler-Kassner argues, “conceptualizing writing 
courses only as service, erases the content of our discipline” (Ethic of Service 1).  
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Jeanne Marie Rose, Bruce Horner, Lynn Bloom and other composition scholars 
have also begun addressing the commoditization of writing programs toward production 
oriented, career-focused students motivated by “capitalist constructions of time” (Rose 
45). As commercial models of production have increasingly encroached upon public 
interests like government and education, profit-oriented managed systems like cost-
efficiency, streamlined manufacturing, and customer service are pushing teachers of 
writing to provide course instruction that offers maximum return on investment with 
minimal expenditures of time and effort. “As this market logic infuses pedagogical 
relationships and shapes classroom community, writing pedagogy’s commitment to 
process, revision, and collaboration becomes particularly vulnerable” (Rose 46). 
While recognizing the dangers this change in academic purpose represents to 
educational goals is both necessary and valiant, expecting the academy to reverse course 
or return to some imagined ideal of liberal education is highly improbable considering the 
nature of entrenched interests and the potential for increased commercialization of 
education in the near future. As composition scholars have worked to address these 
changes in the culture of the academy over the past thirty years, the evolution of 
pedagogical changes moved from Current-Traditional Rhetoric when a growing concern 
about perceived failures in literacy skills among students developed into the social turn 
(Berlin; Bizell; Faigley) that connected student literacy directly to issues of democracy 
(Bizzell).  
This further developed into pedagogies of composition that embraced political 
action as a mechanism for learning about writing, and composition practices as a 
mechanism for instigating political change (Crisco; Lazare; Trimbur). From this turn 
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grew a rich culture of composition pedagogy that embraced community literacy as a 
public act of writing and taking social action (Flowers; Harris; Long; Porter). Migrating 
the practice of composition from the classroom to the community through the promotion 
of social action, however, involved an examination of the power structures present within 
the academy and the development of pedagogies to overcome issues such as ‘banking 
models’ (Freire), ‘inventing the university’ (Bartholomae),  intimidating dialogic 
discourses of the academy (Elbow), and entrenched racist power structures (Ellsworth).  
This transformative period of writing pedagogy emerged in the 1980s and 1990s 
as the Writing Across Curriculum (WAC) initiative that sought to bridge the academic 
discourses necessary for student success with these new models of student-centered, 
social activist composition systems (Bazerman et al.; McLeod; Russell). Modeled on 
British cross curricular programs of the 1970s, WAC programs flourished in the 1990s, 
and today more than three-fourths of American universities either have some form of 
WAC initiative in place or plan to start them (Thaiss). While WAC has been effective for 
promoting the value of writing development across the disciplines, there are drawbacks to 
it as well. WAC tends to privilege academic discourse over unique socio-linguistic 
identities (Rusell) and focuses more on achieving cross discipline expectations of product 
than developing critically conscious citizens capable of examining their world (Kells, 
Villenueva). A more recent initiative started at the University of New Mexico that 
extends WAC programs from the curriculum to the broader communities, however, 
shows promise for addressing these problems (Kells).  
All of these transformations over the past 30 years have been informed and 
supported by scholars connecting the social turn and student-centered pedagogies to 
 Haley 15 
 
 
 
hermeneutic principles (Grondin, Kent, Crusius, Mailloux). Bringing hermeneutic 
theories into student-centered pedagogies helped the field better understand student 
motivations to write, the role of narrative in cultural and socio-linguistic development, 
and the connections between interpretation and composition practices (Phelps, Brauer). 
What work has been done connecting hermeneutics to composition, however, has mostly 
demonstrated the viability of hermeneutics for composition studies but otherwise fail to 
articulate a practical implementation (Brauer). That is the gap in the literature that this 
dissertation hopes to fill, providing both a theoretical underpinning of a hermeneutic 
pedagogy as well as a pragmatic application of rhetoric, what I term applied rhetorics, 
focused on the process of acquisition rather than the end product of that process.  
A hermeneutic pedagogy such as the one introduced here is not the proverbial 
‘magic bullet’ of composition studies, nor is it meant promote a sea-change in 
composition practices within the academy. Rather, its purpose is merely to present an 
idea, a new way of thinking about our existing composition practices informed by 
hermeneutic theory and focused on improving student outcomes both as writers within 
the modern academy and as critically conscious citizens of a changing democracy.     
Globalization and New Composition Pedagogies 
There is a common meme that increased access to global communication and 
globalization in general is homogenizing cultures around the globe. The argument 
suggests that as people from disparate cultural experiences gain access to increasingly 
common media systems and instant knowledge databases, their views, understanding, and 
expectations of the world will become more similar than separate. Indeed, Paul Collier, 
an economist at Oxford, has shown evidence of this homogenization in the growth of 
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consumerism and the global commoditization of natural resources (Collier). Robert 
Phillipson introduced us to the idea of Linguistic Imperialism in the early 90s, and we can 
certainly track the expansion and impact of English language on existing cultures 
collectively (Phillipson). While a holistic view of cultural change and homogenization is 
certainly valid, we are reminded in Manuel Castell’s work that this globalization and 
connectivity is simultaneously creating an ever-shifting personal/cultural landscape 
(Castells). Additionally, in the field of linguistic studies, Bruce Horner, John Trimbur, 
and ohers have extensively examined the effects of language homogenization and 
academic expectations of culture and academy on the native Englishes and native 
languages of students that often leads to class and cultural hierarchies (Horner, Lu, 
Royster, Trimbur). The end result is not a more cohesive, homogenized cultural 
collective of students; rather, the end result is an increasingly divergent set of cultural 
screens among our students that makes a common pedagogical approach to knowledge-
making decreasingly likely to succeed.    
So then, where do we begin? 
If the answers to the questions at hand keep leading us to the same ineffective 
conclusions, then it is always best to return to the questions we have traditionally asked 
ourselves as educators:  
1. How do we more effectively apply limited resources to overcome and/or 
bridge gaps in student learning and cultural differences in pursuit of 
common pedagogical goals?   
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2. What are the common denominators in student educational experiences 
that we can draw upon to overcome these cultural differences in our 
approach to normative, socially-based writing schemes?  
 
 For the graduate students and professors at the University of New Mexico who 
have found success in the Writing Across Communities program, the most effective 
answer to these questions has been to ask different questions:  
1. How do we take advantage of (rather than overcome) gaps in student 
learning and cultural differences to achieve common outcomes in 
critical thinking about philosophies of social justice, equality, and civic 
responsibility?  
 
2. What are the unique differences (rather than common denominators) in 
student educational experiences that we can draw upon to enhance and 
validate (rather than overcome) student phenomenologies in our 
approach to transcultural (rather than normative) modalities of student 
discourse and writing?  
 
If we begin to view the differences in our student experiences as the best possible 
tool for the development of critical thinking about our democracy and issues of social 
justice and civic responsibility while simultaneously validating those differences as 
fundamentally equal, then a concomitant intersection of cultural acceptance and values 
validation occurs and becomes an inspirational driver of social justice and educational 
equality rather than a set of obstacles to overcome.  
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The exigence for UNM’s Writing Across the Communities program is driven in 
part by the excellent research and work of Juan Guerra on transcultural repositioning  
(Guerra) and the idea that members of any given community, whether teacher, student, or 
other, are capable of intuitively moving back and forth among social classes, cultural 
forms and expectations, and even languages and dialects when the members of that 
community accept their own authority and capacity for self-regulating such movement. 
One change to existing educational structure supported by this work and discussed herein 
is how the role of teacher in this flexible space necessarily becomes that of facilitator and 
guide rather than that of authority or defender of Freire’s “banking-model” of education.  
In Donald Davidson’s ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge,’ he develops the metaphor 
of triangulation into the idea of a three-way conceptual interdependence between 
knowledge of oneself, knowledge of others, and knowledge of the world that in essence 
forms a common, ‘objective’ world from an interdependent set of concepts, no one of 
which is possible in the absence of the others (Davidson). If we accept this notion of 
triangulation as a method set of pragmatism, then we cannot expect an increasingly 
pluralistic student population to come together in support of either narrow academic goals 
or overarching world community goals of peace, prosperity, justice, and economic 
equality without an understanding of the hermeneutic processes that take place in the 
development of critically conscious democratic citizens.  
Imaginative experience has the power, through individual action, to shape our 
world as we live and understand it since we are affected both by a past that is not of our 
own making and by the perceived future that our individual phenomenological 
experiences suggest will happen. Therefore, it takes direct personal initiative to make 
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new history and actively affect our perceived realities while constantly redefining 
ourselves in the process, and that is what a hermeneutic pedagogy of composition is 
designed to provide.   
It is our task as composition teachers to embrace these individual 
phenomenological experiences among our students and help them, in turn, develop a new 
idea of democratic social engagement that is reliant upon them defining themselves and 
their roles in their communities based both on personal phenomenologies and a desire to 
understand the “otherness” of those with whom they interact. The outcomes we measure 
among these students becomes less about their ability to craft normative, argumentative 
essays to fit a specific academic structure, and more about their ability to understand and 
effectively communicate how their unique cultural experiences interact with, and are 
informed by, the experiences of others.  
The key to this understanding can be found in Paul Ricoeur’s work in 
hermeneutics and phenomenology, and specifically his arguments against Hegelian 
absolutism in favor of a phenomenology of the mind. Ricoeur argues in The Symbolism of 
Evil that the subject does not know itself implicitly but only as a product of the mind 
interpreting signs placed in the  memory and in the imagination by tradition, stories, 
literature, cultural experiences, etc. (The Symbolism of Evil). If this is the case, then the 
concept of individuality is always an interpreted entity in constant need of new stimulus 
for the purpose of further defining, or even consciously altering, that identity.  This 
concept supports both Hannah Arendt’s arguments for tradition and remembrances as 
guiding principles in educational philosophy (Between Past and Future) and John 
Dewey’s calls for an active learning system (Democracy and Education).  
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 One of our greatest hurdles to achieving this self-reflective space in these 
challenging times, is that the relationship between students, the American public at large, 
and the academy is strained. A number of factors account for this, including political and 
financial ones, but there is an increasing feeling among students and the broader 
community that American universities are no longer living up to their promise as 
institutions that develop critically conscious, innovative thinkers who drive our national 
economic and social agenda. In addition, the academic freedoms offered to researchers 
and scientists by the academy are increasingly under attack by politicians and college 
administrations while the financial stagnation of the American middle class since the late 
1970s has moved the institution increasingly out of reach for many.  
 This is exacerbated by ongoing pressure from the business community to produce 
only technically skilled workers while undermining the Academy’s role in producing 
liberally educated thinkers for the good of society. Recent attempts in Texas, for 
example, to reconfigure the University system in a way that treats all students as 
“customers,” and sets professor benefits and pay in relation to how much “profit” they 
generate for the university system would have effectively eliminated the academy’s role 
as a place for liberal education and the pursuit of new knowledge (Dean).  
At the same time, as Brian Huot  identifies in (Re)Articulating Writing 
Assessment, writing teachers are expected to follow their departments’ pedagogical 
systems and produce assessment-ready student-generated results tied to outcomes that are 
institution – rather than student – focused for the purpose of “maintain[ing] an efficient 
and accountable educational bureaucracy” (Huot 1). Both constituencies have different 
needs that individual teachers struggle to meet. Students don’t care about the assessment 
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problems of a department or institution that must constantly fight for scarce funding and 
needs those assessments to satisfy administrators and politicians. Many students are, 
logically, self-concerned by nature; focused on passing tests, completing assignments, 
and satisfying the expectations of individual teachers in hopes of getting good grades and 
advancing through the system. But, as we’ve discussed, students struggle to overcome 
their own cultural screens and attempt to embrace a linguistic style that privileges 
academic and cultural expectations of “proper” language at the expense of their own in 
hopes of achieving these goals. When some students fail at these tasks, which are too 
often placed entirely upon them with little help or understanding from the institution, they 
are left behind and sometimes forced out of the system altogether, and the statistics 
clearly support this (Marklein). 
 Institutions, as well as the professors and graduate students tasked with teaching 
writing, universally desire and work to help as many students as possible find success in 
the academy, but they are ultimately held accountable not by those students, but by the 
governing bodies of various sorts that dictate pedagogy, budgets, staff sizes, resources, 
and schedules.  Virtually all existing measurements of institutional success are 
instruments designed either by those institutions, or by the governing bodies of those 
institutions, or both. The dirty secret of our current educational system, as Bob Broad 
describes in What We Really Value, is that since these instruments are designed by groups 
with different cultural screens and expectations than the students have themselves, they 
rarely measure anything of value to the actual students in the academy (Broad). They 
only measure items of value to the people designing the assessments.  
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 This dissertation attempts to address this dichotomy by taking a hard look at how 
we understand both our students and the role the academy  plays in their lives by helping 
them engage in functional democratic communities in which they will live and work. But 
rather than generate yet another pedagogical “system” for writing programs to either 
adopt or ignore, this work builds on existing structures already in place for many 
programs and explains how students writing across communities, as described by 
Michelle Hall Kells and supported by the work of Juan Guerra, Victor Villenueva, and 
many others, learn to embrace the discursive processes necessary for what Stanley Fish 
calls “Critical Self-Consciousness” (Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What 
We're Doing?).  
This dissertation also explores both the historical precedent as well as the future 
necessity that writing programs become the place where new university students learn to 
engage in modern democracy as described nearly a century ago by John Dewey in 
Education and Democracy: “Democracy is more than a form of government; it is 
primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” 
(Democracy and Education).  
It is in this intersection of education and democracy that the academy is most 
relevant to society outside the ivory towers. The academy, after all, was born primarily to 
protect and preserve the democracy of Greece by educating young men to be good 
citizens of the state and to teach them how the proper applications of reason and rhetoric 
are best suited for this purpose. When the new American democratic republic was 
founded, the framers reaffirmed this intersection as a primary role of higher education. 
Benjamin Rush, one of the founding fathers and signers of the Declaration of 
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Independence saw higher education as the best possible vehicle for preserving the ideals 
of the new American Democratic Republic. In “Thoughts Upon the Mode of Education 
Proper in a Republic,” Rush argued that it would be a mistake to train new citizens in 
such a way that they would simply reinforce existing institutions. Rather, Rush 
envisioned democracy as a progressive, constantly modifiable institution in which 
students are “taught that there can be no durable liberty in a republic and that 
government, like all other sciences, is of a progressive nature” (Rush 58). He also 
envisioned a hermeneutic, student-centered approach to education in which curricula 
would establish a direct link between higher education and the practical needs of their 
everyday lives. Under this philosophy, students would become “Republican Machines,” 
that would be grounded in democratic principles and, at the same time, be capable of 
modifying the instruments of society necessary for progress toward greater freedom. 
Likewise, Thomas Jefferson, who founded the first public university in the United States, 
saw higher education as the best vehicle, 
to form the statesmen, legislators and judges, on whom public prosperity 
and individual happiness are so much to depend; [and] to expound the 
principles and structure of government, the laws which regulate the 
intercourse of nations, those formed municipally for our own 
government, and a sound spirit of legislation, which, banishing all 
arbitrary and unnecessary restraint on individual action, shall leave us 
free to do whatever does not violate the equal rights of another (Jefferson 
129). 
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Clearly, there is an intersection of education and civic responsibility that has been 
the foundational motive of academics since the first schools were opened by Isocrates 
and Plato. The question now, as it has been since the days of Plato, is how to educate 
citizens of a Democratic society to become informed, engaged critics of their 
environments for the purpose of maintaining a healthy self governance. From the earliest 
schools through the dark ages, this task was accomplished through the study of rhetoric 
as the primary discipline of higher education. Following the Enlightenment, universities 
began subdividing their studies between physical sciences and philosophy, but students 
were still expected to study the classics in Greek and Latin and develop their skills in 
rhetoric.  
Not until after the Morrill Land Grant acts of 1862 and 1890 did higher education 
begin to turn away from focusing on classical rhetoric and the development of citizen 
leaders and begin focusing more directly on the development of citizens capable of 
supporting the rising industrial revolution. Our new public colleges and universities 
began focusing almost exclusively on the development of skilled professionals while 
reducing the importance of engaged citizenship, rhetoric, and critical thinking based in 
Aristotelian logic.  
Hannah Arendt, John Dewey, Howard Zinn, and other liberal education scholars 
of the past century, have pointed out this loss of society-oriented education in favor of 
worker specialization: 
Education, as distinguished from learning, must have a predictable end… 
The professional training in universities or technical schools, though it 
always has something to do with education, is nevertheless in itself a kind 
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of specialization. It no longer aims to introduce the young person to the 
world as a whole, but rather to a particular, limited segment of it (Between 
Past and Future 196). 
  
Thus, it becomes clear that critical consciousness among citizens and civic engagement 
share a mutually codependent relationship. It can be effectively argued that from 
Antiquity to modern society, education has and should play a pivotal role in the 
development of an engaged citizenry. Further, it can be established historically through 
the rise of public higher education and the associated development of composition 
pedagogies that American public higher-education systems have struggled to accomplish 
this task.   
The Hermeneutic Approach  
One of the goals of this dissertation is to bring a broader understanding of 
hermeneutics to writing instructors and other educators because of its potential as an 
educational process. But that is a relatively minor goal in respect to the purpose of this 
work overall, and that is to present a method of teaching composition grounded in the 
hermeneutic theories of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricouer, and focused on the development of 
socially engaged, self-reflective, critically conscious citizens of a democracy. These three 
theorists, in particular, are useful for this purpose because they all were concerned with 
the hermeneutic development of the self, and the preservation of democracy through 
active discourse.  
Hermeneutics, or the philosophy of interpretation as it might be described in 
simple terms, is an area of study that focuses on how a message or idea is interpreted by 
the audience rather than the rhetorical focus on how it is delivered. Though Ricouer is the 
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only one of these three who actively placed himself within the hermeneutic tradition, all 
three were concerned with the nature of human understanding and phenomenologies of 
the world. Dewey’s pragmatism, for example, has often been compared directly to 
philosophical hermeneutics in its embrace of the hermeneutic circle, in its recognition of 
aesthetic experience, and in its rejection of a separation between theory and practice 
(Bernstein, Jeannot, Vessey).  Arendt’s tradition in hermeneutics can be traced directly to 
her work, her studies, and her relationships with Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. She 
has been frequently categorized as a phenomenologist, (Novak, Vasterling) and her work 
examining Totalitarianism and the banality of evil is uniquely hermeneutic in its 
exploration of human motivation and judgment.  
For this dissertation, the important factors of  how hermeneutics function in the 
development of critically engaged students will explore three fundamental elements of a 
hermeneutic approach to composition pedagogies. First, hermeneutics helps us see how 
education itself, not just writing, is a recursive process. Students have as much to teach us 
as we do them. For example, the rapid escalation of technology is almost always adopted 
by our students first, and their immediate access to knowledge today is unrivaled in the 
history of the world, and this is only the beginning. Our students have a capacity for 
coping in and comprehending the world in a way that we as their teachers are clearly 
struggling to understand, and our students are often the most knowledgeable sources on 
new technologies. Yet, in the face of this reality, we have a tendency as educators to 
revert almost reflexively back to our outdated, hierarchical, knowledge-ownership 
models of unidirectional pedagogies. Our students have as much to teach us as educators 
as we have to teach them, and an effective hermeneutic approach involves a constant 
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learning process on the part of the educator as much as the student. Real, lasting, and 
renewable education is recursive in nature, not linear. 
Second, the role of a good educator is closer to that of peer than that of a superior. 
Though Hannah Arendt adeptly demonstrates why maintaining and emphasizing 
authority in primary and secondary educational settings is necessary, in academic writing 
classrooms we are engaging new adults, many of whom have no intuitive understanding 
of their own authority or responsibilities in their various communities. We are dealing 
with a population accustomed to the role of teacher as authority, even though in a 
university setting, these students have entered voluntarily as citizens of full and equal 
rights to their teachers and school administrators.  
Our democracy grants voting rights to every citizen over the age of 18. That 
means each student in our classrooms, from the standpoint of our democratic values, is 
fully equal to each teacher, and we must begin to acknowledge and respect them as such. 
What we have are knowledge, skills, and experiences that our new adult students lack and 
have come to the academy in search of, yet we are too willing to adopt an authoritarian 
role freely offered by a student body already acculturated to such a role in a setting where 
that very proposition becomes an impediment to learning. Donaldo Macedo’s work, in 
conjunction with Freire, highlights the struggles students in this situation face when they 
are confronted with an academic community that assumes authority where little actually 
exists and that fragments knowledge, denies contextual understanding, and undermines 
student ability to make connections between what the school is offering and their actual 
lived worlds (Freire and Macedo). This is also a crucial development for linguistic 
validation of student languages in comparison to the adopted language of the academy. 
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Helping students recognize how the language of the academy functions as standard 
without undermining or discrediting the value and validity of their own personal and 
shared languages is a step in equalizing the classification pressures of language 
differences as examined by George Lakoff, Bruce Horner, and others. A hermeneutic 
approach to working with these new adults, focuses on developing educators as 
facilitators rather than owners of knowledge. It creates a space where students can 
practice, explore, inquire, and engage in discussions with their peers about their 
knowledge and skills along with a critically engaged teacher who actively directs that 
space.  
Third, and crucial to the value of hermeneutics as an educational philosophy, is its 
role in generating inspiration among student learners. When we imagine our students 
engaging enthusiastically in a democratic community as effective writers establishing 
their own authority and voice, the level to which we will be successful is entirely 
contingent upon our understanding of what motivates and inspires that audience. That 
cannot be achieved in an authoritarian setting where knowledge and understanding are 
controlled by the teacher and presented as treasured secrets of the academy for which the 
students should be grateful. Rather, teachers have a responsibility to their students to 
learn about and understand the world as they perceive it too, and that will continue to 
evolve faster with each successive semester of the new century.         
 While a hermeneutic approach to education offers a renewed, exciting, and 
different understanding of our roles and responsibilities as teachers helping composition 
students emerge in their new identities, as a philosophy, hermeneutics is generally poorly 
understood by even our most advanced educational thinkers, and most researchers and 
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administrators shy away from the concept due to its dense nature and the difficulty of 
applying an otherwise abstract concept to real-world pedagogies. The challenges of 
offering this somewhat opaque theory as a possible solution to an underlying weakness in 
our educational system are immense, primarily due to the intractability of existing 
structures to change of any kind, especially a change based on a concept that few people 
understand anyway.  
 What is most important for readers to embrace, however, is that a comprehensive 
understanding of hermeneutic philosophy is not required in any way to understand the 
relatively simple role it plays in addressing the cultural screens, cognition gaps, and 
classroom dissonance currently at play between students and teachers in the academy. 
New teaching strategies and existing pedagogies that embrace simple hermeneutic 
concepts offer a way forward for the academy that is both renewably innovative, and in 
my experiences developing and teaching these methods in the composition classroom, 
highly effective. The real advantage of this concept in the modern academy is that it takes 
nothing away from the work we are all already doing in teaching discourse methods and 
argumentation, but rather enhances it in a way that motivates us to re-imagine our roles as 
educators, both as educators in the classroom, and as educators of educators.  
 Though it requires the relatively difficult process of altering our expectations of 
knowledge-making systems as well as what we assess in student outcomes, it allows us to 
embrace and expand fundamental principles about higher education that include social 
justice, personal and civic responsibility, and critical discourse systems that the academy 
must embrace going forward if it is to remain relevant for our society and our democracy.  
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 Incorporating a hermeneutic pedagogy in the composition classroom also carries 
with it the danger that such a theory might be seen as yet another post-structuralist 
pedagogy that is impossible to actually implement, or a modified process system that 
overvalues individual students’ native practices, experiences, and beliefs at the expense 
of institutional standards and critical self-examination. While some Writing Program 
Administrators (WPAs) have, to varying degrees, adopted postmodern practices that 
focus on student experiences and narratives while downplaying the value of formal 
structure, mechanics, and institutional perspectives, we do our students no service by 
ignoring or working against established institutional biases and expectations in their 
development as writers.  
 Those biases and expectations still exist outside the confines of the writing 
classroom, and helping students validate their individual experiences at the expense of 
preparing them for academic standards in higher-level classes is not a practical solution 
either. We may pride ourselves on acknowledging and promoting agency without 
imposing our ideologies, but a failure to prepare students for understanding, engaging, 
and either embracing or challenging our existing ideologies is a failure of education as 
well. That’s why the strategies I propose in a hermeneutic pedagogy are designed to 
achieve both student agency and the discourse skills necessary for success in the 
academy. 
A hermeneutic pedagogy helps students learn to examine and interpret the world 
by interacting with it on topics of direct interest to their immediate and future social well-
being; topics that we as prior generations with our own unique cultural screens cannot 
begin to understand or predict, and we shouldn’t be trying. Thus, engaging cultural 
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differences in a stable, discourse-centered setting that encourages student involvement 
and social engagement will better prepare students for success in an increasing global 
society on their terms rather than ours, and we can construct a framework of learning that 
is both highly stable and effective as well as evolutionarily mutable to meet the needs of 
each new generation of students. The following chapters will provide both a hermeneutic 
basis in the theories of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur for a new consideration of 
composition pedagogy as well as a practical outline and essential elements necessary for 
such a pedagogy. I will examine the student phenomenologies as learner, citizen, and 
writer, and then use the key findings from those studies to argue for a hermeneutic 
method of teaching composition to first-year writing students in the academy. 
Chapter 2: John Dewey – Hermeneutics and the Student as the Learning Self 
This chapter will explore John Dewey’s educational philosophies and particularly 
the manner in which individuals discover a sense of themselves and understand their 
roles as members of society. Beginning with the acquisition of the mind and continuing 
with the role education plays in that acquisition, this chapter introduces arguments related 
to critical consciousness and the ability to reflect upon one’s own, as well as the other’s, 
motivations and beliefs. It examines the role society plays in this process and how 
engagement in the social sphere affects its development as well as what it means for 
democracy as a whole. Self-reflection and the capacity for critical self-examination are 
key elements in Dewey’s hermeneutics, and how our understanding of the self affects 
civic engagement, the shaping of a shared culture, and the development of democratic 
institution that arise from that will also be explored.   
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Chapter 3: Hannah Arendt – Hermeneutics and the Student as the Political Self 
This chapter brings Hannah Arendt into the conversation and examines human 
motivations for political engagement and the roles of narrative and tradition in shaping 
our political selves. It will examine the cultural construct of freedom as a democratic 
value and discuss its role in guiding civic action. I will also present Arendt’s arguments 
about education and its role in the development of critically conscious citizens capable of 
civic engagement. This includes an exploration of the distinctions between human labor, 
work, and action and how Arendt’s concept of the vita activa functions in the 
preservation of democracy. I will then link Arendt’s hermeneutic arguments to the 
student in the classroom and suggest how the public sphere of the composition classroom 
can capture her ideas and use them effectively in the development of critically conscious 
citizens. 
Chapter 4: Paul Ricoeur – Hermeneutics and the Student as the Narrative Self  
This chapter will bring into the conversation Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and 
identity creation and explore how these created identities can develop into self-reflective, 
critically aware citizens capable of expressing their voices through writing. I will make 
the connection between the phenomenological experiences of the physical world and the 
development of the self as both idem and ipse identities. I will also examine in detail the 
connections between narrative, identity construction, and action that help form the basis 
of a hermeneutic pedagogy. These connections are affected by our concept of time and 
the influence or our culture, which I will explore as well. Finally, the process of 
interpretation in the act of narrative formation and reflexivity in identity development 
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will help connect Ricoeur’s theories to the process of action by individuals in support of 
critical discourse and active democratic engagement. 
Chapter 5: A Hermeneutic Pedagogy of Writing Instruction 
This chapter synthesizes the arguments of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur and 
argues for a functional, applied pedagogy of hermeneutic composition. It provides a brief 
history of composition pedagogy and briefly discusses the few composition scholars who 
have introduced hermeneutic theory to the field during that time. It discusses the value of 
critical interpretation of the narrative structure in the development of personal identity 
and argues for a peer-oriented teacher-student relationship in hermeneutically focused 
classrooms. It also presents the four essential elements of a hermeneutic composition 
pedagogy along with specific strategies for their implementation, including examples of 
my own classroom practices. 
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Chapter 2:  John Dewey 
Hermeneutics and the Student as the Learning Self 
This chapter introduces John Dewey’s philosophy of education that examines how 
people acquire both a sense of the self as an individual and a sense of the self as part of 
society. I will examine how Dewey’s pragmatism connects the acquisition of the mind to 
motivation for civic action, a concept that links Dewey directly to Hannah Arendt and 
grounds his work firmly in hermeneutic philosophy.  But where Arendt focuses on the 
“why” of the political animal that is human nature, Dewey provides us with the “how” of 
the political animal that exists in society. Through this process, I will explain how 
Dewey’s contributions to philosophy extend beyond his arguments about liberal 
education to connect this vital social function to the health and advancement of 
democracy itself. I will also examine how critical thinking, as a concept, is uniquely 
hermeneutic and thus “unteachable,” yet can still be learned by composition students 
focusing on the processes of learning rather than the products of learning. This will 
support key arguments of my dissertation by demonstrating how and why the 
development of critical thought, engaged citizenship, and consensus-focused discourse 
are best accomplished through direct social engagement in a peer-oriented educational 
setting. My units of analysis for this chapter are Democracy and Education, Leibniz’s 
New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, and The Later Works of John Dewey.  
 John Dewey’s contributions to educational philosophy and pedagogy in the 20th 
Century are unparalleled, and he has been studied, praised, and even condemned by 
scholars, politicians, and religious leaders for more than a century. At his 90th birthday 
celebration in New York in 1949, Dewey received telegrams and messages from 
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President Truman, Prime Minister Attlee of Britain, and Pandit Nehru, the first prime 
minister of an independent India, as well as from hundreds of American universities and 
educational scholars around the world (Hardin). His work and ideas have been studied 
extensively, and his direct impact on modern education is perhaps unsurpassed by 
virtually any other philosopher in history save Plato. It is certainly a credible argument to 
make that John Dewey is the most influential philosopher of Western education in 
American history.  
 Today, however, traditional liberal education as it was envisioned and 
championed by Dewey is under attack. From the No Child Left Behind federal mandate 
that emphasizes testing over critical discourse to the charter school movement where 
corporations are taking educational responsibility away from local communities, the role 
of public education as a training ground for civic engagement is in danger. As Nancy 
Welch highlights in her work The Living Room, our students today are faced with a 
public sphere that is increasingly privatized, which constrains public visibility and public 
voice. As scholars faced with the first generations of students trained to pass state-
mandated and uniform tests rather than educated in the liberal tradition to meet local and 
regional community needs, our work to instill Dewey’s philosophies of critical thought, 
engaged citizenship, and respect for research and scientific inquiry is all the more 
challenging and desperately needed.  
That’s why re-engaging Dewey in this dissertation is important for establishing 
two things. First, while the clarion call among composition scholars like Lillian Birdwell-
Bowles, Keith Gilyard, Lester Faigley, and Kathleen Yancey in the past twenty years has 
been for a re-focusing of writing toward civic engagement and democracy as Dewey 
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originally argued, much of that work has focused on the exigence and the product of that 
endeavor. But Dewey also provides a hermeneutic understanding about the necessary 
motivations of the students to engage in discourse in the first place, and that’s a crucial 
element in the ongoing development of civic literacy in writing program. In support of 
this movement, scholars like Victor Villenueva, Michelle Hall Kells, Juan Guerra, and 
Jacqueline Jones Royster have identified and clarified cross-boundary discourse barriers, 
and all have worked to validate individual and minority voices in our discourse 
communities in support of increased engagement in composition classrooms and greater 
pluralization of alternative voices in the public sphere. This dissertation expands their 
scholarship by including the role Dewey’s hermeneutic philosophy plays in the 
acquisition of the mind, something that will help writing teachers understand the process 
their students use to imagine and create those alternative voices in the first place. 
Second, while Dewey has been aggressively engaged over the past 30 years by 
composition scholars like Linda Flowers, Richard Young, David Russell, Patricia Bizzell, 
Stephen Fishman, and a host of others, their research is most often focused on Dewey’s 
pragmatism and its relevance to the “social turn” in composition pedagogy. Beyond 
Dewey’s calls for educational reform in support of democratic engagement, what he 
offers for understanding how individuals perceive concepts like freedom, justice, 
equality, and liberty can best be understood through his hermeneutic philosophy of self-
reflection and the development of critical thought. Critical thinking, according to 
Dewey’s argument, is only possible when critical examination of one’s own beliefs, 
biases, and arguments occurs through active engagement with them. Dewey provides an 
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understanding of the motivation to action, established through critical thought, that is 
vital in a successful hermeneutic classroom. 
Acquisition of the Mind 
“Uncertainty,” according to Dewey, “is primarily a practical matter” (The Later 
Works of John Dewey, Vol. 7 178). This is how Dewey introduces his essay on “The 
Supremacy of Method” in which he lays out the fundamental argument that drives his 
overall philosophy of education, that theory and practice should be congruous rather than 
dichotomous. Dewey was critical of the philosophical tradition in which theory was 
primarily reserved for “mental gymnastics” that sought to identify absolute truths in 
realms of the pure being, what he described as “philosophy’s search for the immutable,” 
and was dissociated from the practical needs of everyday human beings. This separation 
grew, according to Dewey, from the uncertainty of life common in ancient, primal 
cultures that sought knowledge of the ultimate reality in which, similar to Arendt’s 
argument, mankind could achieve a kind of immortality separate from the natural cycles 
of life and death. This separation of theory and practice hampered human development, 
and  Dewey was concerned primarily with bridging these practices for the purpose of 
advancing human development and solving real-world problems through his philosophy 
of pragmatism: 
The actual process of knowing, namely operations of controlled 
observation, inference, reasoning, and testing, the only process with 
intellectual import, is dismissed as irrelevant to the theory of knowing. 
The methods of knowing practiced in daily life and science are excluded 
from consideration in the philosophical theory of knowing. Hence the 
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construction of the latter become more and more elaborately artificial 
because there is no definite check upon them. It would be easy to quote 
from epistemological writers statements to the effect that these processes 
(which supply the only empirically verifiable facts of knowing) are  
merely inductive in character, or even that they are of purely 
psychological significance. It would be difficult to find a more complete 
inversion of the facts than in the latter statement, since presentation 
constitutes in fact the psychological affair. A confusion of logic with 
psychology has bred hybrid epistemology, with the amazing result that the 
technique of effective inquiry is rendered irrelevant to the theory of 
knowing (Dewey, On Experience, Nature, and Freedom 56). 
Rather than knowledge itself, it is the process of knowing things that develops our 
intellect, and that process is driven by inquiry. Dewey believed the process of inquiry 
developed in humans as a response to the life and death consequences of uncertainty 
about the natural world. There is no doubt that inquisition is a natural habit of humans, 
according to Dewey, for inquiries “enter into every area of life and into every aspect of 
every area.  In everyday living, men examine; they turn things over intellectually; they 
infer and judge as ‘naturally’ as they reap and sow, produce and exchange commodities” 
(Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 102). We inquire in an attempt to mitigate doubt and 
increase the effectiveness of our actions. Dewey called this explorative action, an attempt 
to analyze circumstances and improve chances that the outcome will be positive. This 
also gives action a mental or intellectual quality (The Later Works of John Dewey, Vol. 7 
178). Thus, intelligence is born from action mitigated by doubt, and it is directed by the 
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examination of conditions to reduce this doubt and increase the likelihood that outcomes 
of actions will match expectations.  
Education and the Acquisition of the Mind 
How we acquire the mind through this process of inquiry, or how we acquire that 
concept of the self and an awareness of the world in which the self thinks, learns, and acts 
is what concerned Dewey relative to the role education plays in the development of free-
thinking and free-acting citizens: “With the growth of civilization…mere physical 
growing up, mere mastery of the bare necessities of subsistence will not suffice to 
reproduce the life of the group. Deliberate effort and the taking of thoughtful pains are 
required. Beings that are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and 
habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively interested. 
Education and education alone, spans that gap” (Democracy and Education 7). 
 If the mind is something that is acquired through inquiry by all human beings, 
then the process of inquiry by all people shares certain characteristics, and those 
characteristics can be understood through our conscious practice of experimentation, 
which is a clear province of education. For Dewey, to “inquire” is to be aware of the 
physical world and the problems it presents both physically and philosophically, and to 
inquire experimentally, deliberately, and methodically is to conduct science. Hegel’s 
influence on Dewey is apparent in his position that intellectual inquiry, the process of 
thought and reflection, is the primary system of developing a sense of both the “self” and 
the “other,” a concept he shares with Ricoeur. This acquisition of “otherness” and the 
connection between the self and the other as either same or separate cultural entities 
occurs primarily through observation, another element of scientific inquiry. The point is 
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that Dewey saw philosophical development and the process of scientific inquiry as two 
sides of the same coin whose purpose is to solve problems. His criticism of philosophical 
tradition was its failure to focus on real-world problems.  
 Our formation of common groups; our organization into towns, cities, and 
nations; our very society itself is constructed in part as a result of our ongoing desire to 
reduce uncertainty in our lives relative to basic survival and economic and social 
development. Despite the reality that this organization creates the potential for new 
problems to develop such as crime, sanitation needs, and increased use of natural 
resources, it also provides better access to technological advancements, medical care, 
social support, education, and overall better living conditions than a completely rural 
population possesses. It also supports the Deweyan notion that problem-solving is a 
replicative, cyclical, and progressive practice when the members of that society are 
critically engaged in the process through experimentation, and the best space for that to 
be taught to, and understood by, new citizens of that society occurs in community-
oriented educational systems.    
 Additionally, if the mind is something that is acquired through inquiry that can be 
defined as experimentation and observation in an attempt to reduce uncertainty, then the 
education students receive will naturally be restricted by the conditions and experiences 
that result from the cultural interactions in the societies from which they are drawn and 
into which they are placed that have been formed, as argued above, for the purpose of 
reducing these uncertainties. Society, therefore, is both the all-encompassing concept the 
includes all of these subgroups, as well as the individual experiences among these 
societal subgroups from which students are drawn. As Dewey describes it, “a modern 
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society is many societies more or less loosely connected” (Democracy and Education 
20). It is simultaneously an extrinsic concept and an intrinsic experience, and the degree 
to which these two things reflect one another is the epitome of educational purpose in the 
acquisition of the mind.  
Like many other elements of Dewey’s philosophy, education is recursive: “There 
are no senders and receivers of information according to Dewey, it is always a two way 
street” (Biesta 3). This recursion idea in education has been controversial for decades. 
The traditional education model in which lecturers presented information and judged 
student performance based on the ability of those students to regurgitate with accuracy 
the information they have received, what Paolo Friere has termed, “The Banking Model” 
of education, is ineffective for a variety of reasons, including multi-cultural integration 
into common classrooms and rapid technological advancements.  
As we can observe in classrooms today, for example, the rapid escalation of 
technology is almost always first adopted by our students who have a growing capacity 
for coping in and comprehending a new world their teachers are clearly still struggling to 
understand. In the face of this reality, we have a tendency as educators to rely on our 
outdated, hierarchical, knowledge-ownership models of unidirectional pedagogies, while 
resisting the idea that students in our classrooms bring educational value of their own to 
the process by the sheer nature of their advanced engagement with technology. Any 
argument that students have nothing to teach their instructors and/or political decision 
makers is reductive at best, and clearly fails the principle of Cartesian doubt. Students 
may or may not have as much to teach educators in the modern classroom as educators 
have to teach them, but an effective hermeneutic approach of recursive, engaged 
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education involves a constant learning process on the part of the educator as well as the 
student. Indeed, it may be the only process in which real education actually occurs. 
This learning community in which the students, as well as the teacher, engage in 
inquiry and critical examination of information and ideas is a cooperative activity that is 
regulated by the social contract assumptions and interpersonal relationships in place. Lee-
Ann Kastman Breuch summarizes this idea by incorporating Thomas Kent, Stanley Fish, 
and Joseph Petruglia, among others into her claim that there are “two main principles that 
post-process theory can offer pedagogy: the rejection of mastery and the engagement in 
dialogue rather than monologue with students” (Breuch 118). This is not to argue for a 
lack of structure in the composition classroom, or what Keith Gilyard calls “a classroom 
full of perceived instability” (Gilyard 379). On the contrary, the teacher’s role is to 
provide the structure and lead the conversation. What’s important is that it be a 
conversation among peers rather than a lecture delivered by a Master to his students. 
The acquisition of the mind, or the capacity for critical thought to reflect upon 
one’s own, as well as the other’s, motivations and beliefs, is not innate, it is acquired 
through social interaction and transactional experience, which is supported by Dewey’s 
subjectivism and the argument that reality acts and therefore is. People, as students both 
in the formal classroom and the informal classroom of society, evolve through their 
interactions with one another associated with the process of inquiry by “securing 
direction and development in the immature through their participation in the life of the 
group to which they belong” (Democracy and Education 64).  
The mind, in Dewey’s approach, is not regarded as an original being that comes 
into existence from the mere fact of life. A person completely devoid of societal 
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influence, if such a person could exist, would possess no concept of freedom, for 
example, because there would be no situation in his or her life that suggests its necessity. 
Thus, transactional experience is the process by which people engage in activity with one 
another that requires mental reflection. Social interaction, whether between students or 
between students and their instructor, is vital for humans to experience liberation and 
operate at their full capacity to develop social intelligence and promote the progress of 
society toward the resolution of problems through inquiry: “Individuals can find the 
security and protection that are prerequisites for freedom only in association with others” 
(Freedom and Culture 166).   
 Dewey’s main focus in his massive portfolio of writing was education, and 
virtually all criticism and analysis of his work relate to his influence over the last century 
on that institution. But it is important to understand that while Dewey was an educator 
himself who was deeply concerned with educational theory and pedagogy, what 
motivated him throughout his work was something deeper and more profound –  the idea 
and protection of democracy and the individual freedom it serves in an increasingly 
complex society.  
 Living and working from the late 19th century through the mid 20th century, he 
witnessed firsthand the rise of an industrialized society and the increasing influence of 
the merchant class on American political institutions, and he was aware of the pressures 
on educational systems to abandon traditional liberal education in favor of basic skills 
training to support those institutions. He witnessed the rise of the railroad, telephone, 
automobile, highway transportation, and television and lived through two world wars in 
which totalitarianism and fascism rose, seized power through violence, and were 
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ultimately defeated. Dewey had the vision to understand how much influence, both 
positive and negative, an increasingly connected society had on individual freedoms, and 
he saw education as the primary defender of human freedom and spent his life working to 
ensure that institution would remain the fundamental system for building democratic 
citizenship in America and around the world.  
Acquisition of the Mind and Democracy 
Dewey maintained that democracy is much more than a political system; it is also 
a personal way of life, a mode of associated living, and a moral ideal.  If a community of 
people seeks to secure individual freedoms in an increasingly large and complex society 
that in turn, recursively, supports and defends those freedoms, then acquisition of the 
mind must involve an acquisition of common values and meanings through open 
discourse and reflective thought constructed by our experiences and supported by our 
educational system: “The conduct of individuals together, in and with an environment, 
must be adjusted and coordinated… If a community of endeavor is to be established, 
individuals must know how objects are to function in social action” (Gouinlock 88). This 
is not to say, however, that values and meanings themselves are common, nor that they 
should be taught as static concept. On the contrary, the potential for static values and 
meanings to serve as tools for totalitarian emergence is well documented throughout 
history. What Dewey is arguing in his theory of mind acquisition is that individuals 
within a group or society must know how values and meanings function relative to social 
engagement and interaction because “shareable meanings are derivative of social action” 
(Gouinlock 88). The experience of social action, in other words, is the grounding 
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mechanism for establishing common awareness and agreement on common ideas within 
and between social groups.  
This is why hermeneutic awareness of cultural screens and student expectations 
are important for teachers in a writing classroom so that an exploration of these values 
and meanings towards an acquisition of mind can be achieved with any level of 
effectiveness. Value propositions, meaning-making, and inquiry are all uniquely 
hermeneutic processes that require social interaction to develop and mature, and only 
through engaged discourse in an environment established for its purpose to train citizens 
to conduct such discourse in self-reflective ways can democracy flourish. Acquisition of 
the mind is a social exercise, and the common principles of a free society can only be 
acquired in a common social environment where the tools for critical inquiry and 
communication are developed for the purpose of achieving consensus among those 
engaged. It is critical to note, however, that consensus is not the same thing as 
concession.  
Confusing consensus with concession is a fallacious malapropism often presented 
by Objectivists and others who deride the concept of a social entity separate from 
individual identity. Despite some conservative arguments that public education 
undermines individualism, an effective educational pedagogy for teaching engaged, 
critical discourse is reliant more upon individual differences and disagreement than it is 
on ubiquity of ideas or values. Disagreement and debate are vital to the long-term 
strength of an effective democracy, but only so long as all sides can at least agree that the 
purpose of debate is to achieve consensus based on research and logic rather than to 
“win” an argument or defeat of the “other.” Indeed, an individual can only enjoy one’s 
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“freedom” and individuality when there is a diverse group among which one can 
associate freely and draw comparisons between the self and the other without fear of 
reprisal or rejection from the group. “Liberty is the secure release and fulfillment of 
personal potentialities which take place only in rich, manifold association with others: the 
power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its 
own way the fruits of association” (The Public and Its Problems 154).  
Counter to the false dichotomy of the pro-individualist, anti-socialist meme that 
dominates both political and educational philosophy in modern America. An individual 
enjoys a diversity of values and a quality of individual experiences only because of the 
diversity of ideas and population present in the various groups and social engagements 
available in a pluralistic society. While it is accurate that tendencies toward confirmation 
bias and group identification exist in part due to our underlying drive to reduce 
uncertainty, it is not true that these tendencies naturally threaten individual personality, 
expression, or creativity. Our understanding of hermeneutics and phenomenology 
described previously demonstrate this point effectively. The loss of individual expression 
and dissent occur, instead, when authoritarianism promotes the false ideology that “the 
other” is a threat to personal freedom specifically because the other is different than the 
self and that conformity of ideas and positions are in some way stabilizing when they are 
instead undermining. Social groups and society in general provides an opportunity for 
those engaged to develop new ideas and attitudes in response to those presented, 
sometimes in agreement and sometimes in disagreement, but always as a response.  
When the opportunity for civic discourse is present, and when those trained in 
effective discourse are engaged in building consensus toward action, then individuals can 
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come to consider themselves part of the society with a valued voice, and consequently 
comes to consider the other as part of the same group, associated in a joint enterprise 
with a common goal. “This is not an ideal of conformity. It is an ideal of democratic 
equality; and it manifests itself in the individual not only in his recognition of the 
interests of others as having the same status as his own, but also in his willing and 
habitual regard for these interests” (Gouinlock 114). Through this process of engagement 
with the other, an individual mind is acquired that recognizes equality as valuable and 
necessary for all voices to be heard and for one’s own voice to carry equal weight as 
another’s even when those voices disagree. Equal to me does not mean “the same as me.”  
The solution to disagreement in a society of equal, disparate individuals is 
building consensus toward action without abdicating individualism, and this is one of the 
principle values of democracy. Consensus is not concession of ideas or values. Since we 
know action is mitigated by doubt, and our goal is to reduce uncertainty for the purpose 
of successful action, then we come to understand that consensus is merely a social 
contract for action. But for that contract to have the maximum benefit with the best 
possible outcomes for the group as a whole, then cooperation as well as an understanding 
by all the individuals of the group is necessary for the action to achieve success. That 
requires communication among the group and between individuals so each will know the 
responsibilities of the others as well as understand how to keep the others informed about 
one’s own progress and purpose in the plan. Therefore, “consensus demands 
communication,” and effective communication and discourse require critical, reflective 
minds that can best be acquired in an educational setting that supports hermeneutic 
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perspectives and practices argument and consensus building in peer-oriented 
environments (Democracy and Education 8).  
Self-Reflection and Critical Thought 
“He who offers a penny for your thoughts does not expect to drive any great 
bargain” (How We Think 2). Though this sentiment might be applied as a jibe to any 
number of modern American politicians or media personalities, Dewey was merely 
presenting the proposition that thought, in one definition, consists of all the random 
sensibilities, daydreams, recollections, choices, and other disconnected scraps that float 
through our minds every day. In this sense, every conscious human thinks. This is not to 
say, however, that every person thinks reflectively or critically. On the contrary, what we 
find in our modern discourse, both social and political, as well as in our test-driven 
educational focus, is an unfortunate dearth of self reflection or critical thinking. The 
evidence for this is not merely anecdotal either.   
A four year research study of undergraduate students in the United States, 
conducted from 2005 to 2009 by New York University sociologist Richard Arum, found 
that 45 percent of students showed no significant improvement in their critical thinking, 
reasoning, or writing skills in their first two years of college, and after four years that 
number improved but was still an unacceptable 36 percent (Arum). Ostensibly, writing 
programs and the academy exist to develop scientifically trained, research oriented 
critically thinking members of society. “In a rapidly changing economy and society, there 
is widespread agreement that these individual capacities are the foundation for effective 
democratic citizenship and economic productivity” (Arum 2). While there has been some 
criticism about Arum’s methods and definitions of critical thinking, it is the only research 
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study that has taken a broad view of this topic using a consistent and measurable 
standard, and the research shows well over a third of university students are failing to 
develop effective critical thinking skills. 
 The reasons for the decline in critical thinking skills among graduating university 
students are numerous, and no single alteration of student expectations or behaviors is 
going to resolve this significant, multi-faceted problem. For example, labor economists 
Philip Babcock and Mindy Marks examined how much time students spend in class and 
studying every week compared to students of prior generations and found, using 
individual surveys dating back more than 80 years, that undergraduate college students 
until the early 1960s spent an average of 40 hours per week studying or attending class. 
Over the past 50 years, that number has declined precipitously to just 13 hours today 
(Arum). If we examine just this element and make attempts to correct it in hopes of 
improving student critical thinking skills, we would be ignoring the many reasons why 
this decline has occurred that we may be unable to affect from an academy-focused 
perspective.  
 Beginning in the early 1960s, for example, the number of minorities and children 
from traditionally middle class and lower class families began attending college for the 
first time. The multi-cultural clash of expectations and hermeneutic understanding of the 
world on the part of the students met an entrenched academic standard and pedagogy for 
which many students were simply unprepared, and the academy was unwilling or unable 
to meet their changing pedagogical needs. In addition, the number of these students who 
could only afford school if they also worked part time or full time increased dramatically.  
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 According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the number of full time 
undergraduates aged 16 to 24 working fewer than 20 hours per week declined to 15 
percent nationwide in 2007, the last year for which data is available (Perna). Compare 
that to the 60 percent of students in 1961 who didn’t work at all and a picture begins to 
form about why students spend so much less time studying and doing class work today 
than they did then (Stern). But even this is only a beginning. Students in 1960 had much 
different pedagogical needs than students of today since modern students with full-time 
instant access to the world’s largest database of information have no motivation to 
memorize knowledge, and productivity overall has increased significantly through 
technological development. 
 We cannot expect students to alter their cultural norms to accommodate the 
demands of the academy without helping them develop the tools necessary to do so. This 
is no great revelation for the academy or our society as a whole. The collective hand-
wringing on the part of our political institutions, citizenship, and the academy itself over 
the lack of critical thinking skills among college students has led to a rash of rhetoric-
oriented pedagogical theories all looking for the silver bullet solution to this problem 
with varying degrees of success. The first real step in resolving this issue, however, is to 
understand where the problem actually lies, and it’s not necessarily with the students. In 
fact, as James R. Flynn has effectively demonstrated from his research into Intelligence 
Quotient development, students today are in many ways much smarter than students were 
in the first half of the last century (Flynn).  
 Nevertheless, the focus of the academy is almost always on how to bring students 
closer to academic expectations rather than examining ways the academy must also 
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change to help bridge that gap.  A hermeneutic approach to student critical consciousness 
and discourse skill development requires student-centered thinking and cultural 
awareness on the part of the academy that is essential to  understanding the gap between 
student capacity for objective critical thought and the actual practice of critical thought. 
But what exactly is critical thought?  
 Edward Glaser wrote the seminal paper on critical thinking in 1941 and co-
developed the most utilized test of critical thinking skills still in practice today. His 
research determined that the ability to think critically involves three elements (Glaser): 
1. An attitude of being disposed to consider in a thoughtful way the 
problems and subjects that come within the range of one’s 
experiences; 
2. Knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning; 
3. Some skill in applying those methods. 
Glaser clearly separates the intrinsic attitude of a person from the banked knowledge of 
methods as well as from the extrinsic skills of application. Glaser argued that some 
people have these things in more or less greater capacity than others, which may or may 
not be accurate, but the implications of that assumption means the academy and educators 
too often dismiss Glaser’s crucial first element as unteachable since it relies upon the 
abstract notions of capacity and personal attitude. Thus we tend to focus too heavily on 
the latter two elements in the classroom and not enough on the hermeneutics of student 
disposition, which can indeed be learned. Thomas Kent incorporates this same argument 
in Paralogic Rhetoric about teaching writing, the ostensible vehicle for expression of 
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critical thought, because it is ultimately a “situated, interpretive, and indeterminate act” 
(Breuch 99).  
 It is clear that Glaser owes a great deal to the thinking on this subject by Dewey, 
who is widely regarded as the “father” of the modern critical thinking tradition. Dewey’s 
definition of reflective thinking is “active, persistent and careful consideration of any 
belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it, and the 
further conclusions to which it tends” (How We Think 6). By defining reflective thought 
as an active process, Dewey is once again rejecting notions of a passive 
phenomenological experience and arguing that only purposeful conscious engagement 
provides for educational opportunities on the part of the learner. Reflecting on a belief or 
idea “in light of the grounds that support it” is an affirmation of reason as the basis of 
belief  and “the further conclusions to which it tends” an admonition to consider the 
implications and consequences of those beliefs.  
This idea of self-reflection can be seen in Dewey’s foundation of naturalism as 
well as Locke’s influence in his argument that if “upon thought hang all deliberate 
activities…then it is the greatest concernment that care be taken of its conduct” (How We 
Think 19).  Unfortunately, most scholars combine Dewey’s notion of “reflective 
thinking” with today’s notion of “critical thinking” and use the latter term to the 
exclusion of the former arguing they are essentially the same thing. But while they may 
contain the same elements, it is a mistake to assume they are interchangeable notions or 
that the ability to think reflectively about oneself automatically translates into the ability 
to think critically about the external world or apply critical thought as a skill, and vice 
versa.  
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 Cultural screens, confirmation biases, and other hermeneutic elements make the 
process of critical self-reflection much different than objective critical inquiry of the 
external world even if the two processes use similar skills. However, the necessity of first 
achieving the capacity for self-reflection and an attitude of careful consideration of all 
assumptions and beliefs is vital for objective observation of the world, and the academy 
is an ideal setting, even an anticipated setting, in which such self-reflection is possible. 
Without the encouragement and expectation to practice reflective personal inquiry 
regarding beliefs and assumptions then critical thought of the external world will always 
be clouded by unexamined personal biases.  
Real, objective, critical inquiry that serves to reduce uncertainty and increase the 
probability of successful action first requires self realization to develop true ethical 
deliberation skills. Our tendency to overemphasize critical skill development in our 
pedagogies rather than ensure the necessary attitude of being disposed to critical thought 
in general results in a culture of political argument derived from unexamined ideals and 
divorced from objectivity or principled deliberation.  
Skill obtained apart from thinking is not connected with any sense of the 
purposes for which it is to be used. It consequently leaves a man at the 
mercy of his routine habits and of the authoritative control of others who 
know what they are about and who are not especially scrupulous as to 
their means of achievement. And information severed from thoughtful 
action is dead, a mind-crushing load. Since it simulates knowledge and 
thereby develops the poison of conceit, it is a most powerful obstacle to 
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further growth in the grace of intelligence (Democracy and Education 
116). 
Both Dewey and Arendt were concerned with understanding the nature of critical 
thought itself and developing the argument for why it is so vital to defending democratic 
principles of freedom, justice, and equality. Both recognized the importance that social 
experience plays in establishing those principles and in learning the discourse skills for 
engaging in the necessary public debate that keeps democracy alive and flourishing. 
“Any social arrangement that remains vitally social, or vitally shared, is educative to 
those who participate in it. Only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine 
way does it lose its educative power” (Democracy and Education 9). Dewey argued that 
self-reflection is not innate, but that the ability to reflect inwardly and think outwardly 
has a social origin. This is the social conception of Dewey’s subjectivity that Arendt 
further develops. 
Dewey believed individuals only evolve through social interaction and reasoned 
self-reflection based on and structured by those interactions, “securing direction and 
development in the immature through their participation in the life of the group to which 
they belong” (Democracy and Education 64). The cooperation of development is one of 
society’s greatest benefits. The mitigation of uncertainty obtained through social 
interaction and the critical engagement that society naturally breeds liberates individuals 
to achieve their full potential through the support of the group, which recursively, breeds 
better minds and increases social intelligence for the group going forward. This is 
Dewey’s theory of subjectivity. The one problem with this theory lies in the realization 
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that some educated social groups advance at different rates than other educated groups, 
and some social groups don’t advance at all or even regress.  
While Arendt embraced Dewey’s idea of social intelligence in general, she 
recognized  the importance of the human condition (i.e. politics) in its effect on social 
intelligence development. Since Arendt saw plurality in the public sphere as a condition 
of validity for action to take place, she argued that social intelligence is a product as 
much of the action of others upon the self as it is upon the self’s ability to engage in self-
reflection and critical thought. “The main reason for this,” argues Gert Biesta, is that 
Arendt holds that subjectivity “is only possible in the situation in which others can be 
subjects as well” (Biesta). By incorporating the possible actions of others in the 
development of social intelligence, Arendt opens Dewey’s theory of subjectivity to the 
possibility that groups can move in an infinite number of directions since the human 
response to particular action is unpredictable and the potential outcomes of individual 
actions are innumerable. Thus, positive progress on social problems associated with 
freedom, justice, and equality is only a potential outcome of action.   
This is why Dewey and Arendt both supported social public education and its 
vital role in the development of engaged individual citizens of a democracy with shared, 
common principles. In a society where social groups promote the individuality of their 
members and value critical inquiry rather than impose conformity of thought, 
individuality increases and authoritarianism retreats. Public education exists to provide 
the tools, experiences, and challenges necessary for self-reflection to occur, which in turn 
develops a self-identity unique within the social group, but that also exists as part of the 
social group.  
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As a naturalist, Dewey campaigned for an educational pedagogy that challenges 
personal biases and beliefs and stresses scientific inquiry for the purpose of promoting 
self-reflection and critical inquiry, or “thought.” As he put it, “the sole direct path to 
enduring improvement in the methods of instruction and learning consists in centering 
upon the conditions which exact, promote, and test thinking. Thinking is the method of 
intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards the mind” (Democracy and 
Education 116). Thus, scientific inquiry grounded in Cartesian doubt breeds self-
reflection and challenges our assumptions not only about the physical world, but also 
about social order, class, and individual human potential divorced from ideologies that 
promote inequality: 
“By disclosing unity in a common humanity, scientific analysis gave 
evidence of and support for the ethical conception that all men should 
share in the ends and values of society, and more important, that each 
must share in the creation and control of the processes that achieve these 
ends, and finally, that in such participation each individual best realizes 
his own potentialities… for this idea to be consciously shared, a wide 
distribution of intelligence is also required… the task of building such 
intelligence is the work of education” (Baker 122).  
But understanding the “work of education” in promoting common principles of a society 
and the necessity of self reflection for the purpose of advancing society and solving 
problems provides us only with the theory of education and the development of social 
intelligence. The process of how we actually achieve this self reflection and teach it to 
others is the challenge of developing a critical hermeneutic pedagogy, and that’s where 
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Paul Ricoeur’s work offers significant value to the academy. Both Arendt and Dewey 
provide the theory and exigence for critical engagement by all members of a society, and 
both are equally aware that our society’s education system is the best place for this 
critical engagement to be developed. Educators, reformers, politicians, and citizens of all 
stripes have introduced and argued for educational programs and policies they believe 
will improve outcomes in knowledge and critical thinking, but how they choose to assess 
those improvements and what they value as outcomes are often different and sometimes 
conflicting. While they all believe in the value of their positions, those positions too often 
lack consensus and are often ideologically driven.  
 Where the academy has fallen woefully short has been in understanding the best 
method for meeting the goals set forth by Dewey and Arendt.  If we can build consensus 
not about specific outcomes or pedagogies, but rather around a principle that regards 
critical thought and the practice of objective critical inquiry as valuable and rewarding, 
then perhaps the development of self reflection and the resulting improvements in social 
progress are possible.  
 This is particularly challenging today, though, in light of our changing cultural 
demographics, changing student needs, and changing technologies. Trying to build a 
universal pedagogy around outcomes by focusing on rhetorical theories will always be 
limited by the cultural screens in place throughout the academy in different cultural 
regions. Instead, approaching self-reflection from the standpoint of common cultural 
principles and individual student experiences, a hermeneutic approach, may provide the 
flexibility necessary for success in developing the critical consciousness skills and social 
engagement necessary for democracy as a philosophy to flourish.  
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Dewey wrote about education because he cared about individual freedom first and 
foremost. In his 1939 work, Freedom and Culture, he immediately draws upon Thomas 
Jefferson’s words from a letter to John Adams in defining his thesis: “The advance of 
liberalism encourages a hope that the human mind will some day get back to the freedom 
it enjoyed two thousand years ago. This country, which has given to the world the 
example of physical liberty, owes to it that of moral emancipation also, for as yet it is but 
nominal with us” (Freedom and Culture 6). In other words, we must also free the mind if 
the body is to remain free forever. 
Critical Thinking and Civic Engagement 
Dewey’s own civic engagement and social activism in his support of women’s 
right to vote, as well as his work in support of the labor movement and the organization 
of the American Civil Liberties Union are testament to his practice of what he believed 
was a vital role of engaged citizens of a democracy. Like Hannah Arendt, Dewey 
believed the concept of good citizenship was associated too closely with the idea of 
obedience to authority and saw the dangers of this connection promulgated in an 
educational system that emphasized obedience and ritualized learning. Enlightened 
citizens of a democracy are highly unlikely to be produced by such a system. As Dewey 
argues, a healthy democracy consists of citizens capable of skepticism, willing to 
experiment with new ideas, desiring of evidence, and disposed to discussion and inquiry 
rather than bias and idealization. 
 As with Hannah Arendt, Dewey’s philosophies are heavily influenced by the 
work of Immanuel Kant, and Dewey’s dissertation, The Psychology of Kant, is testament 
to that influence. Though Dewey could not be called a “Kantian” by any stretch and 
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would later come to embrace a Hegelian, pragmatic, and naturist philosophy, Kant’s 
categorical imperative nevertheless provides Dewey with the fundamental philosophical 
concept upon which he would build a lifetime of work, that is our moral systems should 
be anchored in concrete principles guided by inquiry, self-reflection, and pragmatic 
societal functionalism rather than “traditional” hypothetical systems based on purely 
subjective considerations. Dewey viewed freedom as a construct of culture, ultimately 
unique to each individual within a culture but possible only in a society where authority 
exists to preserve individual freedoms from the tyranny of the many over the few.   
 While Kant’s rational autonomy is the foundational theory behind much of 
Dewey’s and Arendt’s work, its exclusive focus on rational, individual perspective limits 
its functionality in a pluralistic, increasingly social world, particularly in the age of the 
Internet. Dewey and Arendt both recognized that all perspectives, while uniquely 
individual and shaped by private cultural norms, are ultimately only relevant in a social 
world in which an active exchange of ideas between the individual and the environment, 
government, and social spheres that affect that individual is possible. Hegel’s influence is 
much more apparent in this development of Deweyan thought. Indeed, while rational 
autonomy is vital for an individual’s concept of freedom to form, there are increasingly 
important societal and political issues (e.g. healthcare, workplace safety, environmental 
protection, nuclear war, etc.) that must be addressed through subjective models of 
democratic discourse and critical thinking for a stable polis to exist at all in the 21st 
century. It may seem a trivial point to separate individual perspective as free from the 
influence of society vs. individual perspective influenced and reliant upon the influence 
of society, but it’s vital to consider this separation in the development of a free and 
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engaged democratic polis. It’s the subtle but vital difference between the development of 
a politics of ideology that leads only to conflict, and the development of a politics of 
principles that leads to consensus. 
 The shaping of culture and the development of critically engaged citizens of a 
democracy were simultaneous processes for Dewey. The two existential spaces are 
connected in the same way people are connected to nature. One does not preclude or 
derive from the other, but rather they work simultaneously together in a constant 
evolutionary process of development, destruction, and recreation. Dewey was  a 
naturalist, and he continually orbited around the central philosophy that “subject and 
object, self and world, cannot be specified independently of each other” (Kestenbaum 1).  
 There is an important evolution of thought in this naturalism that helped Dewey 
develop his educational philosophy that has become so important for understanding the 
life of the mind. Certainly in his early research about Kant we can see a rejection of the 
socially detached self, but also in his opposition to the sensationalist psychology of John 
Locke that argued for a passive sensational experience upon a blank slate (tabula rasa) of 
the mind in which reality, and the substance of reality, merely exists secondarily to the 
phenomena we experience, and our phenomenological understanding of reality masks its 
true nature. Dewey was more interested in Leibniz’s argument that “substance is activity; 
that its process is measured by its end, its idea” (Baker 10).  
The problem with Locke’s view of tabula rasa, as Dewey saw it, was that it failed 
to account for the commonality of ideas and the development of common values among 
individuals raised with differing phenomenological experiences. If we are merely passive 
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experiencers of the physical world who are impressed upon by our individual engagement 
with that world, then we can  
“know nothing of existence as it is in itself, but only of its phenomena. 
Mind, matter, objects, are all substances, all equally substances, and all 
have their unknown essences and their phenomenal appearance. Such a 
distinction between the known and the unknown can rest, it is evident, 
only upon a separation between reality and phenomena similar to that 
which Locke makes between substance and qualities. In knowing the 
latter, we know nothing of the former” (Leibniz's New Essays Concerning 
the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition 181 - 182).  
Yet humans do possess qualities and values that transcend culture and 
independent experiences, and society is built upon and functions in large part due to the 
acceptance and enforcement of these commonalities. The development of a culture, 
therefore, is shaped by the experiences of the people in that culture, which also shapes the 
experiences of the people. Culture, like freedom, is dialogic in nature. But this dialogic 
presented a dilemma for the naturalist Dewey who was distrustful of theological 
implications associated with rejecting Locke’s tabula rasa theory.  
Dewey sought to solve this dilemma first by embracing the Hegelian notion of 
human psychology as part of a larger shared “consciousness” that also finds its way into 
the theories of  Émile Durkheim and Sigmund Freud. Dewey argues in Psychology, for 
example, that our psychological values are the science “of the reproduction of some 
universal content or existence, whether of knowledge or of action, in the form of 
individual unsharable consciousness” (Psychology 6). But this was transitional for Dewey 
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and did not fully express his naturalistic beliefs that actions and engagement with nature 
are part of man’s inherent and necessary process of learning. A truly shared 
consciousness, though opposite in concept but similar in ideal to tabula rasa, presupposes 
a level of conformity in thought among individuals that runs counter to principled, self-
reflective enlightenment. If we share a consciousness, then original thought would 
require an effort to overcome commonalities through conflict with the shared ideal rather 
than being a natural part of human development. This is where Leibniz helps Dewey 
connect his naturalism to the principles of enlightenment through self reflection and 
action.  
Leibniz argued  it is an active participation with the world, rather than a passive 
phenomenological experience of it, that shapes our shared consciousness. Humans are 
both unique in that we each experience the world in our own hermeneutic ways, but also 
consistent in that our experiences and actions bring us to similar conclusions about the 
desires for freedom, justice, and equality. We may not all define the substance of these 
goals in the same way or see them as achievable through the same processes, but the 
goals are nevertheless consistent and universal despite our individual phenomenologies. 
For Locke, reality essentially exists outside of our phenomenologies and secondarily to 
them, and therefore has “no revelation of itself.” For Leibniz, and for Dewey however, 
reality exists only because it does act: “Reality acts, and therefore is. Its being is 
conditioned upon its activity. It is not first there, and secondarily acts; but its “being 
there” is its activity. Since its very substance is activity, it is impossible that it should not 
manifest its true nature” (Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A 
Critical Exposition 181 - 182).  
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This is a significant adjustment to Plato’s position on the “unknowable truth” 
about the universe, the renaissance discovery of Cartesian doubt, and the enlightenment 
concept of tabula rasa. Plato argued that reason is a necessary skill of the thinking man 
because we can never know the absolute truth of anything, but we can approach it 
through logical analysis and a close examination of the truth using reason. Descartes took 
this unknowable truth a step further and examined the possibility that all reality is suspect 
except for his ability to simply ask the question about it, which is proof of his own 
existence but nothing else. Locke’s concept of a purely phenomenological reality leaves 
the possibility of nature absqua knowledge in which all we can know about reality is 
what we understand and experience.  
What Dewey draws from Leibniz is an argument that man and nature are 
interconnected in a way that it is impossible for man not to know the truth of nature 
because its very being is the whole truth. How we interact and engage with nature and 
culture is reliant, therefore, on how well we understand it and one another so that we 
might continue to progress toward a common and realized society of freedom, justice, 
reason, and peace.  
This inter-connectedness between man and nature, and between man and culture, 
means an actively engaged citizen of a democracy will have the most influence on the 
reality of that democracy, and vice versa. If our goal is freedom, but freedom is subject to 
the ideals and principles of those engaged in the process, then an actively engaged 
citizenship is vital if we want those ideals and principles to reflect our own 
phenomenologies, both individually and as a culture, and protect it from those whose 
“second nature” of power acquisition and defense of that power impinge upon it. Over 
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the course of his long career, Dewey developed an idealistic psychology approach that 
was most concerned with the question of how to achieve engaged citizenship, for it is not 
something that can be compelled without falling victim to the same totalitarianism it is 
intended to prevent. Thus, rather than a rhetoric-based strategy of education and 
acculturation, a hermeneutic-based strategy makes the most sense because it is directed 
by each individual based on his or her experiences and personal education of the world.  
The best solution for the development of consistent political institutions that align 
themselves with the principles of individual freedom in a complex, interconnected society 
lies in finding common cultural engagements where learning and development are 
consistent across groups and where those groups are most likely to open their minds to 
the possibility of learning, and that clearly lies in our system of education: 
The idealistic psychology which Dewey first approved…postulates an 
active, continuous, and organic development, thought of as self-
realization. In [this view] the individual was seen as active, as motivated 
by feeling and desire, and as striving to reproduce the universal 
consciousness. To reach this state of near union of the self with the 
wisdom and spiritual ideals of the absolute is a long, tedious journey. The 
same feelings that motivate the individual also may lead him astray unless, 
presumably, they are carefully disciplined by others until such time as his 
own intellect and will arise to control his desires. And before the 
individual is able to understand the institutions of men which embody the 
ideals of the absolute, he must acquire the tools of learning and the 
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information with which intellect and will, when finally developed in early 
adulthood, can contrive to form into spiritual wisdom (Baker 23). 
 Thus, education is the mechanism that provides the necessary equipment and 
training for citizens to become fully functioning members of a society dedicated to the 
preservation of individual liberty through democratic institutions whose power is limited 
by law. The limits and controls in place on those institutions exist to prevent the second 
nature of humans from over-riding the primary responsibility of that institution to 
preserve liberty while improving the lives of the constituent members of society. It’s a 
delicate balancing act that politicians of all stripes battle over in every American election. 
The degree to which these political forces either fail or achieve success lies in their 
capacity to influence voting citizens to support their positions. The best defense against 
what Isaac Asimov argued is a “cult of ignorance” in our country that assumes one’s 
ignorance is equal in value (democratically speaking) to another’s knowledge is an active 
and engaged educational system that trains all students in the art of discourse and 
reflective thought and develops their minds for the rigors of an often turbulent and ever 
evolving democratic process.  
Before we delve into the necessary elements of an effective democratic education, 
it is first necessary to set aside a common argument that media plays an equally viable, 
and possibly an even greater role in the education of American citizens and thus reduces 
the importance of focusing our national efforts exclusively on education. While it is 
possible that our increasing media proliferation has a greater impact on knowledge and 
education than do our schools, it can also be argued with equal legitimacy that the media, 
with its profit-driven model, is a reflection of the demand and desires of its audience, 
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whose relative education level and ability to think critically affects the content delivered. 
It reflects the same dialogic, interconnected relationship between man and culture that 
Dewey identified and developed in his idealistic psychology.  
 Dewey himself specifically addressed the role mass media plays in the education 
of citizens and knew that it would continue to grow and expand beyond even his capacity 
for imagination. In the now famous debate between Dewey and Walter Lippman in the 
1920s, both men argued that the press had a responsibility to the preservation of our 
democracy. Lippman argued that an increasingly complex society precluded the average 
citizen from fully understanding the issues of the day and required an engaged, watch-
dog press whose responsibility is to analyze the decisions being made by legislatures and 
explain them to the public with recommendations for action. Dewey, however, believed 
in active engagement by members of a democracy in all matters great and small. He was 
concerned with the potential for a corporate media system, ruled as it is by pecuniary 
interests over broader principles, to undermine the individual liberties of a free society.  
Dewey recognized the potential for communications systems to bring together 
communities of interest outside the confines of geographic location and argued that “both 
government and the press shared the responsibility to figure out how to engage the entire 
public in the decisions that would affect them all in the end. In other words, all members 
of a given democracy have responsibilities” (Champlin 138). It is the responsibility of 
citizens to be informed about issues that affect their communities, and it is the 
responsibility of teachers to develop the tools necessary among their students to act 
democratically to support, sustain, or change the laws and institutions that affect those 
issues as they are delivered to them through this increasingly complex media.   
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 The role of our educational system, then, has never been more vital to the 
preservation of an educated and engaged democratic populace than it is today in the age 
of the Internet and instant, real-time communication. It is ironic that as mechanisms for 
the delivery of media content have increased exponentially in the past two decades that 
citizens in America are decreasingly likely to be exposed to multiple points of view. The 
Farleigh-Dickenson research about Fox News and the Kaiser Family Foundation research 
about media consumption clearly demonstrate that a public facing increasing access to 
multiple viewpoints will naturally tend to filter out those views that conflict with their 
own internal biases. This modern reality of confirmation bias in media outlets appears to 
support Dewey’s position over Lippman’s in the need for a polis educated as broadly as 
possible about multiple subjects and basic facts rather than a media interpreting and 
recommending positions for a citizenry unprepared for the complexity of governance. As 
this research indicates, we cannot count on the media for educating our citizens, but must 
insist upon an active educational system free from the pressures of pecuniary corporate 
interests that focus almost exclusively on investment returns rather than educating 
actively engaged citizens with critical thinking skills and democratic ideals. 
 As we’ve discussed, Dewey was primarily concerned with maintaining individual 
freedom in a socially complex society considering the political institutions necessary for 
such a society to flourish. The ever-present conflict between economic, political, and 
social justice issues requires a liberally educated, critically engaged citizenship capable of 
engaging in serious discourse about common problems and adjusting laws and policies to 
improve or correct the issues that naturally occur in the evolution of every society. 
Dewey relied, perhaps too much, on the idea that all people of a democracy, at a base 
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level, desire freedom and justice for themselves and their communities. Regardless of the 
mechanisms and policies promoted by conflicting interests to achieve these goals, Dewey 
believed the commonality of those goals could help direct and preserve our fundamental 
freedoms so long as the people of that society have the tools and freedom to question 
authority and the ability to engage in critical discourse and compromise. That’s why he 
focused his work so extensively on the theory and application of education where these 
tools are best developed. In the 1949 Saturday Review of Literature, William Kirkpatrick 
wrote: “Pestklozzi had prepared the ground. Froebel and Herbart had helped. Horace 
Mann, Henry Barnard, ...and others had carried America along the Pestalozzi road. But 
one thing was lacking. No one of these men, nor all combined, had given an adequate 
theory for a thorough-going democratic, science-respecting education. This Professor 
Dewey has done” (Kirkpatrick 12).  
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Chapter 3: Hannah Arendt  
Hermeneutics and the Student as the Political Self  
  
 In this chapter, I will use Arendt’s concepts of historicism, human motivation, the 
vita activa, and the role of narrative in the development of self identity, and particularly 
the development of political self-identity. I will examine the cultural construct of 
“freedom” as a fundamentally hermeneutic space and identify the conjunction of 
hermeneutics and personal motivation for engaging in civic action necessary to defend 
and extend freedom in a democratic society. Through this process, I intend to explicate 
how Arendt’s analysis of the natural political self can be used to develop a pedagogy of 
composition that connects writing students to their communities. This will support key 
arguments of my dissertation by demonstrating how and why our political selves develop 
in relation to our communities and how harnessing those unique perspectives in the 
composition classroom presents new opportunities for engaged democratic citizenship 
among our students. My units of analysis for this chapter are Between Past and Future, 
The Human Condition, and The Origins of Totalitarianism.  
 Understanding Arendt’s role and unique contribution to the idea of a hermeneutic 
classroom involves first establishing her credibility as an observer of democracy and the 
dangers of Totalitarianism taking control of that society through its political systems. I 
will also establish the importance of returning the academy to its proper role as defender 
of democracy in the manner envisioned first by Plato and recaptured by modern scholars.  
Examining the history of the political self is first step in developing a pedagogy of 
engaged civic discourse by establishing how the political self developed in antiquity as a 
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pursuit of permanence against the temporality of nature, as well as the motive of political 
actors in pursuit of remembrance. I’ll present the importance of action as the defining 
characteristic of engaged citizenship and carry that idea into the modern era. In the 
modern era of the political self, I’ll examine the role of narrative in establishing political 
norms and discuss how the loss of transcendent truth affected the political institutions and 
the political motivations of mankind. I’ll then cover how the search for new transcendent 
virtues led to the rise of totalitarianism and how and why a hermeneutic pedagogy can 
best prepare modern students to recognize and defending freedom and egalitarian 
democracy. Finally, in conditioning the student as the political self, I’ll discuss the 
modern notions of equality and freedom as they are codified in our constitution and what 
that means for the political self. I’ll also look at the role the academy played traditionally 
in the development of engaged citizen rhetors and argue for its return to the role along the 
lines of Nancy Welch, Steve Parks, Ira Shor, Genevieve Critel, Paul Loeb, and others. 
Most importantly, I’ll present the unique contribution that Hannah Arendt makes to the 
movement toward citizen rhetors in the composition classroom. 
Hannah Arendt as Rhetor Philosopher 
 Perhaps no philosopher of the 20th century is better positioned to critique the 
intersection of the political and the personal than Hannah Arendt. Arendt studied 
philosophy with Martin Heidegger at the University of Marburg in the late 1930s, but as a 
Jew was not allowed to Habilitate (Graduate). She supported refugee Jews in France until 
1941 when she and her husband were forced to flee Nazi Germany to the United States. 
Later she reported on the Nuremburg trials and wrote a book about them in which she 
coined the phrase, “the banality of evil,” a concept that serves as her treatise on the 
 Haley 71 
 
 
 
potential for evil to emerge in democracies. Having witnessed the rise of a totalitarian 
state through popular vote, Arendt was particularly concerned with the role democracy 
plays in the evolution of freedom such that it could result in the creation of a fascist state. 
She had a uniquely qualified voice on the subject. Indeed, it may easily be argued that 
few people in the last century have as much credibility on the subject of democracy and 
the need for a critically engaged citizenship as does Hannah Arendt. Her work with 
Heidegger prepared her for the hermeneutic, or interpretive, observation of how 
Germany’s democracy turned into totalitarian rule, and Arendt worked the remainder of 
her life presenting ideas and solutions to prevent it from reoccurring. In this way, her 
work complements Dewey’s arguments of the need for engaged, critical citizens.  
However, unlike Dewey, Arendt’s primary discussions of education argue against 
incorporating community politics in the education of children, and she encouraged a strict 
authority/student division between teachers and their classrooms in primary and 
secondary education. While these arguments are valid and should bear further discussion 
for students prior to college, university students are almost all adults of voting age who 
are completely equal to their teachers when it comes to our only direct form of political 
change, voting. These students’ ability to examine their society and government critically 
is vital for an effective democracy that resists totalitarian rule. The academy, in its 
primary role since its inception by Plato, exists to develop critically thinking, logically 
reasoning citizens who engage in the process of self-rule. Though universities and 
colleges have taken on the role as well of developing skilled workers who support an 
industrialized society, the protection of our democracy first and foremost must never be 
abrogated by the academy, and it is time for the academy to reestablish its cultural 
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authority in this role. That process begins by connecting our newest voting members of 
the citizenry to their political responsibilities and helping them understand how their 
political selves relate to the political world.  
This argument is certainly not new in the field of Rhetoric and Composition. 
Beginning in the 1990’s, scholars like Sharon Crowley, William Keith, Michael Leff, 
Steven Mailloux, and others identified the shift away from civic rhetoric in English 
departments throughout the 20th Century and argued for a return to the study of rhetorical 
practice and civic engagement. Certainly in the last few years the emphasis on 
community engagement in Rhetoric and Composition programs has been promoted by 
Lorraine Higgins, Elenore Long, and Linda Flower among others. This move toward 
civic literacies and action in composition programs has broadened to encompass Writing 
Across Communities programs like the one at the University of New Mexico as well as 
gender and racial rhetorics of activism. While everyone seems to recognize the loss of a 
civic oriented rhetorical education as well as argue in favor of new pedagogies of 
engagement, few have examined why such civic engagement focused composition 
pedagogies should be an important function of Writing Programs beyond the culturally 
constructed desired outcomes. Fewer still address the basic human motivation toward 
freedom, and the necessary action in its defense, that Hannah Arendt offers through the 
analysis of the political self.  
Historicism in the Development of the Political Self 
 Hannah Arendt built much of her philosophy on the notion that history plays a 
dominant role in the development of Western culture and by extension the development 
of the political self. She divides Western history into two components, ancient and 
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modern. Arendt tracks modern history from the beginnings of the scientific revolution 
and the Renaissance, though it didn’t become ubiquitous in the lives of humans until the 
rise of industrialization. Much of her philosophy and criticism in both The Human 
Condition and The Origins of Totalitarianism is tied to the effects of this modern history 
on the human consciousness and contemporary public self. However, the role of Ancient 
history and its inventions are what motivate Arendt’s construction of the nature of human 
existence itself, and that is important in a number of ways, including the motive of 
history, the role of narrative in cultural consciousness (which is further extended by Paul 
Ricoeur), and the concept of the political self. 
 For Arendt, Ancient Western history deals with the Greek invention of 
Democracy and the concurrent invention of the citizen legislator responsible for the 
function of government and answerable to the polis. However, the development of these 
political inventions would never have happened without the dichotomy that exists 
between man and nature. What is important to understand from Arendt’s view of Ancient 
history is the role historicism, and the narrative form we use to express it, plays in the 
development of our political selves as beings simultaneously capable of self-reflection 
and self-deception in our pursuit of permanence, our pursuit of immortality separate from 
the limitations of our natural processes. 
For the Greeks, nature existed outside the realms of gods and men, and thus was 
immortal. Since the Greeks did not mythologize the creation of the world by their gods, 
those parts of the world that came “into being by themselves without assistance from men 
and gods” (Between Past and Future 42) are ever-present, and thus immortal in their 
“nature.” Since mankind is part of nature, the nature of mankind is immortal. As Arendt 
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highlights, “Aristotle explicitly assures us that man, insofar as he is a natural being and 
belongs to the species of mankind, possesses immortality” (Between Past and Future 42) 
but the consciousness and memories of individual men do not. Those things are the 
hallmark of mortality because they are capable of disappearing from the world to be 
forgotten forever, and it is that part of human nature that defines the concepts of human 
existence and legacy.   
 Even mountains change. That is the argument by Rilke against the Greek notion 
of permanence in nature, and thus Arendt concludes that even if concepts like 
imperishability or immortality actually exist, they would be homeless. There are no 
permanent structures, and even those artifacts such as the Greek ruins and Egyptian 
pyramids that have lasted a few thousand years on a billion year old planet are there only 
because they draw their relative permanence from the natural materials from which they 
are constructed. No one can name the men whose hands laid the stones. Their thoughts 
and ideals and memories are forgotten forever, and eventually even those ruins and 
monuments will collapse into dust. Stories, however, approach permanence because they 
are rejuvenated continuously in the hearts and minds of new generations of humans, each 
of whom are impermanent by themselves. Only humans possess the capacity to 
communicate, teach, and remember the names and acts of those who came before them to 
generate a kind of immortality, a kind of permanence that exists nowhere else, not even 
in nature. For Arendt, this is the true motive of history, and it is this particular idea that 
ties Hannah Arendt to hermeneutic philosophy, particularly in her understanding and 
expression of the role of narrative in the establishment of the political self and the 
promulgation of cultural norms across cultural spheres.  
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 It is this dimension of Arendt’s philosophy, that the motive of history is to secure 
immortality and remembrance in support of cultural norms and development, that we 
begin to think in political terms. For Arendt, the political mind is not one concerned with 
the acquisition of political office or financial gain, rather, the political mind is intricately 
tied to the nature of human consciousness. We are political beings because we are beings 
concerned with propagating ideas and supporting our personal beliefs in the ongoing 
pursuit of permanence, whether that be ideological or biological. Beyond the pursuit of 
legislation and prosperity as vehicles for driving permanence for our society, as 
individuals we also pass down family traditions and raise our children in our own cultures 
and belief systems in a subconscious desire to extend ourselves into the future beyond the 
limitations of our temporary physical lives. The primary vehicle for this translation of 
history, tradition, and culture is narrative, a concept important in its totality to Arendt’s 
philosophy that will be explicated more thoroughly in Ricoeur.  
 Both Ned Curthoys in “Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Narrative,” and Julia 
Kristeva in Hannah Arendt, Life is a Narrative, bridge Arendt’s ideas of the political self 
and the role of narrative in the construction of the “conceptual personae,” (Curthoys 350) 
or as I have framed it, the political self. Narrative is a crucial element in the propagation 
of cultural norms, and therefore is not necessarily anchored in objective facts or 
documentation. Arendt was concerned with objectivity primarily as a necessary element 
of a genuine historical account, but she recognized as well the contributions of Werner 
Heisenberg, whom she quotes in The Human Condition, regarding the natural tendency of 
humans to alter objective fact simply from the process of observation itself. In the 
observation of history and the development of the political self, the effect of altering our 
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observations to reflect cultural expectations are what Kenneth Burke calls terministic 
screens and Arabella Lyon describes as “suspicion within interpretation” (Intentions 85). 
Psychologists call this behavior the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), which is the 
human tendency to ascribe dispositional effects for the behaviors of others rather than 
situational ones. I call these alterations cultural screens because they’re culturally 
anchored rather than species anchored.  In other words, we tend to apply our own biases 
and cultural judgments on the behavior of others rather than view them objectively.   
 For the observation of history, Arendt described the problem of a true objectivity, 
what Ranke defined as the “extinction of the self,” in terms of the human tendency 
toward smoothing (Between Past and Future 49), since even attempts at such true 
historical objectivity are undermined at their outset by the selection and editing of the 
material used in the research of that event or personality. The narrative we tell about 
Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, is filled with cultural norms about civil rights, 
human dignity, courage, and leadership because those elements defined the man, and 
were defined by the man in his actions. He was the youngest man to receive a Nobel 
Peace Prize, and he continued his work toward peace and equality in spite of often violent 
opposition until the day he was assassinated.  
 Few narrative accounts of M.LK., however, recount his “weakness for women” 
(Abernathy), or his “numerous extramarital affairs” (Garrow), or the reported FBI 
surveillance tape of Dr. King from the Willard Hotel on the day before his assassination 
with 14 hours of recorded partying and sex. Indeed, our history is replete with examples 
of heroic figures and great achievements that fail to also account for the very 
“humanness” of the individuals involved. Thus, Arendt argues that historical narrative is 
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about the essence of the historical tale, a “sensuous objectivity which has the subjective 
as one of its elements” (Hansen 19). History is not about objective fact, it’s merely the 
process by which we carry forward valued cultural ideas and expectations based on 
people and events as we choose to see them, not as they actually were. 
 Arendt uses the story of Ulysses (the Latinized form of Odysseus) listening to the 
tale of his own life at the court of the king of the Phaeacians as the paradigm for 
understanding the dual nature of historical narrative. As actor, audience, and sufferer of 
the story, Ulysses is in a unique position of both remembering the objective historical 
reality as well as being moved to weeping by the subjectivity of the reports of the 
messengers. This catharsis, the “reconciliation with history,” (Between Past and Future 
45) as Arendt describes it, is the ultimate purpose of historical narrative. For Arendt, 
Ulysses lacks the usual motives of curiosity and lust for information that drives all 
historical inquiry, since he has already lived them; rather, Ulysses is moved by his 
repositioning within the timeline of history, by the recognition of his own immortality in 
the words and deeds of the Ricoeurian other.  
 When confronted with the greatness of his actions, Ulysses comes to recognize 
that immortality is a collection of historical moments as perceived by the historians in 
reference to themselves and their cultural ideals rather than by himself who knew the 
truth of the humanness of those moments. This is an important hermeneutic concept for 
Arendt’s political self, that the solutions we seek to the problems of mankind, whether 
through “objective” science, or “subjective” history will always be undermined by the 
questions we ask, questions limited by the subjective humanness of the questioners. 
Arendt presents us with a criticism of objectivity as an idea confused by an assumption 
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that there could exist independent answers that lie outside the human limitations of the 
questioners.  
 This is why narrative plays such a crucial role for the political self. Narrative is a 
structure that is pervasive across all human histories and thus serves as a bridge between 
cultures that is anchored in each cultural sphere by the expectations of both the speaker 
and the audience as it is perceived from within those spheres, regardless of which person 
is the historian and which the audience in a given point in time. This can lead both to 
mutual understanding, if those anchors are similar in concept, or to mutual 
misunderstanding if those anchors are displaced by unique cultural historicism. That’s 
where Donald Davidson’s triangulation theory becomes so important in hermeneutic 
pedagogies of higher education in constructing discourse between cultural spheres.
 This aspect of historicism is what fuels the political self, and it foregrounds 
Arendt’s criticism of modernity as a poor foundation for concepts such as human 
equality, civil rights, and moral transcendence necessary for the preservation of a 
productive, egalitarian society. If we can’t rely on true objectivity because it doesn’t 
exist, then we are left with subjective views of history and the world that must always be 
questioned, and thus we are always questioning our own sense of permanence, the thing 
that defines our sense of human existence.  
 For Arendt, modernity and its anchor in the Cartesian doubts about the reality of 
human experience marked the end of transcendent “truths” that served as the scaffolding 
of human rights and moral ideals. Western traditions, prior to modernity, held that moral 
standards existed outside the limitations of the human mind, standards against which we 
could compare and evaluate our subjective choices. These standards helped us define 
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“right” versus “wrong,” and “good” versus “evil” through the use of Aristotelian logic to 
clarify whether our beliefs and behaviors were appropriate and in line with the standards 
our narrative historicism provided. Without this transcendent anchor for human morals 
and actions, we lose the foundations of our moral behaviors and beliefs, and this loss 
serves as a fertile field for the rise of Totalitarianism and entrenched radicalism at the 
expense of equality and justice.  
Totalitarian ideology is appealing precisely because it provides a sense of 
permanence and authority “in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied 
upon” (The Origins of Totalitarianism 478). The value of this argument in the 
development of engaged citizens among modern generations is the recognition by Arendt 
that these dangers are not external, as we tend to assume, but rather internal. It was not 
that the reality of the world rejected human notions of morality and equality, rather, it 
was the political self removed from transcendent moral virtue that rejected the reality of 
the world as a common space in which we all must live, integrate, and cooperate. If we 
can no longer trust our senses and our traditions as harbingers of unquestionable virtue, 
then we are left only with our individual contributions to the world in which to find 
personal salvation. In other words, “if we are incapable of knowing the world given to us, 
we can at least know what we ourselves have made” (Hansen 22). The result is a 
rejection of historicism as the framework upon which modern common experiences, 
regardless of our cultural spheres and screens, can ground our basic concepts of accepted 
moral authority.  
This “crisis of authority,” as Arendt sees it, means “we can no longer fall back 
upon authentic and undisputable experiences common to all” (Between Past and Future 
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91) in pursuit of an egalitarian modern world. This is valuable to our work in rhetoric and 
composition because it demonstrates there are no “common” experiences, only similar 
ones. A healthy critical mind is not created by seeking the commonalities among a group 
and examining them. Healthy critical examination comes from examining the differences 
in our similar experiences and how and why those differences exist, and that’s where 
hermeneutics can contribute so effectively to new composition pedagogies. 
  Modernity denotes progress, and progressivism is a threat to status quo cultural 
institutions. The criticism of civil progress is often couched in the threat that progress 
poses to established ideologies and traditions. For example, the rhetorical “beachhead” 
established for the defense of marriage against gay marriage supporters over the past 
decade has been less about the relative morality of love between consenting homosexual 
adults and more about its assumed existential threat to the institution of marriage itself. 
Hannah Arendt recognized that it is exactly efforts by  modern societies to reestablish 
absolute authority and unquestioning certainty that led to Totalitarian regimes and 
religious radicalism in the 20th Century: “Totalitarianism became this century’s curse 
only because it so terrifyingly took care of its problems” (The Origins of Totalitarianism 
430) by creating the false politics of a new transcendent moral authority.  
 Sharon Crowley explores the resurgence of Totalitarianism in America over the 
past 30 years in The Rhetoric of Fundamentalism. She identifies the political disconnect 
between liberal democracy that is the foundation of our constitution and based on reason 
and factual evidence, and Christian apocalyptists, who rely on revelation, faith, and 
biblical interpretation to ground their political claims. According to Crowley, 
Fundamentalists “judge the world against some otherworld of the supernatural and find it 
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wanting – this life is but a falling off from, a dim reflection of, or arduous preparation for, 
a better one” (Crowley 134). If our work in the academy is about preparing new students 
for the rigors of academic thought and the practice of critical examination, then helping 
them see among themselves this same struggle between progress and tradition, between 
pragmatism and ideology, will help them become better stewards of their democracy and 
help defend against the ever-present threat of Totalitarianism.  
 Hannah Arendt, for her part, is neither critical of the loss of transcendent value 
nor supportive of a specific new structure upon which to establish our sense of human 
existence; rather, she is primarily concerned with the political implications such a change 
suggests for the evolution of human thought and the preservation of a fair and equal 
society. Rather than seek moral grounds for human rights in some mythological grand 
authority or in some version of natural law, Arendt’s solution, and one that is central to 
the development of critically engaged citizens in the modern Academy, is the 
understanding and acceptance of a new “transcultural” common experience, what Juan 
Guerra terms “transcultural repositioning,” in which grounds for human dignity, equality, 
and civil rights can be established. This is the exigence for a contemporary political self 
in which human rights are grounded not in political or religious authority, but in the value 
and dignity of human experience itself, regardless of how unique that experience may be. 
By embracing the hermeneutic experience of life then, we embrace the unique, individual 
experiences of it and ground those experiences in equality and validity. The acceptance of 
the Ricoeurian “other” as valid and equal is the best vehicle for undermining Totalitarian 
conformity and preserving democracy, and it is the cornerstone of a hermeneutic 
pedagogy in the composition classroom. 
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Modernity and the Political Self in Democracy 
 Establishing a framework for identifying the contemporary political minds of 
students in the academy involves understanding the world from their unique and often 
limited exposure to it. However, as we’ve already established, that understanding is 
naturally restricted by our own cultural screens and experiences. It’s one thing to 
consume the popular media of our student audience, for example, in an attempt to 
understand their influences; it’s another to build a pedagogy of hermeneutic composition 
based on that reductivist practice. Instead, our understanding of our students, our 
“others,” in the classroom can be accomplished by examining the varied world 
experiences of these students and the implications that those unique experiences engender 
among them, and that is best accomplished as a meta-conversation amongst and between 
the teacher and the students.  The practice of that examination is part of the the pedagogy 
of a hermeneutic classroom through critical interpretation.  
 Thus, rather than searching for cultural commonalities around which to construct 
a composition pedagogy, which will always be flawed, a pedagogy of composition and 
critical examination can be anchored instead in the individually unique experiences of our 
students themselves – varied, interpreted, conflicting, and disputable as they may be. This 
ultimately unique hermeneutic understanding of the world is the ironic commonality of 
all humanity, and that commonality is the foundation of our social order. Embracing our 
varied cultural screens in pursuit of common political action is possible only when we 
understand and accept the idea of unique, sometimes conflicting, but always fully valid 
perspectives of shared human experiences as David Donaldson so eloquently defines in 
the principle of charity. 
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 It is not a new argument that focusing on commonalities in a writing classroom 
can undermine individual experiences and render invalid unique perspectives. Kurt 
Spellmeyer is highly critical of “shared communities” in composition pedagogy, likening 
them to the shared conventions of a prison because they shared communities necessarily 
subjugate the individual experience to the group. (Spellmeyer 83). Greg Myers criticizes 
the community metaphor of composition pedagogy as a system that rewards conformity 
at the expense of dissent and difference, and Frank Walters began encouraging writing 
teachers in the mid-90s to examine the extent to which they “reinforce the strategies of a 
social order that coerces agreement” (Walters 823).  What Arendt offers us through her 
concepts of narrative, objective history, and hermeneutic motivations are vehicles for 
examining the individual in both contrast to and consensus with the group as a whole, and 
this is more representative of the real world our students will always occupy. Pedagogies 
that either embrace individualism in resistance to social order or focus on common 
denominators at the expense of unique perspectives both fail to address reality. The 
dichotomy of individuation versus communal pedagogies is a binary tension that 
hermeneutic classroom specifically seeks to understand. 
The Dangers of Totalitarianism in a Democracy 
 When she began work on the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt was concerned 
not with preserving or conserving the historiography of totalitarian rule, but rather with 
destroying the capacity for its reoccurrence. This poses a dilemma for a narrator who 
simultaneously seeks to present a relatively objective history of the process for the best 
understanding of it while also seeking to undermine and criticize that same process for 
future generations. “Thus my first problem was how to write historically about something 
 Haley 84 
 
 
 
– totalitarianism – which I did not want to conserve but on the contrary felt engaged to 
destroy” (A Reply to Voegelin 79).  This engaged rhetorical practice places Hannah 
Arendt in the dual position of philosopher and rhetorical scholar. Arendt also believed in 
the agency of her own rhetorical project, and thus she crosses the line from purely 
objective scholar into the realm of Applied Rhetorics because she was ultimately 
concerned with the process of objective understanding as a mechanism for influencing an 
audience toward a particular position.  
 Arendt accomplished this challenging task by humanizing the actors within the 
Totalitarian culture and highlighting the human decisions made under the most difficult 
of political circumstances. While the process of historical narrative in its traditional form 
requires an adherence to the chronology of events from precedent to succession that 
grants it the appearance of inevitability, Arendt was most concerned with breaking this 
pattern by stressing the overlapping human experiences surrounding them, including 
alternative orientations and unique viewpoints as well as potentialities for alternate 
outcomes. This process of “fragmentary historiography” (Benhabib 121) creates 
opportunities to reposition our historical understanding of the process, helps us re-
imagine the varied human experiences and multiple viewpoints within the history itself, 
creates empathy for the failed hopes and efforts of the dead that historical necessity has 
ignored, and alters our judgment of the “inevitability” of history. In essence, it helps us 
engage history in a new and more active way outside of the accepted cultural norms of 
the official historical narrative, and this is the praxis of hermeneutic pedagogies in 
support of our social concepts of freedom. 
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 However, the problems in this new process of repositioning one’s viewpoint 
toward an understanding of the “other” in any given historical recreation are twofold. 
First, any form of relativism that such a process implies can lead away from the similar 
moral elements of an experience from multiple viewpoints and toward a conclusion that 
there is no shared concept of “right” or “wrong” and that all our moral justifications are 
mere smoke screens for our individual biases, perspectives, and desires. Second, the 
adoption of a plural view of history is only possible insofar as the historian is capable of 
imagining the viewpoints of the other with limited resistance from the cultural screens 
inherent in each of us. Arendt addresses both of these issues, with varying degrees of 
success, in her adoption of two key positions regarding human engagement and moral 
development of the political self: The vita activa and natality.   
Freedom and the Vita Activa 
 The nature of human existence is political, and the purpose of the political self is 
freedom. This is the conclusion we can draw from Arendt’s exploration of the vita activa 
and her adoption of Aristotle’s dictum “man is by nature political, that is, social,” as well 
as Kantian concepts of freedom and free will, subject as they are to the categorical 
imperative. Like John Dewey, Arendt was concerned with the contributions of labor and 
work to the social animal. For Arendt, specifically, the vita activa consists of three 
elements: Labor, work, and action. Labor is the personal and private activity one engages 
in for the sustenance and reproduction of one’s physical life, and Arendt draws heavily 
on Marx’s ideas regarding labor in her definition. She argues that labor is the force in our 
vita activa that keeps us linked to the natural world, for “the blessing or the joy of labor is 
the human way to experience the sheer bliss of being alive which we share with all living 
 Haley 86 
 
 
 
creatures, and it is even the only way men, too, can remain and swing contentedly in 
nature’s prescribed cycle” (The Human Condition 106). Work, by contrast, corresponds 
to our community engagement and need for social sustenance and reproduction. It is what 
we make with our hands or produce in value for the sake of ourselves within and 
compared to our respective communities. Arendt connects work to homo faber, or “man 
the creator.” In the role of homo faber, man constructs a bridge between labor, which was 
traditionally private in nature, and the public realm. This bridging aspect of work occurs 
through the inherent destruction of nature necessary to achieve work’s products, thus 
moving humans into a unique position relative to other animals outside the confines of 
nature and into the realm of the polis, and it exists for the sake of the public alone. “Since 
his productivity was seen in the image of a Creator-God, so that where God creates ex 
nihilo, man creates out of given substance, human productivity was by definition bound 
to result in a Promethean revolt because it could erect a man-made world only after 
destroying part of God-created nature” (The Human Condition 139). But only in this 
man-made world are humans capable of engaging in the third aspect of the vita activa, 
action.  
 Action is defined by Arendt in relation to Labor and Work. All three, says Arendt, 
are “conditioned by the fact that men live together, but it is only action that cannot be 
imagined outside the society of men” (The Human Condition 22). Any behavior, such as 
labor, that is limited to self-sustenance is not action, for all animals in nature are engaged 
in their own ways in this endeavor, and thus Arendt calls this behavior animal laborans. 
Even a man who toils in a field and provides for his own shelter and sustenance, if he 
does so alone, is not fully human, for while he labors, he lacks the elements of work or 
 Haley 87 
 
 
 
action in his life. As well, homo faber may serve as a bridge between labor and action, 
but itself is focused on fabrication and preoccupied solely with means and end. It is in 
this utilitarian nature of work that homo faber fails to compare with action, because it has 
“an innate incapacity to understand the distinction between utility and meaningfulness” 
(The Human Condition 154). Nevertheless, both labor and work are necessary elements 
in the life of humans for action to emerge because only when our physical needs are met 
such that they do not preoccupy our constant thoughts and when our work creates the 
structures and goods upon which a community is built are we free to undertake new 
beginnings (natality) and distinguish ourselves from others in the public world through 
action and speech. 
 Abraham Maslow expanded extensively on this concept in his 1954 book 
Motivation and Personality in which he argues for a “hierarchy of needs” that must be 
met in order for self-actualization to occur. If labor and work are effective for meeting 
those base needs, in Arendt’s interpretation, then self-actualization is generative to 
creation. For Arendt, this space of self-actualization occurs in the natality, the creation, of 
new ideas and/or the development of creative solutions to common problems through 
action in public spaces. The composition classroom is an excellent public space for new 
college students to learn and practice the mechanisms of effective action. In contrast to 
her contemporary peer, Heidegger, who linked private contemplation (Sophia) to action, 
Arendt argues that action and plurality are intricately linked because action always occurs 
in conjunction with other people. “Action, as distinguished from fabrication, is never 
possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act. Action and 
speech need the surrounding presence of others no less than fabrication needs the 
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surrounding presence of nature for its materials, and of a world in which to place the 
finished product” (The Human Condition 188). Action outside of the public sphere is 
merely introspection, no matter how many tools or how much destruction of nature is 
involved. Action, therefore, as the principal means of defining and expressing the 
political self corresponds to the condition of plurality, which in turn is THE condition, the 
of all political life. Bridging the concept of valid individual experiences to the common 
political realm is the point and purpose of rhetorical practice in the composition 
classroom.  
 For Arendt, like Aristotle, action and speech are “coequal” and necessary 
companions under the broader definition of “action” as it relates to the vita activa. 
Without action, there can be no new discoveries or changes that benefit the public or the 
individuals who make up the public. Without speech, there can be no “remembrance” or 
means of persuasion that is necessary for action to take hold. Our words and our deeds 
together serve as defining principles of the political self in determining what makes each 
of us unique within the confines of the public sphere in which we engage. Mary Dietz 
points out that Arendt did not apply a Latinized form for this third aspect of human nature 
as she did for labor (animal laborans) or work (homo faber) “perhaps because Arendt 
means for it to capture an aspect of human life that is essentially collective” (Dietz 235). 
The idea that we all live in a world in which we share common goals and traits, yet each 
of us within that common world is inherently unique, is described by Arendt as “the 
paradoxical plurality of unique human beings” (The Human Condition 176). 
  This role of action and its relationship to plurality is intricately connected to the 
process of developing a hermeneutically engaged citizenship primarily because of its 
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impact on our ideas about freedom and how we define and communicate those ideas. 
However, before we can discuss these ideas about freedom, it is first necessary to 
examine the political self to better understand how individuals move intellectually from 
labor, work, and introspection into the realm of action. A strong understanding of this 
evolution toward action will help us better understand how to communicate and deliver 
the necessary tools to composition students for this action to occur.   
All people are defined in two ways, first in “what” they are, and second in “who” 
they are. Our understanding of the key differences between these ideas can best be 
understood through this lens of plurality. If plurality is the essential condition for the 
public realm to exist, then plurality is also explicitly reliant upon the political self 
actively operating within that realm. To create a public space is merely half the battle. 
Without active engagement within it, the creation of public space simply becomes 
publica absque causa (public without purpose).  
For Arendt, this public space is the sphere in which individuals are 
simultaneously united and identified as unique human beings. But plurality cannot fully 
and objectively define “what” a person is, e.g. the characteristics, talents, faults, etc. of a 
person, because those things can be hidden or misrepresented by either the person or the 
public and because our human limitations and situational biases prevent us from 
completely and objectively analyzing the defined “what.” Nevertheless, that same 
incomplete and vague definition, while still subject to the vagaries of ontology as Arendt 
expresses in her criticism, can be argued is still the necessary condition for acceptance 
into the public sphere as an equal.  
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If we are to accept the Enlightenment concept that all humans are born equal to all 
other humans relative to the natural world in which our unique human capacity for 
meaning-making is grounded, then the idea of “what” a person is will have both the 
unique qualities of each person as well as the universal qualities that ties us all together. 
As Linda Adler-Kassner argues in The Activist WPA¸ “the power of personally grounded 
stories for individuals... when seen as a collective body, testify and give witness to a 
larger one” (Adler-Kassner 4). In other words, “what” a person is has the same “paradox 
of plurality” that Arendt describes in The Human Condition.  
For plurality to exist, we must accept the other within that public space as having 
valid and relevant positions compared to ourselves, and we can only accomplish that if 
we accept the humanness of the other as equal to our own, regardless of the differences in 
race, gender, identity, or handicap that may exist. Put another way, if we reject any other 
person or group as less than equal to ourselves or possessing fewer “rights,” then we are 
also engendering the proposition that others may possess greater rights than our own, and 
that is antithetical to the Enlightenment ideals of equality and justice. Thus, plurality is 
limited in its capacity to define equality by any measure other than a fully socialized and 
realized ubiquity if plurality itself has any meaning at all. True plurality therefore, can 
only exist in a fully socialized and equal public space. 
While plurality may be constrained in its definition of “what” a person is, it is 
ideally suited for defining “who” a person is, because our purposeful engagement through 
actions and speech within the public realm reveal who we are, and that can neither be 
hidden nor purposefully exposed by the other within that space. This does not mean that a 
person is not human if he or she fails to engage in public speech or democratic actions 
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that we observe in others. This is because public space itself can’t be limited to 
considerations of social political action. Public space is anywhere that humans engage 
one another in various communities, whether in the home, at school, at work, or among 
friends and acquaintances, as well as public political speech.  
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca expand on this idea in The New 
Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Perelman argues that no universal audience is 
absolute, but rather that all audiences are made up of individual people with different 
perspectives dependent on the situation and the relative values of the orator. Wherever 
two or more humans engage in any type of communication there exists the individuation 
of the political self. This individuation is an inevitable consequence of living “among 
men,” as Arendt describes it, because the necessity and process of communication 
required for life among others means that we automatically disclose ourselves in the 
process. Seyla Benhabib provides us with the differentiation that Arendt brings to modern 
philosophy in this idea that the political self is constructed wholly through action. 
Contrary to traditional philosophical ideas that the self can be constructed either in 
comparison to others (e.g. the Kantian “I”) or as an introspective thinker separate from 
them, Arendt’s definition of the political self is reliant upon one’s position within the 
human community, for not even introspection is possible without a position from which 
to differentiate or define the self within the world or without interacting in the realm of 
men.  
If we can imagine a human born into the world who never has the opportunity to 
interact with another human (ignoring for the moment ideas of survival in the early stages 
of life), then that human would never possess the capacity for language, comparison, or 
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philosophical introspection, and thus the concept of the Kantian “I” would not be 
possible. Therefore, it is from our interactions with others that we learn to define 
ourselves, and those interactions necessarily breed concepts of individuation and 
community – i.e. the public realm. Thus, according to Perelman and the new rhetoric, all 
exploration of differences within this public realm must proceed from a “communion,” or 
point of agreement between the orator and the audience, or between the teacher and the 
students, that they are equal in order for contentious matters to be addressed with any 
hope of achieving consensus. This is a vital consideration for addressing the lack of 
political consensus in 21st Century, post-9/11 political rhetoric in which key influencers 
of the public realm seek to undermine points of agreement on issues ranging from 
progressive taxation to the value of social support programs by attempting to undermine 
the validity of the other.   
If all experiences are unique, then finding communal values among individuals in 
a given audience is necessarily predeterminate for action to work. Conversely, action, and 
its supporting component speech, is an integral part of defining “who” a person is within 
a given community, though it is not always clear that the definition is understood by the 
person speaking or acting. Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, is a man defined 
uniquely by his extraordinary actions and speeches, but those actions and speeches have 
no impact on the public space unless common values exist among the audiences he 
addresses. Regardless, the “who” a person is perceived as by the audience, particularly in 
retrospect, is rarely predictive because the speaker cannot know for certain if the 
communion exists until the action of the community manifests as a result. As Parekh 
argues, “the self that is disclosed in speech and action is often a mystery even to the 
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agent” (Parekh 31). This is because the phenomenologies of both the speaker and the 
audience are unique and filled with cultural screens. Often, in trying to disclose “who” a 
person is based on his or her speech or actions, we resort to describing part of “what” that 
person is to help connect our ideas to existing cultural biases and concepts as a short-
form of communication.  
When describing the ideas presented in a speech from a speaker, we inevitably 
position that speaker within acceptable, known spheres to the audience – e.g. credentials, 
position, gender, political party, class status, race, etc.  Aristotle defined this process as 
the Ethos necessary in a speaker for persuasion and rhetoric to find success. Speech and 
action in and of themselves are ambiguous without these cultural anchors from which we 
draw our opinions on the content. This is based, in part, on the inherent difficulty of 
articulating the distinctiveness of one person from another without intersubjective 
agreement between the speaker and the audience regarding the meaning and judgment of 
the speech and action.  For Ethos to apply, therefore, the audience must also possess a 
hermeneutic Confidence in the “what” of the speaker as valid relative to the topic at hand. 
This requisite intersubjective agreement is the core requirement for political influence 
and power to exist in the public space, and public space is necessary for the political to 
exist at all. As Hansen argues, “political thinking is itself a political act: it can only 
proceed dialogically” (Hansen 3).  Neither rhetorical Ethos nor hermeneutic Confidence 
can exist without one  another, just as plurality and society cannot exist without politics. 
Human existence is about more than survival and work, it is about action that occurs in 
our public spaces and how we interact and engage with the others through what Patricia 
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Bizzell defines as “social processes” in those spaces. As humans, we think politically not 
out of choice, but out of necessity.  
Aristotle dismissed epideictic rhetoric as the weakest of three genres of rhetoric, 
but Perelman promotes epideictic rhetoric and the communal values it relies upon as 
central to all arguments for action to occur. From a hermeneutic perspective, Perelman is 
right, but his explication of this new rhetorical hierarchy fails to consider the dangers that 
such rhetoric poses for critical democracy. Nazi Germany was excellent at using 
epideictic rhetoric for establishing common values among German citizens that, in 
broader analysis, were ultimately destructive to democratic ideals of equality, justice, and 
freedom.  Arendt’s unique contribution to the study of public life and the nature of human 
interaction, therefore, is motivated by her direct experience and observations of the rise 
of a Totalitarian state in Germany and is bounded by the nature of the political human in 
modernity and the ways in which humans interact with one another in public spaces. She 
avoids judgment or directives in her philosophies, even of those people who supported 
the Nazi party in Germany. Her goal was neither deconstruction of the political world nor 
a rationalization of  pro forma ideals; rather, she was interested in exploring, as 
objectively as possible, the history of mankind and its influence on  the hermeneutics of 
individual action within political spheres regardless of moral or ethical decree, yet her 
“objective” study of this space also relied upon modern communal values constructed as 
a result of the sins of the Totalitarian Nazi state.  
Humans are political animals driven by individual desires shaped by our history 
but not controlled by it. We are both creatures of our past and progenitors of our future, 
but our actions exist only in the now, or as Arendt describes it, “Between Past and 
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Future,” between what has shaped us and what we are going to shape. It is clear from our 
history that humans are both capable of shaping a society that benefits the greatest 
numbers of people within it as well as shaping one that is destructive to all but a few. 
Thus, Arendt’s goal was to understand rather than proscribe human action and interaction 
in an effort to explicate the notion of freedom and improve our collective consciousness 
regarding the roles action and politics play – “for action and politics, among all the 
capabilities and potentialities of human life, are the only things of which we could not 
even conceive without at least assuming that freedom exists…and freedom…is actually 
the reason that men live together in political organization at all. Without it, political life 
would be meaningless. The raison d’etre of politics is freedom, and its field of 
experience is action” (Between Past and Future 146).  
This is critical for composition teacher to understand because our role not only 
within the academy, but also within the broader democratic society the academy exists to 
protect, is to educate new citizens about their responsibilities in a democratic society, 
about the dangers of unexamined ideologies and traditions, and about the necessity and 
process of action in the public sphere to protect basic freedoms. However, the concept of 
“freedom” itself is an ontological one, and uniquely hermeneutic. That’s why an 
examination of that rhetorical space is also necessary for understanding the motivations 
of composition students.  
Freedom never exists in a vacuum, but can only exist in relation to others within 
the public sphere, thus freedom is dialogic in the Bakhtinian sense.  Our notions of 
freedom, conflicting as they sometimes may be, are always framed in response to the 
notions of freedom as expressed by others and in anticipation of arguments that will be 
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framed against our own expressions in the future. There are also the dialogic notions of 
freedom “to,” and freedom “from,” which are sometimes diametrically opposed. In other 
words, there is no unified ideal or proposition of freedom that can be either demanded or 
imposed without simultaneously infringing upon the notions of freedom as they are 
understood by others, and that is the exigence of  politics as well as the necessity of 
action within the public sphere.  “Men are free – as distinguished from their possessing 
the gift for freedom – as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act 
are the same” (Between Past and Future 153). We are free, in other words, only as much 
as we define freedom for ourselves and act to gain, maintain, and defend it.  
This necessity of action for freedom to exist is the foundational argument for a 
hermeneutic pedagogy within higher education that bridges the desires for freedom by 
new citizens in our classrooms with the necessity of an active and engaged citizenship in 
a functional Democracy. It’s also a simple argument to make to new writing students in 
the academy: “If you desire freedom in your life, it is necessary for you to act. Without 
constant and persistent action, there is no freedom for yourself or your family.” As we 
have discussed, wherever social spheres exist, there exists the individuation of the 
political character, and though “political” thinking is often intimidating when the idea is 
broached with new students, it is important for our audience to understand that thinking 
politically involves neither academic intelligence nor moral ideology; rather, it is the 
fundamental, naturally social process by which we secure our individual places in our 
overlapping spheres of influence through our relationship to the “others,” in Ricoeur’s 
definition, and more importantly, to our concept of the self. Most importantly, how we 
understand ourselves is the engine that drives our political motivations. Therefore, it’s 
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one thing to tell students they should be involved and even to tell them why, but unless 
we understand what motivates our students to action from their perspectives, we will 
never generate true engagement on their part.    
This is Arendt’s recursive proposition of the self, that is, how we identify 
ourselves as individuals depends on how we choose to interact and engage with other 
individuals and groups that make up our Jabermasian spheres, and our identities are 
inextricably tied to our personal experiences and views regarding our capabilities, 
opportunities, and limitations within those spheres. Our concepts of freedom exist in a 
binary tension between the individual concept of the self and the concept of what defines 
the social good in support of the self. Supporting the social good at the expense of 
individual free will necessarily places constraints on the purely pluralistic individual who 
wishes to live among others in a stable society of laws, morals, and ethics. One can never 
be ultimately free to act without considering the consequences of those actions both upon 
the self and upon the social world one inhabits. One cannot have freedom without a 
public sphere in which to exercise it, and one cannot have a public sphere without laws 
and limits upon individual action, thus infringing upon that freedom.  
Those who act out of pure selfishness with no regards to the social sphere act 
outside the bounds of that sphere, and thus act alone. As Arendt points out, acting alone 
occurs only in the realm of the animal laborans and does not meet the minimum 
definitions of what can be said to be fully human. In addition, acting alone without 
consideration of that action on one’s social spheres is not “action” in the political sense, 
but rather is an act of abrogation of society itself. Since freedom can only be defined 
relative to our actions and capabilities within the public sphere, acting alone without 
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regard to that sphere can never be defined as freedom. Freedom, therefore, is a boundless 
concept without a universal definition even though, and perhaps because, it is the purpose 
of the political self. It is only in our natural political minds that freedom has meaning, and 
only within our individual, hermeneutic minds that it has definition.  This may appear 
antithetical to the public notion of freedom, but it is ultimately appropriate since we both 
imagine our plurality and engage in common society only through our individual ideals 
and actions, and the motivating elements of all political thinking lay in our many varied, 
intensely hermeneutic concepts of freedom.  
Within the public realm, freedom exists only so far as it can be experienced by 
those engaging in that realm through action, yet freedom itself “does not express 
anything. It just is, in itself” (McGowan 151). It is a conceived and perceived concept 
that exists only in our political minds, with as many variations of concept and perception 
as there are minds engaged in the process. Humans overcome this fractured, hermeneutic 
concept of freedom by developing political institutions to codify and enforce systems 
designed to preserve and protect “freedom” for those who are acting members of those 
institutions. Since freedom itself cannot express anything, it is left to these institutions to 
define public concepts of freedom as they are perceived by its acting members and use 
political action to ensure the security of those concepts in the public realm. The reality of 
freedom, then, depends entirely upon institutions enforcing limited ideals of a concept 
that cannot exist without those ideals being promoted through action. This lies at the 
heart of Arendt’s claim that freedom only exists where men live together in political 
organization, for “not one man, but men, inhabit the earth” (The Human Condition 234). 
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The academy is an ideal example of a political institution responsible for the preservation 
of freedom through the education of engaged citizens.  
There is, of course, a danger inherent in the proposition that freedom only exists 
where many individuals gather, define, and act upon a concept that is so uniquely 
hermeneutic, and that danger is evident in virtually all modern political institutions. For 
wherever people gather to define and enforce their concepts of freedom, there exists the 
probability that such enforcement will subjugate other people and infringe upon their own 
distinct ideas of freedom, and that infringement comes into existence when the inherent 
properties of power that emerge naturally from political institutions are applied in ways 
that undermine ideals of equality, justice, and freedom that the institution is meant to 
preserve.  
Arendt is careful, however, to differentiate power from strength and violence. 
Power is potentially existent wherever people gather together and agree on ideas or 
actions for their community, and its realization corresponds to the condition of plurality 
and the people who agree and support the propositions of the institution from which it 
derives. But true power, like freedom, is a boundless concept that exists only in the minds 
of men and is wholly reliant upon the continued actions of those who accept its 
potentiality through an aggregation of approval or indifference. The boundlessness of 
power lies in its ability, like freedom, to be divided without decreasing its effectiveness.  
However, wherever people seek to abuse power through strength or violence as a 
means of decreasing the effectiveness or freedom of other institutions, then power 
inevitably dissipates.  “Power is actualized only where word and deed have not parted 
company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to 
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veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but 
to establish relations and create new realities” (The Human Condition 200). Tyranny, on 
the other hand, is often defined by the violence toward and oppression of the subjects 
who are prevented from acting and speaking together in the establishment of new 
political institutions. Tyranny relies on violence and oppression masquerading as power, 
but inevitably destroys itself because only the weak rely on such machinations to achieve 
control, and that control is always illusionary. Mahatma Ghandi and Martin Luther King, 
Jr. both realized this truth and were able to create true power from the actions of 
“powerless” people banding together in new non-violent institutions for the purpose of 
creating a new reality.  
Power only exists where there is freedom to act, and power is circulated and 
accepted by a culture through the formation of political institutions. Moreover, freedom is 
the only condition under which power can be maintained. It is not power itself that 
“corrupts” as Pericles claims, rather it is the “will-to-power” and anti-political concepts 
of greed and control that is corrupting as Nietzsche so artfully describes. However, unlike 
Nietzsche who saw will-to-power as the main driving force in man, Arendt viewed the 
quest for permanence against the  ongoing, never ending cycles of nature as the prime 
motivations of human consciousness, and that quest for permanence lies not in relatively 
fleeting ideas of power, wealth, or station, but in the remembrance of ideas and actions 
that are only possible in a realm where freedom is the ideal and the vita activa is the 
process from which it derives.  
The Student as Political Self  
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The American notion of equality as inherent in all living persons from the 
moment of birth is a purely modern concept brought about as a codification of new 
ideologies embodied in the philosophies of the Enlightenment, which in turn developed 
in response to the chaotic ambiguities of a world seeking new values and discovering 
them only in the limited spaces. Without natural law as transcendent truth, new 
ideologies formed based on race, power, intrinsic ability, or in the case of Protestantism, 
moral rectitude, and dominated philosophic thought. Arendt refers to this development of 
ideology in place of transcendent truth as Weltanschauung.  
The fact that such a basic concept like equality must be codified in the nation’s 
constitution is an example of a political  institution establishing an idea as sacrosanct in 
pursuit of egalitarianism and protection of human rights that only has power so long as 
the people support it because there is no “natural law” to defend it otherwise. “No 
answers handed down by tradition are available and valid any longer; the break in 
tradition is an accomplished fact…we are irrevocably modern” (Between Past and Future 
15, 26). This is where Arendt presents one her most controversial assertions, an assertion 
that not only possesses enough evidence to be necessary for consideration, but which also 
offers us the exigence for redefining the role of the academy as the place for the 
development of the political self.  
Arendt argues that modern society, on all its levels, having absorbed both the 
traditional political and private realms into the public, excludes the possibility of action 
for political purposes because it “expects from each of its members a certain kind of 
behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to normalize its 
members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding 
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achievement” (The Human Condition 40). This argument strikes at the heart of our 
semantic disagreements over the concept of “freedom,” because society expects from its 
members a conformity to social rules where behavior has replaced action as the primary 
means of relating to one another in the public sphere. The obstacle to action that 
expectations and societal pressures create have been explored by other writers like 
Spellmeyer, Myers, Walters, and R. Lane Kaufmann, but what Arendt offer us as 
composition teachers is more than observations and criticism of this obstacle; she offers 
us the underlying motivations to and from action that is engendered by our presence in 
society as both individuals and members.   
Modern equality is uniquely different from ancient equality not because we have 
institutionalized the idea of equality as inherent in all living people, but because modern 
equality means conforming to social rules of acceptance of the other as the same as me, 
where ancient notions of equality required citizens to differentiate themselves from one 
another through action and speech, to be distinct, to distinguish oneself and demonstrate 
one’s individuality through unique ideas. “In the modern world, distinctions are the stuff 
of the private, where we are unique only to our friends and family, while in society we 
conform in order to appear equal and lacking in distinction” (Parekh 47).  
This does not mean, however, that society built on the proposition that all people 
are inherently equal is incapable of recapturing distinctiveness and originality within its 
plurality; on the contrary, in the modern age of instant communications, worldwide 
media, and an increasingly decentralized notion of authority, we are observing the rise of 
individuality and political action by those who support democratic reforms around the 
world.  What we are beginning to see at the beginning of the third millennium is a return 
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to political action that challenges enshrined political institutions that, in their attempts to 
secure their existence and stabilize the status quo have increasingly undermined political 
action by individuals or groups with differing philosophies that might challenge them.  
It’s ironic how these institutions fail whenever their prominence or power is used to 
oppose or reject political action necessary to change their structures as the world changes 
around them, for “political institutions, no matter how well or how badly designed, 
depend for continued existence upon acting men” (Between Past and Future 153).  
When the plurality is no longer served by the institutions designed to support and 
defend the governments of which they are part, then those institutions lose their power 
when the people stop supporting them, and those institutions inevitably are faced with 
three choices: To resort to violence, which we have already determined is antithetical to 
real power and doomed to eventual failure; to adopt fundamental reforms and change in 
leadership as a means toward salvation outside the status quo; or to dissolve altogether, 
which often leads to upheaval and instability until new institutions might be formed. 
When the founders of the United States codified our constitution, their aim was to create 
a system in which the second option is the natural default of political action in an attempt 
to ensure the long term survival of the nation through regularly scheduled elections as an 
institutionalized form of political action in support of constant, conservative change. 
Though this system has been tried and tested since its foundation through often 
contentious, sometimes violent discord, it has demonstrated a level of stability and 
general prosperity in modernity that no other political system or nation can claim. As 
Winston Churchill so famously proclaimed, “Democracy is the worst form of government 
except for all those others that have been tried.” 
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It is important to note, however, that Arendt’s concept of political action neither 
engenders nor is concomitant to “social equality.” As we have discussed, social equality 
is purely modern concept in which we accept others as same as me and thus equal and 
deserving of the same social, educational, jurisprudent, economic, and political 
attainment. In our fervent and noble efforts to extend the benefits of equality to the 
plurality as a whole, we often confuse the realm of the political with the realms of justice 
and security. Remember that the nature of human existence is political, and the purpose 
of the political self is freedom. This does not mean that “freedom” trumps political 
action, but rather that freedom does not exist without it. Neither can freedom be granted 
to others through political action, rather, freedom exists only where political action is 
taken by individuals or groups working in concert toward their own political ends.  
 Likewise, using politics as mechanism for delivering wealth to oneself or to 
others is doomed to undermine the very freedoms it hopes to establish. In the Origins of 
Totalitarianism, informed as it is by her analysis of Karl Marx, Arendt presents a politics 
of accumulation as the “fundamental dynamism” of capitalist economics in which 
totalitarian power uses political devices to secure property and wealth at the expense of 
the polity despite the rhetoric of those forces who claim capitalism is the only philosophy 
under which freedom can thrive. On the contrary, as Arendt so aptly argues, the 
acquisition of wealth as the sole focus of political action is anathema to freedom and 
through its devices will always undermine “the liberty and autonomy of man” (The 
Origins of Totalitarianism 143). Neither can politics be a mechanism for abolishing 
poverty or equalizing the distribution of wealth. While Arendt was deeply motivated by 
the American Revolution and the political structures developed by free-thinking men who 
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were heavily influenced by Enlightenment thinkers like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, 
she was equally critical of the French Revolution that focused more on serving the 
recurring economic needs of all its citizens at the expense of stabilized constitutional 
government.  
In On Revolution, Arendt adopts the position of Edmund Burke who wrote of the 
French Revolution that the people of France “may have subverted Monarchy, but they 
have not recovered Freedom” (Clark 64). For Arendt, governing policies that are extrinsic 
to personal liberty in their pursuit of either property accumulation or wealth redistribution 
are based on “the aimless, senseless chaos of private interests” in which “property 
becomes a dynamic, new-property producing device” and creates a system where “wealth 
becomes a never-ending process of becoming wealthier” (The Origins of Totalitarianism 
142, 145). To be clear, it is not that capitalism or social welfare programs are unjust, 
though they possess those properties as well, nor are they the panacea for any of our 
nation’s needs or problems, it’s that they are meaningless relative to the pursuit of 
freedom through political action. These economic philosophies are merely philosophies 
with both positive and negative consequences, but they are not progenitors of freedom for 
anyone. 
Many critics have noted the aesthetic nature of Arendt’s ideal of freedom, 
unbounded as it is from conditions of economics, society, culture, etc. For Arendt, each 
of us seeks a life distinguished from others and worthy of “remembrance” as a means of 
attaining a kind of historical permanence that exists nowhere else but in the minds of 
men. But an individual life can only be distinguished if it is unique, and uniqueness is 
shunned in a society built on a same as me philosophy of equality. Therefore, attaining 
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such distinction requires individual actors, in the political sense, to live and perform their 
political actions in a space of societal expectations of adherence to a norm while also 
challenging that norm in very public ways. Martin Luther King’s “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail,” is an excellent example of this dichotomy of norm and challenge.  
Political life in modern society, therefore, is reliant upon attention from an audience who 
connects with the actor personally or sees the actor as representative of the audience’s 
interests, especially when those interests challenge the status quo.  
Political actors compete with one another for attention in a bid to win acclaim and 
secure support for their positions, a skill that Arendt refers to as “virtuosity,” a concept 
she borrows from Machiavelli’s concept of virtù, or the “excellence with which man 
answers the opportunities the world opens up before him in the guise of fortuna (Between 
Past and Future 153). Arendt was interested primarily in the virtuosity of performance 
itself rather than the end product that such a performance is intended to produce due to 
her strict adherence to the notion of political action that is separate from necessity, which 
belongs in the private realms of labor and work. “The accomplishment lies in the 
performance itself and not in the end product which outlasts the activity that brought it 
into existence and becomes independent of it” (Between Past and Future 153). Any 
political action motivated by need or intended to produce specific results is inherently 
bounded by predicted outcomes and antecedent causes and thus falls in the realm of 
governing policy rather than being an act of freedom. Furthermore, a political act limited 
in idea or scope by cultural or societal expectations on the part of the actor is not an act of 
freedom, but is performed for the sake of the audience’s expectations, which can never be 
original nor free.  
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Without the tangibility of physical boundaries, such an act is entirely reliant upon 
the presence of the other as audience who can see and acknowledge the free act, learn 
from it and critique it, and engage in a discourse of freedom necessary for the political 
self to exist. For an act of freedom to exist at all then “depends entirely upon human 
plurality, upon the constant presence of others who can see and hear and therefore testify 
to [its] existence,” and that is ultimately the necessary equation for permanence in an 
impermanent world (The Human Condition 94). Action in the form of freedom, as Arendt 
defines it, is what locates the agent in the political realm and separates the agent as a free 
thinker among those who occupy the space of appearance in which the act occurs.  
As inhabitants of a material world with its political and social systems focused on 
the needs and security of a society, we are intractably engaged in the day to day functions 
of labor and work towards those ends, but political action in a space separate from those 
is our best potential response, perhaps our only possible response to the limitations of the 
physical world in pursuit of freedom of the mind and immortality of the spirit. Freedom 
cannot exist without action. 
The Composition Classroom as Public Sphere 
Bounded as we are as living beings in a complex world by circumstances of 
culture, society, material needs, and security, finding a space in which the political actor 
can engage in the kind of freedom that Arendt defines is particularly difficult, especially 
considering the modern confusion and blending of the mutually exclusive concepts of 
freedom, economics, and religion. But without the capacity for modern people to 
experience freedom in its pure form, an act that is completely spontaneous and a totally 
unexpected intervention into the causal world, then freedom as a concept ceases to exist 
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and all political action is relegated to oppression, subversion, submission, or 
inconsequence. “Action, to be free, must be free from motive on one side, from its 
intended goal as a predictable effect on the other. This is not to say that motives and aims 
are not important factors in every single act, but they are its determining factors, and 
action is free to the extent that it is able to transcend them…as such the free act is quite 
literally a miracle” (Between Past and Future 151, 169). What such an act produces is a 
space of appearance that is unbounded by the dictums and expectations of the world and 
thus brings into being a truly new idea distinguished from material goods or personal 
necessity. This capacity for producing new ideas or bringing into existence new forms of 
political thought is captured in Arendt’s concept of natality. 
Most critics see Arendt’s concept of natality as a response to Heidegger’s 
argument that mortality drives human motivations. Heidegger positions all human action 
relative to “anticipatory being-towards-death” in which humans confronted with their 
imminent and guaranteed demise are propelled to action in between birth and death, and 
Arendt anchors much of her philosophy on the in between, and drew the title of her 
collection of essays from this idea. Other scholars note that Heidegger does not use the 
term “natality” in his work and Arendt did not begin to incorporate it into new essays or 
revised editions of her work until the 1950s. Nevertheless, the concept of natality as 
Arendt introduces it is rooted in her argument that birth, not death, “sends forth each 
person as unique” and “makes possible the action, and more particularly the political 
action, which Arendt regards as the privileged vehicle of authentic self-disclosure” 
(Gottsegen 26).  
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Originality then, is not a derivative characteristic of a person’s existence among 
others in time and space, or as Heidegger argues in Being and Time as a realization of the 
self relative to one’s encounters with the existent world; rather, Arendt argues that 
differentiation is inherent in every individual as a condition of birth, and each person has 
the capacity for original thought and new political action in the pure form of freedom 
regardless of whether each person achieves that potential over the course of his or her 
life. This bringing into the world of something wholly new and free of external demands 
is the nature of Arendt’s natality. Where Arendt and Heidegger do agree is that human 
political action can only be revealed through appearance to an audience. In that view, 
who a person is in his or her singularity can never be known “except to the degree he [or 
she] attains concrete particularity” as a person among others through interaction with 
them (Gottsegen 27).  
As we have discovered, however, interaction with the other is often bounded by 
cultural and societal expectations within a given sphere such that freedom is suppressed 
in favor of approval seeking and acclaim. This is compounded by an increasingly 
profligate media and communications industry designed to appeal to individual and group 
confirmation biases in which original thought, conflicting opinion, and political freedom 
are sacrificed to the convenience of multiple spaces delivering tailored rhetoric to 
decreasingly discerning audiences. But if we accept Arendt’s notion that only in 
community can people achieve the manifestation of their individual potential, then it 
becomes necessary to construct a space in which multiple cultures and viewpoints, 
combined with a freedom from worldly necessities and otherwise constructed 
confirmation biased audiences, can gather to share ideas and engage in political action 
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and speech unfettered by the boundaries these restrictive elements imply. “If, then, we 
understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or raison d’être would be to 
establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear,” and the 
space of the academic writing classroom is ideally suited for just this purpose (Between 
Past and Future 154). It is the academy, and perhaps in modern times only the academy, 
that provides an opportunity to establish for new citizens a space in which economic, 
cultural, and religious interests can defer to pure political action.  
The academy is an educational institution that could, and should, lend itself to the 
creation of the type of public space that Arendt imagined as many current composition 
scholars argue. From Susan McLeod in the early 90s to Eli Goldblatt, Arabella Lyon, 
Sharon Crowley, Steve Parks, Adler-Kassner and others in the past decades have argued, 
the  composition classroom is a natural extension of the community, and the development 
of Writing Across Curriculum/Community programs have been so successful because 
they are right. Since the writing classroom does not belong to the realm of necessity and 
is freely entered into by students from multiple communities and cultural backgrounds, it 
is ideally located in the nexus of engagement among these communities with the students 
themselves serving as representatives of them.  
In Crisis of the Republic, Arendt very briefly discusses this space as an 
opportunity for political engagement of the form she promotes, since its concerns are 
open to discussion by all those involved, does not require a managerial form of 
government, and provides the space in which students can regularly meet and engage in 
open discourse. However, Arendt also argues that students and their professors are 
unequal in their capacity to conduct their common affairs and since professors and staff 
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possess a space of authority within the system, the potential for public space is limited in 
scope. This argument is certainly valid in a traditional curriculum focused on common 
denominators among students and one in which students are compared to one another 
relative to their adherence to the institutional forms and knowledge. However, in a 
hermeneutic classroom, the discourse model focuses on the individual experiences of the 
students and uses the meta-conversation to help those students develop the kinds of 
rhetorical tools necessary for effective public action. In support of this ideal, Arendt 
herself taught classes at The New School in New York, a uniquely student-driven 
academy designed to foster exactly the type of open public space Arendt proposed.  
Kenneth Bruffee’s more recent work in collaborative learning models are good example 
of how the discourse model can be developed as well.  
One of our greatest hurdles, however, to achieving a purely political space in the 
academy in which natality can flourish is that the relationship between students, the 
American public at large, and the academy is strained. A number of factors account for 
this, including political and financial ones, but there is an increasing feeling among 
students and the broader community that American universities are no longer living up to 
their promise as institutions that develop critically engaged, innovative thinkers who 
drive our national economic and social agenda. It becomes necessary then for us to begin 
the process of “Re-Validating” the academy as a key component in the defense of 
political action and freedom through the education of good Democratic citizens who are 
aware of their own cultural biases and possess the capacity for self-reflection and 
intellectual thought necessary to action.  
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By recovering Arendt and injecting her political theory into the field of rhetoric 
and composition we can build on the excellent work of rhetoric and composition scholars 
of the past 20 years who have argued for a return to civic literacy and engaged 
community action in composition pedagogies. From Anne Ruggles Gere’s Chair address 
at the CCCC’s in 1993 to Susan McLeod’s work in strengthening WAC programs, the 
early development of community engaged writing and other efforts to extend writing 
from the composition classroom into the community were successful in part because they 
take advantage of key parts of Arendt’s hermeneutic philosophy of the political self. The 
same can be said for Victor Villanueva’s, Michelle Halls Kells’, Juan Guerra’s, and 
other’s work to extend the writing classroom in multi-cultural directions and begin 
recognizing the value of minority voices in democratic values of equality and justice. 
What a hermeneutic classroom offers is not a revolution in teaching theory, it is rather an 
evolution of thought regarding student voices and the responsibilities of the academy to 
connect those voices to their democracy. What Arendt offers is all of these scholars is an 
underlying philosophy of the political self that both grounds and extends their work in 
student phenomenologies. It’s a philosophy that will help writing teachers better 
understand not just how to connect student voices to their communities, but more 
importantly why students respond so encouragingly to the pedagogy. If the exponential 
growth of social media is any indication, then our students are hungry for the public 
space. A hermeneutic classroom can be that sphere and help them shape their voices for 
greatest effect within it.  
More so today than even in the second half of the Twentieth-Century, the 
possibility of public space in which all voices have equal opportunity and truly new ideas 
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are welcome and discussed is increasingly unlikely to occur outside of a space designed 
to foster exactly that kind of freedom. If our goal is to develop new citizens capable of 
reasoned discourse in pursuit of common problems, then it is vital that we create the 
kinds of spaces and intellectual skills necessary for such a discourse to exist beyond the 
confines of a carefully controlled space. The modern writing classroom in American 
universities represents this opportunity of space, but only if writing teachers recognize 
their dual roles as classroom leaders and citizen peers whose function is to initiate, 
propagate, and guide classroom debate in which all student voices and ideas are granted 
equal validity. How this can be accomplished, as well as the research and theories that 
support this process, are detailed thoroughly in Chapter Five. But first it’s important to 
further explicate the concept of the “other” as Ricoeur defines it as well as the role 
narrative plays in establishing our collective cultural consciousness. 
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Chapter 4: Paul Ricoeur 
Hermeneutics and the Student as the Narrative Self 
 
This Chapter brings into the conversation Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and 
identity creation. This is an important element in the development of self-reflective, 
critically aware citizens capable of expressing their voices through writing. In this 
section, I will make the connection between the phenomenological experiences of the 
physical world and the concept of the self. I will also show how this process generates 
interpretative activity and an understanding of “being in the world” as both idem and ipse 
identities. This subjective process, as Ricoeur describes, is framed by his theory of 
mimesis, which I will explicate. I will also examine in detail the connections between 
narrative, identity construction, and action that help form the basis of a hermeneutic 
pedagogy. These connections are affected by our concept of time and the influence or our 
culture, which I will explore as well. Finally, the process of interpretation in the act of 
narrative formation and reflexivity in identity development will help connect Ricoeur’s 
theories to the process of action by individuals in support of critical discourse and active 
democratic engagement. My units of analysis for this chapter are Freedom and Nature, 
The Symbolism of Evil, From Text to Action, and Time and Narrative. 
If self-reflection is a critical element in the development of positive action for a 
society, as Dewey and Arendt argue, then a more thorough understanding of the process 
of identity development through an anthropology of the self can provide the foundation 
for a hermeneutic practice of education that promotes and enables self-reflection. In other 
words, if we can understand how human beings establish their individual identities and 
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interpret the world, then we can engage them in a process of interpretation that unfolds 
the world more thoroughly and generates critical thinking, defined as an “attitude of 
being disposed to consider in a thoughtful way the problems and subjects that come 
within the range of [their] experiences.” We can help students understand how to 
interpret, understand, and engage more effectively with others in their communities 
through the simultaneous process of self-discovery and other-discovery that results from 
reflection of their own biases and phenomenologies. The idea is that the stimulus of 
discovery promotes further discovery, including self-discovery, and this is vital in the 
development of critically engaged citizens of a healthy democracy. 
An important element in Ricoeur’s concept of discovery is his rejection of 
Cartesian dualism; Ricoeur argues in “Crisis of the Cogito” that the mind and body share 
an interrelated existence. Where Descartes saw the body as a thing and the mind as 
separate from that thing, Ricoeur argued that the body is an organism through which we 
live our intentional existence and our consciousness is a construct of all those experiences 
both physical and mental. We are our body, and consciousness is not just some trapped 
entity locked inside it: “Consciousness is not a closed place about which I might wonder 
how something enters it from the outside, because it is, now and always, outside of itself” 
(Ricouer 119).  
Consciousness, for Ricoeur, is the disposition to act, not merely an awareness of 
one’s existence. This disposition to act is defined by Ricoeur as “intentionality,” and it 
draws heavily on Edmund Husserl’s thematic awareness theory that argues for a unity of 
experience polarized between a conscious physical knowledge of something and the 
reflective internal meaning of that thing. The important point is the consciousness of and 
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the meaning of objects, ideas, concepts, etc. are always of that external presence in the 
world, even when internalized, and thus possess a certain unity derived from our 
reflective consciousness as beings who encounter phenomena in the world and must 
always interpret it relative only to our physical experiences of the world.  
This concept provides one of the strongest intersections among Arendt’s, 
Dewey’s, and Ricoeur’s theories. If, as argued in the previous chapters, there is no 
external physical world that is relevant to an individual beyond that person’s 
comprehension of it, and the intentionality of consciousness generates a natural unity 
between the self and the world, then Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur frame an existential 
phenomenology that says a person has meaning only because the world has meaning, and 
vice versa. Thus, in our natural state of engagement with the outside, we are confronted 
with “an already meaningful world. It is not a world that lies vacant, available for an 
individual spontaneous construction and reconstruction of meaning. Consciousness 
applies to, or is applied to, what Husserl termed the “life-world” that is already 
meaningful. This relationship of meaning between consciousness and its life-world is a 
fundamental, irreducible structure of our being-in-the-world.  
This “being-in-the-world” is a construct of Heidegger’s Dasein in which he 
argued that human beings cannot be accounted as real except that they exist in a world 
amongst other things. Ricoeur references Heidegger in his famous “Model of the Text” 
essay as “rightly [saying]…that what we understand first in a discourse is not another 
person, but a project, that is, the outline of a new “being-in-the-world”” (From Text to 
Action 218). This also provides the intersection between Ricoeur’s phenomenology and 
Arendt’s being-in-the-world philosophy of the vita activa, demonstrating Heidegger’s 
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clear influence on them both.  But where Arendt was concerned with the fundamental 
activities in the world that define being human, Ricoeur was concerned with how 
existential phenomenology of  that world is responsible for the hermeneutic development 
of self-identity and motivation.  
As Ricoeur argued, a hermeneutic phenomenology of existence is one that is ruled 
by the signs, symbols, and texts, including language and its construct, that we use to 
apply meaning and convey information. Since all of these elements require interpretation, 
and since all interpretation is a product of the phenomenology of the self and experience, 
then self-reflection and identity will always be mitigated by the signs, symbols, texts, and 
language we use to identify the self: “There is no self-understanding that is not mediated 
by signs, symbols, and texts; in the final analysis, self-understanding coincides with the 
interpretation given to these mediating terms” (Oneself as Another 15). In addition, 
Ricoeur argues in The Symbolism of Evil that the self does not know of itself implicitly 
but only as a product of the mind interpreting these signs and symbols placed in the  
memory and in the imagination by tradition, stories, literature, cultural experiences, etc. 
by others in the world. If this is the case, then the concept of individuality is always an 
interpreted entity in constant need of new stimulus for the purpose of further defining, or 
even consciously altering, that identity.   
This concept supports both Hannah Arendt’s arguments for tradition and 
remembrances as guiding principles in educational philosophy as well as John Dewey’s 
calls for an active learning system. It is in Ricoeur’s ethics of subjectivity that a common 
heuristic can be found among these reformers for practically applying hermeneutic tasks 
in higher education classrooms. Dewey recognized the impact that conscious social 
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engagement has on the development of society, and Arendt developed this idea to suggest 
that social engagement generates an awareness of the other such that social development, 
both personal and as a society, is also subject to the effects others have on the self. 
Ricoeur advances this notion one step further. For Ricoeur, subjectivity includes the 
imagined other as self-same to one’s own phenomenology in which we tend to project 
our self awareness onto the other by imagining our experiences as shared and thus 
complementary. Patricia Bizzell adopts this same argument in her development of 
discourse communities. 
This is not to argue that phenomenological experiences are the same for each 
person, even when each person shares cultural, societal, and even historical 
commonalities. Nor does it undermine the notion that equal to me does not have to mean 
same as me. But it does argue that an experience that elicits common reactions among a 
group of people does so because that group shares at least some values in common, and 
those values are developed through individual phenomenological experiences mitigated 
by the signs, symbols, and discourse we use to understand them. This means there is, at 
some level at least, common reactions to similar experiences, and that generates a 
connection between individuals and/or among a group that can be utilized toward 
consensus building for the purpose of advancing social development. What it also means 
is the connections between the self, the other, and the world are genuine, even if we don’t 
fully comprehend all the details of those connections.  
This is Ricoeur’s subjectivity and, nuanced as it is, provides a key element in the 
value of a hermeneutic philosophy of writing education. As Ricoeur argues, “by 
subjectivity I mean the subject function of an intentional consciousness, such that I 
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understand it as applying to me and to others; thanks to this mutual elaboration of 
knowledge of self and other, I arrive at true concepts of subjectivity, valid for man, my 
fellow” (The Philosophy of Paul Ricoer: An Anthology of His Work 10).  This intentional 
consciousness has the power, through individual action within the group and in support of 
the group, to shape our world as we live and understand it. By embracing Ricoeur’s inter-
subjectivity, we begin to develop a better understanding of both the self and of the role 
society plays in shaping the self, and vice versa. Thus, we become engaged citizens not 
out of a sense of responsibility or through indoctrination into the political realm by order 
of the academy, but instead by merely being part of a group and of society. The writing 
classroom is an ideal place for this group participation to flourish in support of critically 
thinking engaged citizens, especially if we as teachers remain conscious of the 
connections and differences among our students that hermeneutic principles imply. 
Students can’t be anything else but engaged members whenever they connect, in 
whatever fashion, with another or group of others. This is a foundational theory of a 
hermeneutic pedagogy of education, and we succeed in helping our students understand 
their connections to one another and to their roles in the broader society and world 
communities when we help them understand how we are affected both by a past that is 
not of our own making and by the perceived future that our individual phenomenological 
experiences suggest.  
The Role of Narrative in Effective Action 
Our ongoing humanistic mission and progress toward universal goals of freedom, 
equality, and justice are always interpreted through and affected by this lens of 
subjectivity, but such progress is neither unidirectional nor inevitable. This means it takes 
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initiative to make history and affect our future reality while defining ourselves in the 
process.  This definition of the self becomes our personal identity, and understanding its 
process will help us understand how best to provide our writing students with 
opportunities for its development.  
Ricoeur reasoned that personal identity has two essential elements, an idem-
identity and an ipse-identity. The idem-identity is the self as one understands oneself at 
any given time, a self with a constant spatiotemporal existence. This constant-ness is 
created by applying the signs, symbols, and language to ourselves in the process of 
identity building, an identity that is unique and constant through the fact of our being. 
The ipse-identity is also the self, but it is the one that changes over time. The personality 
and identity one has at 40 is unlikely the same as they were at 19. Thus the self, though 
possessing a static identity, is also mutable in its personality, knowledge, etc. “Ricoeur’s 
wager is to construct an alternative epistemological hypothesis…that will account for the 
self both in its sameness and in terms of its manifestations in time, its temporality.” In 
addition, “the self can be accounted for over time not only in terms of its identity but also 
in terms of its transformations” (Rasmussen 216). The idem identity is the self that helps 
establish permanence of being, the concept of the self as unique, and the concept of 
personal values, ethical positions, traditions, etc.  The ipse identity is the self that gives 
humans the unique capacity to initiate meaning-making interpretations of ideas and 
experiences that have not been experienced before and apply them to the idem identity, 
which, by its nature, initiates interpretation of those experiences and applies them to our 
motivations for action. Ipse identity is also the self capacity to create brand new things, 
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what Arendt refers to as our natality, and impute them to the self. It frames our potential 
as human beings.  
Without both sorts of identity there is no self, and because there are two kinds of 
identity that work together by both stabilizing and continuing to develop the self, then the 
self exists in two effective orders of causality, the physical now and the intentional future. 
This places Ricoeur and Arendt on the same footing in which Arendt argues for two 
different spaces, the private and the public, the family and the political. The private, 
family self is idem oriented. It inhabits ritual and tradition and security. As Dewey 
argues, we attempt to keep it free of uncertainty. The public, political self is ipse oriented. 
It’s the space where motivation and desire generate initiative for progress and solutions to 
problems of self, the community, and society. But neither exists without the other, and 
understanding how the two identities of the self are intersubjective is developed through 
the process of narrative. 
Ricoeur argues that the way humans resolve the conflict between the self as idem, 
and the self as ipse, between both the self as self and the self as other, is to construct an  
identity of self using the tools of narrative to relate a past, a present, and a future that 
includes agents of action in a plot in which the self is the main character affecting, and 
affected by, these agents and experiences across time. In essence, we construct a story 
about ourselves as we used to be and how our experiences came to make us who we are 
today, our idem. Our ipse identity is what grants us the ability to subjectively project 
ourselves into the future, and we do that by interpreting the narrative of the past self and 
consolidating that narrative with our perceptions and knowledge of the self at present into 
a new idea, a potential being who does not yet exist but could through intentional action.  
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It is this process of how we interpret the narrative past that is vital to 
understanding Ricoeur’s value in the development of critically engaged political citizens. 
For Ricoeur, historical time is human time “to the extent that it is articulated through a 
narrative mode, and narrative attains its full significance when it becomes a condition of 
temporal existence” (Time and Narrative 58). Ricoeur was concerned with the question 
of why reflection on a historical narrative must also include interpretation of the symbols 
and texts we use to understand it. In part, it’s because all of our memories and histories 
can only be representations of those events in time as described by the narrator, even 
when the narrator is the self who experienced those events. Our own memories, no less 
our stories, histories, and traditions, exist only in a form of the symbols, images, 
language, etc. we use to imagine them. We are not actually seeing the full reality of that 
event in its time and place, but only our interpretation of it. Ricoeur calls this the “detour” 
of interpretation to highlight his belief that the operation of interpretation does not access 
the world directly but instead “shapes” the world through our subjective understanding of 
it: A person “constitutes it as the world that surrounds him by projecting onto it the aims 
for his action and his demands for meaning”  (Ricouer 89).   
Ricoeur argued that the external world and the internal self are knowable only 
through this detour of interpretation (Oneself as Another 297).  Ricoeur preferred this 
notion because the effort of interpreting the world is dependent entirely upon our pre-
existing phenomenology and therefore is not the same thing as actually accessing the 
world as it is. We must “detour” through our experiences of the world to interpret it, and 
that will always be affected by that phenomenology. Ricoeur writes, “what is a situation 
that is not already interpreted, even if this be only in the categorizing of properties and 
 Haley 123 
 
 
 
relations?... From what external position does one perceive the correspondence between 
the mental situation and the factual situation?” (Reply to Dabney Townsend 212). Our 
interpretation of the world, at any given moment, is reliant on this intersubjectivity as 
well as our individual hermeneutic notions of being-in-the-world. The world has meaning 
because we have meaning, but we draw our individual identities and meaning from our 
phenomenological experiences of the world. This is related to the famous “hermeneutic 
circle” problem in which interpretations of individual things are relevant only within the 
whole, and the whole is relevant only because of the individual things within it. Thus, our 
temporal self is always a subjective self. This idea is anchored in Aristotle’s concept of 
mimesis, and Ricoeur argues in Time and Narrative that our narratives merely imitate, or 
mimic, the action of the past or present, and this mimesis is constructed upon three 
essential stages, which he calls mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3.         
 Mimesis1 is the stage of understanding the sphere or reference in which the action 
takes place, what Ricoeur calls “pre-understanding of what human action is, of its 
semantics, its symbolism, its temporality.” In doing so, Ricoeur credits Arendt with the 
framing of this pre-understanding of past action being grounded in narrative: “We speak 
of a life story, as though life were a story in search of a narrator. In the same way, 
Hannah Arendt, in her magnificent work The Human Condition, distinguished action, 
properly speaking, from labor and from work by means of the fact that action is what 
calls for narration, as though any action worthy of the title expects no other confirmation 
than fame and glory” (Mimesis and Representation 142). This referential past that we 
understand both in our internal narrative and our external engagements contains common 
elements, or anchors, of shared knowledge and experiences that are accepted intuitively 
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by the narrator and audience. These anchors include everything from an accepted 
physical sphere in which the action takes place (the basic laws of physics and the 
consistency of physical objects found on earth through time) to common historical 
assumptions and knowledge of the referents within the narrative. Common human 
activities like dining or shopping, for example, are ritualized and contain an “inchoate 
narrativity” that doesn’t require interpretation. Mimesis1 engenders the intuitive narrative 
structures that are described by mimesis2 like metaphor, motive, desire, conflict, 
cooperation, heroism, and misfortune. Ricoeur refers to these pre-understood narrative 
structures as “emplotment.”  
 Though narrative content, structure, and style may vary across cultures, the 
underlying existence of narrative itself across all cultures along with a consistency of 
themes (e.g. good vs. evil, triumph over adversity, heroism, comedy, tragedy, etc.) 
indicates its universality as a tool for bridging cultural divides. It can also be argued, as 
Ricoeur hints throughout his study of narrative and language, that the very structure of 
language itself has no meaning outside of narrative; it has no objective reality of its own 
but serves only to symbolize being and action. One piece of evidence for this is that every 
language in the world has verbs that signify action, giving even the most diametric 
cultural differences a shared narrative referent centered in action.  
 This pre-understanding of action is intuitive, but intuition is not the same as 
interpretation. That’s what Ricoeur signifies as the stage of mimesis2. In this stage, every 
symbol used in representing the narrative gives birth to meaning through the process of 
understanding. Here we configure the sphere of overall action and the individual actions 
taking place into an understanding of their relationship to the self and the external world. 
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Where mimesis1 provides a sphere of reference by relying on antecedent structures and 
patterns established through our experiences of the world, mimesis2 allows us to 
internalize those referents and apply meaning to them and develop beliefs based on our 
relative cultural expectations. Thus, if our narrative language exists to represent temporal 
action, then narrative is also instrumental in the establishment of belief, values, ethics, 
etc., and can either reinforce or challenge cultural norms based on the narrative schema, 
an important point in the justification of a narrative component in a hermeneutic 
pedagogy of writing.  
To understand how the self moves from the intuitive phenomenology of the varied 
parts of the life-world in mimesis1 to a configured meaning relevant to the personal and 
the public in mimesis2, Ricoeur draws on Richard Rorty’s consideration of the “linguistic 
turn” in the philosophy of language, and also Loius O. Mink’s  act of narrative 
configuration that consists of “grasping together the details, or what we have called the 
incidents, of the story. From these diverse events it draws the unity of the temporal 
whole” (Mimesis and Representation 146).  In this sense, the process of moving smoothly 
from the first mimetic conception of the narrative to the meaning-making function of the 
second mimetic stage necessarily involves accepting contexts and responses that are not 
entirely our own creation when we borrow meaning from the intention and rhetorical 
devices of a narrator who is not our self. Thus, the narrative emplotment necessary for 
meaning-making serves as a mediator between the other’s point of view and our own. 
The interpretive process we engage in hermeneutically in mimesis2 links the listener to 
the speaker through the active process of understanding, acknowledging, and accepting 
the narrative emplotment, and this linking between speaker and listener is the space 
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where social dimensions of the human subject are formed. “Such is the realm of mimesis2 
between the antecedence and the descendance of the text. At this level mimesis may be 
defined as the configuration of action” (Mimesis and Representation 147).  
The third stage of mimesis3 derives directly from this process of interpretation and 
involves “application” in the sense of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. Influenced 
as it is by the social dualism of interpretation, mimesis3 is the stage of understanding 
where the narrative moves from interpreted story to personal action. It is in this space 
following interpretation that self-reflection and evaluation generate the motivation to act. 
We have already determined that self-reflection is the critical element in the development 
of positive action for a society, and this stage of mimesis is the narrative as we imagine it 
moving forward, either in its own development or in ours as impacted by it. In other 
words, mimesis3 “is the intersection of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or 
reader. Therefore it is the intersection of the world unfolded by fiction and the world 
wherein actual action unfolds” (Mimesis and Representation 148). Since narratives are 
made up not only of action, but also of characters, then our interpretation of these 
characters’ motives, desires, and sufferings becomes relevant to the self both because our 
hermeneutic concept of the self is projected onto the motivations of a narrative’s 
characters, and because our self is simultaneously being influenced and affected by those 
characters’ motivations and actions.  
We evaluate the qualities of a character in a narrative based upon that character’s 
responses to, and actions in, his or her fictional environment, but that evaluation is 
always predicated upon the cultural biases and screens of the reader or hearer, which may 
not have been the same at the time of the narrative’s emplotment or the time of the 
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creator’s development of it. The classic Roman story of Cimon and Pero is a good 
example. The lesson of Roman Charity praises the act of a daughter breastfeeding her 
imprisoned father to prevent his starvation and winning his release from jail through her 
selfless act. Well into the Renaissance, this story was a common inspirational lesson 
taught by the Catholic Church and was captured in numerous paintings of the great 
masters like Ruben and Caravaggio. Today, the same story in a composition classroom 
evokes initial reactions from students that are far from inspirational connections to 
charity. Once an interpreted frame is presented in cultural terms of that time, 
understanding might occur, but the initial repulsion by modern students is a relatively 
new development of Western Culture. How our culture evaluates the qualities of the 
characters Cimon and Pero has changed over time, along with the impact of our 
interpretation of that story on its perceived reality and that story’s impact upon our own 
understanding of ourselves. Thus, time also plays a critical role in Ricoeur’s theory of the 
self and  narrative temporality.  
Time and Narrative 
Since we consider the self as existing in three time spaces – the past, the present, 
and the future – then the narrative self is inextricably bound to a structured timeline, and 
thus time determines all thinking and all self-reflection. But time in the narrative sense 
embodies two axes, one is the objective formulation of time as a chronological 
measurement of existence; the other is the subjective formulation of time where self-
reflection generates a psychological self-image that consists of interpretations across time 
and brings them into the present. According to Ricoeur, “the task for thinking about time 
is to understand how the human being embraces both psychological and cosmological 
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dimensions of time” (Klemm 57). Narrative is the place where these two concepts of time 
intersect and can be incorporated into the identity in a unified way. Ricoeur dedicated 
three volumes of Time and Narrative to this process in which he argues that “time 
becomes human time to the extent that it is organized after the manner of a narrative; 
narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features of temporal 
existence” (Time and Narrative 3).  
This confluence of narrative and time on the understanding of the self means our 
identities are never based on accurate, objective reality, but rather consist of a composite 
of interpreted narratives, both from external stories and internal memories across time. 
“The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her 
narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that 
makes the identity of the character” (Oneself as Another 147–48). Since our concept of 
the self and the values we embrace are the result of mimetic narratives of history that 
change over time, then our composite, interpreted idem-identities are never static.  
As one might imagine, this constant mutability of identity creates dissonance 
between the self as interpreter and the self as actor. If, as Dewey asserts, action is 
mitigated by doubt and the desire to remove uncertainty to ensure the best outcomes; yet, 
as Ricoeur reveals, we are never completely “at one” with ourselves, then self-doubt 
becomes an irreducible fact of human nature and the only effective tool for reducing 
uncertainty in the world is constant, life-long, critical self-reflection. Thus, one’s identity 
is never an objective, static entity waiting to be uncovered, but rather must be constantly, 
actively created through the process of narrative.  This constant process of identity 
development based on our re-actions to the actions of the other “is why identities are not 
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fixed structures or substances; instead they are mobile and, until the story is finished, the 
identity of each character or person is subject to revision” (Chiari 32). Our goal in a 
hermeneutic classroom is to give students both the awareness and tools necessary to 
actively and consciously revise their own identities.  
The Role of Narrative in Establishing the Self and Self-reflection 
As we’ve established, narrative is both the structure of self-identity and the 
constant change agent of that identity. Who we are, and who we will become, is always 
affected not only by the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves, but also by the history 
and influence of an external world that is not of our own making. We become capable 
then of affecting our future selves and the future selves of those with whom we engage in 
our communities and society by initiating new interpretations of past actions to develop 
and sustain new realities. Building on Arendt’s concept of natality, Ricoeur argues that 
every action is both conscious and purposeful while also being the product of other 
actions, and new actions only take place in a context of meaningfulness as a response to 
past action and in anticipation that there will be future responses to it, reinforcing the 
relationship between time an narrative.  
As a side note, we should consider that there is no concept of “present” action that 
occurs outside the self, because the process of mimesis means that only after an action 
has occurred can we react to it. This even holds true in the sense that action, particularly 
political action, is often undertaken as a response to potential action as proposed by 
others. Yet that proposal itself, whether as legislative policy or even philosophical ideal is 
action in itself, and our responses to that are anchored in our mimetic interpretation of its 
meaning and impact in the past and motivated by our desires to either ensure or prevent 
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its fulfillment in the future. Therefore, all action external of the present self takes place in 
the past, and since future action is only potential action, then real action in the present is 
only possible within the self.  
Regardless, our responses to past actions are the product of the interpretation, 
synthesis, and judgment of those actions as rooted in current cultural biases and 
expectations. That means that all narratives of those actions possess moral and ethical 
dimensions that present themselves through the evaluations we place upon the characters 
of those narratives by how they act or what they endure relative to our own moral 
identities. Indeed, this moral connection to character behavior is the very exigence of 
narrative itself, since narrative exists in part to develop one’s own identity and also in 
part to establish cultural norms across society.  
Narratives are also the vehicle for understanding the other in respect to the other’s 
impact on one’s own identity and character. This generates a kind of primacy of the other 
relative to the self that undermines the fundamental arguments presented by objectivist 
ideology. It generates a validity of the other as necessarily equal to the self, possessing 
qualities that we find both positive and negative, allowing us to embrace, accept, or 
change our own characters based on our response to those characters and their actions. As 
Ricoeur argues in Freedom and Nature, objectivism actually lacks the capacity for 
identifying the objective self: 
“Objectivity is not naturalism. The be sure, a psychology which pretends 
to treat the Cogito as a class of empirical facts which it calls mental facts 
or facts of consciousness and which it claims to be verifiable by methods 
of observation and induction used in natural sciences, a psychology which 
 Haley 131 
 
 
 
degrades the central experiences of subjectivity, such as intentionality, 
attention, motivation, etc., to the level of a physics of the mind, is in effect 
incapable of shedding light on my bodily existence in any profound sense” 
(Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary 15). 
 Ricoeur’s subjectivity is robust in its grounding of the self as other, and vice 
versa. This not only includes others in the community around us or who have come 
before us in history, but it also includes the self-as-other in the sense that we are mutable 
beings in constant development. The self we were a decade ago may not be the self we 
are today, but that other self is still an other whose past actions impact our current 
identities and to whose past actions we are responding. In terms of our ethical being, this 
narrative unification of the other and the self consists of an identity that exists to be 
responsive to and act in ways that generate responses from others. Thus, the self in action 
is not an autonomy preserving self, as Kant might argue, but is instead a social preserving 
self. It is motivated by the prospect that its responsiveness to others is capable of 
changing the future in a way that continues to preserve both the self  and the social group, 
to the greatest benefit of all the group, since others are such an equal and irreducible part 
of the self.  Dauenhauer summarizes Ricoeur’s analysis of personal identity development 
through narrative with four conclusions (Paul Ricoeur: The Promise and Risk of 
Politics): 
1. Because my personal identity is a narrative identity, I can make sense 
of myself only in and through my involvement with others. 
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2. In my dealings with others, I do not simply enact a role or function 
that has been assigned to me. I can change myself through my own 
efforts and can reasonably encourage others to change as well. 
3. Nonetheless, because I am an embodied existence and hence have 
inherited both biological and psychological constraints, I cannot 
change everything about myself. And because others are similarly 
constrained, I cannot sensibly call for comprehensive changes in them. 
4. Though I can be evaluated in a number of ways, e.g., physical 
dexterity, verbal fluency, technical skill, the ethical evaluation in the 
light of my responsiveness to others, over time, is, on the whole, the 
most important evaluation. 
Narrative is instrumental in the development of the personal identity, and personal 
identity shapes how we interpret and engage the world. Thus, the stories we tell about our 
external world as well as the narratives we create about ourselves are what shape action. 
If action is necessary for freedom to exist, as we’ve established throughout this work, 
then there is an inextricable link between the internal mind shaped by narrative and 
physical world freedom embodied in action.   
Ricoeur examines the basic disproportion that characterizes the finite and the 
infinite dimensions of a human being in the difference between the mind’s capacity for 
reason and meaning-making and the biological, incorporated self that inhabits the 
physical world. This disproportion  is evident in everything we create that is not intended 
to meet the immediate or near term needs of our biological selves. Art, architecture, 
metaphor, music, speech and all other forms of meaning making and attempts to 
 Haley 133 
 
 
 
influence an outward society are disproportionate to the personal biological need, and as 
a result, we are never wholly internalized beings separate from the external world. Since 
the external world has both meaning of its own and must be interpreted by each of us 
with our inherent cultural screens, then our interpretations are always potentially fallible. 
That means our actions based on those interpretations are always potentially fallible as 
well. Indeed, we are innately fallible. This is the crux of a hermeneutic education, the 
capacity to accept our own potential fallibility, and thus the need for self-reflection, 
social engagement, civic discourse, and consensus building.  
The implication of this idea is that while our attempts to reduce uncertainty may 
be the motivation for action and the precursor of critical thinking as Dewey ascribes, the 
outcome of that action is not reliably predictable for actually reducing uncertainty or 
achieving desired outcomes like freedom, justice, and equality. This is exacerbated by the 
actions of some individuals who, for whatever reasons, seek to destroy and sow discord 
within a society. Indeed, the existence of people whose actions are “evil” or who have 
“bad will” toward the other is simply not accounted for in Dewey’s Subjectivism at all.  
Ricoeur, however, sees these elements (bad, evil) as constructs of identity that 
also help create the possibility and motivation of elements like goodness, kindness, 
charity, etc.  The elements of social progress we value most in our democracy exist in 
part because of the existence of elements like greed, evil, violence, etc., and we wouldn’t 
have one without the other. Thus, the quest for common values and unity through 
communication to bridge differences and promote consensus is only possible because of 
the nature of personal identity that includes notions of fallibility and recognizes “evil” 
doing by those whose actions are not in the best interest of the self-supporting society. 
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The very disproportion that makes us fallible and makes human evil 
possible is also what makes goodness, knowledge, and achievement 
possible. It is what distinguishes us from one another—each one of us has 
his or her unique spatiotemporal location—and at the same time makes it 
possible for us to communicate with each other, through the logos that 
intends to transcend such localized points of view.” 
Precisely because we can observe, think, communicate, act, and observe again, 
the differences between individual values are never absolute. Even notions such as good 
and evil, or right and wrong, are mutable and susceptible to interpretation and 
perspective. That means there is always potential for communication and action to alter 
values or build consensus between seemingly diametric points of view, and that is the 
real value of discourse for building and preserving freedom in a democratic society. 
Values change over time as action by individuals and groups challenge cultural 
assumptions. This means no one of us alone can be a self-actualized person. Though each 
of us has an individual identity, those identities are the construct of social engagement 
and demonstrate that we are intricately connected with the other: “Man is this plural and 
collective unity in which the unity of destination and the differences of destinies are to be 
understood  through each other” (Fallible Man 138). If our individuality defines our 
hermeneutic understanding of freedom, and individuality only exists in complement to 
the other as equal, then only through social engagement where the other is treated as valid 
and equal is freedom even possible.  
“For Ricoeur, freedom is not a transcendental presupposition. Rather, freedom is 
human capability that traverses the structures of a project motivated by needs and desires, 
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of movement that exerts effort on bodily resistance, and of voluntary consent to the 
limitations upon action. Therefore, human freedom is an embodied, incarnate freedom” 
(The Poetic Imperative 24). In other words, if the self is essentially embodied in the 
physical, then the self exists in part due to the material and social world that supports it, 
yet it nevertheless always retains a freedom of imagination and initiative to create new 
things, as Arendt argues about natality. What this ultimately means is that both the idea 
of freedom and the idea of the self are essentially the same thing. This is why self-
reflection is so vital to the preservation of a democracy that embodies freedom itself. By 
setting the construct of freedom within the context of the self, Ricoeur was already 
establishing a philosophy of the basic structure of human capability grounded firmly in 
our narrative interpretations and strengthened, rather than weakened, by the reality of our 
constant mutability and our physical connection to nature.  This distinctive understanding 
of subjective structures as relevant to our phenomenological experiences is one of the 
keys to a hermeneutic pedagogy that unfolds the process of interpretation for students so 
that process can both be better understood and actively engaged in support of our ideals 
of freedom, justice, and equality.  
The Process of Interpretation and Reflexivity 
If reflection is a form of interpretation, then understanding the process of 
interpretation when one encounters a narrative will be helpful in the development of a 
practical pedagogical system that allows students to recognize their idem and ipse 
identities and the influences of their experiences in the formation of those interpretations, 
which is vital for active self-reflection. Since all acts of interpretation are a dialectic 
between guessing and validating based on phenomenological experiences combined with 
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education and knowledge to produce a conclusion, it is important for students to 
recognize how that conclusion is filtered through their experiences and subjected to the 
flaws of cultural bias and confirmation bias. 
As reflective and interpretive creatures influenced by phenomenology, we make 
educated guesses about the meaning of a narrative or action and then check that guess 
against the meaning of the whole. At the same time, we comprehend the meaning of the 
whole based on our understandings and interpretations of the parts. This is the 
hermeneutic circle in action. At the end of this process, we make conclusive assumptions 
built on our relative skills in logic and deduction, but there is never a definitive outcome 
or “truth” that can be derived from this process, only mitigated opinion. Since we can 
always derive more than one conclusion from an interpreted action, these differences in 
conclusions must therefore be negotiated in order to generate consensus among a 
plurality, particularly for political action. This process of negotiation is validated not by 
measuring it against a preset or empirically verified outcome, but by measuring 
interpretations against the logic and deductions of competing interpretations. Thus, 
validation and consensus are built not from concrete truth but through “a logic of 
uncertainty and qualitative probability” (From Text to Action 159).  
Despite the differences in interpretations, it is possible to set the criteria for 
conclusions based in research, logic, and deduction. When more than one interpretation 
fulfills these criteria, it is also possible to compare the conclusions and make judgments 
about which interpretation is the most likely considering all possible factors and the 
quality of deductive reasoning. This falls in the realm democratic discourse and 
consensus. Indeed, for the purpose of developing critically engaged, discourse oriented 
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citizens of a healthy democracy, competing interpretations in a classroom setting are a 
goal to be achieved rather than avoided. Since any narrative, text, action, idea, etc. 
encompasses a limited field of possible interpretations, then the process of building 
consensus through validation is the casus belli of interpretive conflict. As Ricoeur argues, 
“It is always possible to argue against an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to 
arbitrate between them and to seek for an agreement, even if this agreement remains 
beyond our reach” (From Text to Action 160). Indeed, any contrast in opinion or 
interpretation that leads to cognitive conflict sets the stage for discovery, and discovery is 
the core motivation of a critical mind. What’s important to understand here is that 
Ricoeur argues throughout his reflections on discourse and action that individuals are the 
agents of their own construction or demise, both as self and as members of a social world 
since each person is simultaneously unique and representative of the whole. Regardless, 
the greatest capacity of any individual, so far as Ricoeur is concerned, is the ability to 
bring into being things in the world that must be interpreted.  
One problem of a hermeneutic interpretation, as Ricoeur himself noted, is that it 
provides no means of evaluating its claims about the world: “In expressing itself, how 
can life objectify itself, and in objectifying itself, how does it bring to light meanings 
capable of being taken up and understood by another historical being, who overcomes his 
own historical situation?” (The Conflict of Interpretations 5).  Ricoeur was concerned 
with finding a method for choosing between different interpretations that would have 
some level of objectivity and reason that could be communicated across cultural and 
social differences in an effort to bring consensus into the equation.  If the detour of 
interpretation is restricted by individual phenomenology, then a method of overcoming 
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that restriction lies in Ricoeur’s concept of reflexivity, meaning that an interpretation has 
value if it successfully reflects both the object being interpreted and the person making 
the interpretation. Reflexive activities such as speaking, willing, knowing, and evaluating 
are methods of “self-knowing” and also interpret the world by their very act of coming 
forth from the mind that is itself an interpreted entity.  
The fact that human beings possess the capacity for these reflexive activities 
engenders the proposition that such reflexivity is possible when they are understood not 
as mere methods of communicating and interpreting of the world, but also as methods for 
interpreting and communicating the ever-evolving self that exists in that world. When 
that kind of reflexive interpretation is engaged, then it is possible to achieve that level of 
objectivity that Ricoeur is concerned with. Reflexivity combines both elements of the 
idem identity formed as a condition of one’s past experiences, traditions, and culture, as 
well as the ipse identity capable of projecting ideas, actions, and promises into the future.  
This dialectic of interpeting both self-identity and the otherness of the world, as 
represented in the hermeneutic circle, gives one the capacity to both narrate the self and 
be responsible for one’s narration of the world in a way that comprehends and reaches 
across cultural divides because it is grounded in an understanding of the self, influenced 
as it is by both historic memory and potential action. Here we find the concrete 
connection betwee Ricoeur and Arendt regarding the impact of tradition and memory on 
the self as well as the potential for action reaching into the future. Ricoeur summarizes 
this connection: “In memory and promises, the problematic of self-recognition reaches 
two high-points simultaneously. The one is turned toward the past, the other toward the 
future. But they need to be considered together within the living present of self-
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recognition, thanks to several features they have in common” (The Course of Recognition 
109).  
Ricoeur contributes significantly to this concept of the self as understood in 
relation to memory and promises, as well as the self as other in his work on attestation. In 
deference to brevity, focus, and a practical hermeneutic pedagogy, we will dispense with 
a complete and thorough analysis of attestation, which could take several volumes and is 
already well-covered by such scholars as Jean Greisch, Richard Cohen, Sebastian 
Kaufmann, Bernard Dauenhauer, and many others. In summary, attestation is Ricoeur’s 
term for the concept of the self-as-other in action, represented by the dialectic between 
interpretation and self-analysis discussed in reflexivity as well as the desire to “be-in-the-
world.” Attestation is the assurance of being oneself acting and suffering based in the 
belief of the “I am” inherent in the Cartesian cogito as well as the confidence that one’s 
actions can affect the interpreted world at large. As Kaufmann summerizes, attestation is 
what “allows the self to appropriate its otherness: The otherness of its capacities, the 
otherness of its identity, the otherness of its body, of other people and of its conscience. 
In other words, the self gains the confidence of being a self through the confidence that 
the actions it performs and the words it says are its own actions and words; the 
confidence that the narratives it tells expresses its own identity; the confidence that the 
body is its own body; the confidence that the esteem of other mediates its own esteem 
and that the values it embraces are its own values” (Kaufmann i). Attestation and 
Reflexivity are two conditions of Ricoeur’s philosophy that contribute to the active self, 
both interpreted and projected into the world. But understanding these ideas is only half 
the battle. Reflexivity and attestation in practice is necessary for a pragmatic pedagogy 
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and the process of interpretive activity converted to action is the goal of such a system. 
That is the topic of the next chapter, a pragmatic pedagogy of hermeneutics in the 
composition classroom that embraces and encompasses these theories of Dewey, Arendt, 
and Ricoeur. 
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Chapter 5: The Student as Citizen 
A Hermeneutic Pedagogy of Writing Instruction 
 
This Chapter combines the philosophical arguments of Dewey, Arendt, and 
Ricoeur and distills from them a functional, applied pedagogy of hermeneutic 
composition. To frame this pedagogical argument, I will provide a brief history of 
composition pedagogy of the past three decades and briefly discuss the few composition 
scholars who have introduced hermeneutic theory to the field during that time.  I will also 
examine the important role that narrative plays in identity development. Then I will 
discuss the value of critical interpretation of the narrative structure in support of that 
development and argue for a peer-oriented teacher-student relationship in 
hermeneutically focused classrooms. With these important structures established, I will 
summarize the key arguments of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur to better demonstrate the 
areas of overlap in their philosophies that provide for a synthesized application of 
hermeneutic education. Finally, I will present the four essential elements of a 
hermeneutic composition pedagogy along with specific strategies for their 
implementation, including examples of my own classroom practices. My units of analysis 
for this chapter are A Teacher’s Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, Ways of 
Reading, Reflection in the Writing Classroom, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, and 
Alternate Readings: Student Hermeneutics and Academic Discourse. 
Hermeneutics in the Composition Classroom 
Since at least the early 1980’s, composition scholars and pedagogical practices in 
the academy have embraced what Patricia Bizzell, Lester Faigley, and James Berlin, 
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among many others, have defined as the “social turn” in composition pedagogy. The 
move away from the individualistic, structuralist, and cognitive pedagogies of the prior 
decades toward social epistemologies and multiculturalism was driven in part by a 
generalized concern over falling “literacy” skills among students. Bizzell clearly 
identifies the problem of literacy skills as equivalent to the “problem of democracy in 
contemporary America and the practical political task of fostering the rhetorical 
processes needed to negotiate differences within a divided and unequal citizenry” 
(Trimbur 108). The resulting theories and practices embraced composition as a 
mechanism for action in political, economic, historical, and cultural realms. 
The social-epistemic movement defined and embraced by Bizzell and Berlin was 
supported, in part, by hermeneutic theorists in the 80s and 90s like Jean Grondin, Thomas 
Kent, Timothy Crusius, Stephen Mailloux, and Louise Weatherbee Phelps.  Scholars like 
Grondin and Kent sought to recover hermeneutics from the realm of abstract theory and 
apply its interpretive understanding to the growing popularity of student-centered 
pedagogies that challenged dominant narratives and established discourses of the 
academy. Crusius linked Ricoeur’s hermeneutic philosophy directly to James Berlin’s 
work in social-epistemic rhetoric with a focus on interpretation, and his book A Teacher’s 
Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics comes closest to accomplishing what this 
dissertation attempts to clarify. Specifically, Crusius embraces the “being in the world” 
frame of student composition as well as the Ricoeurian idea that “interpreting is not so 
much what human beings or some class of human beings do but rather what all human 
being are” (Crusius 5). Yet Crusius relies too heavily on Kenneth Burke’s constructive 
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deconstruction and fails to account for the elements of motivation toward freedom and 
action that Arendt and Dewey provide.   
Crusius was not the only theorist of the 80s and 90s to bring hermeneutics into the 
conversation of composition pedagogy. Mailloux built on Stanley Fish’s interpretive 
models to try and resolve the constructionist/deconstructionist tensions that emerged in 
the post-process debate by using hermeneutics to support students as interpreters of their 
own world. He embraces Rorty in a focus on historicism and cultural context for 
interpretive practices yet fails to fully empower the student as peer in the present or 
embrace how “being in the world” affects the interpretive process.  
Phelps focuses more on the theoretical connections between Ricoeur and 
composition scholarship rather than pragmatic practice in the composition classroom. 
Indeed, most of the scholarship of the late 80s and early 90s in hermeneutics and 
composition lacked pedagogical directives. As David Brauer points out, “though these 
critics (Mailloux and Phelps) demonstrated the viability of hermeneutics for composition 
studies, they struggled to articulate its role in helping students negotiate written texts or 
deal with the exigencies of academic writing” (Brauer 73). Nevertheless, the work of 
these theorists connecting hermeneutics and composition theory helped pave the way for 
the social turn in composition classrooms that materialized in the 90s and 2000s, as well 
as the cultural studies and discourse practices of scholars like Villanueva, Guerra, 
Gilyard, Kells, and many others.  
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, theorists and scholars advanced the social turn 
through both “cognitivist” (Flower) and “expressivist” (Gradin) pedagogies that 
embraced inclusion rather than exclusion. In 2000, Robert Yagelski sought to combine 
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these two pedagogical trends into a unified theory that embraced both the discourse and 
cultural functions of cognitivism as well as the self-interest and agency of expressivism 
(Yagelski). What all of these scholars have brought into modern composition classrooms 
are the techniques and theories of a basic hermeneutic practice of connecting students to 
both themselves and the world, and teaching these students the value of their individual 
and collective voices relative to society at large. That makes embracing a hermeneutic 
pedagogy that much easier because the tools for its implementation already exist, even if 
the understanding of why these tools work has been largely ignored in graduate 
composition pedagogy classrooms. What is important is the connection these scholars, 
and many others, make between the interpretive act of writing and the promise of 
political, social, and cultural engagement by new citizens of the democracy.  
Essentially, writing is a process of activating our ipse-identities; it is the action 
that connects students to their individual and collective life-worlds. Yagelski sums it up 
best when he argues that writing is a transformative power that is more likely to occur 
when it is conducted by individuals within a group setting, such as a composition 
classroom, because its “transformative power is more likely to be realized, and it ceases 
to be merely a matter of procedure, a tool for communication, an exercise in control, and 
a means for sorting and norming. Instead, writing becomes a way of being in the world. 
When we write, we enact a sense of ourselves as being in the world” (Yagelksi 7). Thus 
we come full circle to Dauenhauer, Heidegger, Arendt, and Ricoeur who saw this “being 
in the world” as a primary necessity of self-identity, and through writing and narrative we 
justify and legitimate ourselves as both individuals and members of a social world. When 
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we write, we act, and as we have already well established, action is the primary process 
of ensuring, defending, or creating ideas of freedom in a society.   
 
 
Narrative and Interpretion in Identity Development 
The narrative function of composition we use to tell our stories is much more than 
a simple structure for the teaching of writing. Narratives are acts of interpretation, both as 
writers interpreting our world and readers interpreting the same world through different 
hermeneutic lenses. The probability of those interpretations being different, and even 
conflicting, from one writer to the next or one reader to the next is not a weakness of that 
form, but rather a fundamental strength that engenders the overall goal of creating self-
reflicting, critically thinking students. Jean-Francois Lyotard, a contemporary and 
follower of Ricoeur, provides us with a connection between narrative and critical 
thinking by way of interpretation. He argues that readers encounter narratives both 
intellectually and emotionally, and that it is our emotional reaction to a narrative that 
guides our individual interpretations. The emotional sensations we encounter in a 
narrative, on a scale ranging from extreme displeasure to extreme pleasure and 
everything in-between, informs the intellectual mind of its state of being.  
This aesthetic interpretation is a reflection of the act (the narrative) and is, 
according to Lyotard, “the site of invention, where desire works free of the rule of truth” 
(Bourgeois 166). Here Lyotard foregrounds the social turn of composition pedagogy by 
placing the process of interpreting a text fully in the hands of the individual and linking 
reflection directly to interpretation, thus giving that individual the power to reject or 
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accept the underlying meta-narrative. Furthermore, Lyotard undermines objectivism, 
rationalism, and other notions of absolute “truth” by placing reflection (i.e. aesthetic 
interpretion) in the primary role of critical thought: “Reflection is the laboratory of all 
objectivities. In its heuristic aspect, reflection thus seems to be the nerve of critical 
thought as such” (Bourgeois 167). 
One key point in the Lyotard argument is the role not only that writing plays in 
connecting students to narrative, but also the role of reading as well, something that 
modern composition pedagogy has largely ignored with the institutional focus on 
generative rather than interpretive composition skills. Considering the goal of a writing 
class is, after all, writing, the focus on pedagogies for production of text rather than 
consumption of text seems logical in a non-hermeneutic sense. However, what Lyotard 
substantiates and modern scholars like Ken Bruffee, Patricia Bizzell, James Berlin, and 
Stephen Mailloux have come to embrace, is the idea that composition is both a rhetorical 
and a hermeneutic act, and to privilige one of these acts (writing) at the expense of the 
other (interpretation) is to undermine the strength of the hermeneutic circle and interfere 
with the process of critical thinking development. Indeed, the social turn’s contributions 
to composition theory and pedagogy in developing discourse communities by interpreting 
and challenging dominant narratives paved the way for post-process pedagogical 
development seen in most composition classrooms today. This, in turn, has generated an 
opportunity for a hermeneutic pedagogy that contextualizes composition pedagogy both 
as a process of creation and a process of interpretation, what Stephen Mailloux describes 
as “the double nature of rhetoric” (Mailloux 38).  
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Most composition pedagogies assume that interpretive reading is a pro-forma 
practice primarily for engendering textual creation, and little has been done in the past 
three decades to invigorate the hermeneutic engagement of reading. David Joliffe, David 
Bartholomae, Linda Adler-Kassner, and Margarite Helmers are among the few scholars 
in recent years to approach this subject and challenge the dominant paradigm of textual 
genesis at the expense of textual interpretation in the general composition classroom. In 
Adler-Kassner’s (with Heidi Estrem) 2007 article, “Reading Practices in the Writing 
Classroom,” she aptly critiques the dearth of studies that focus on writing-instructor 
contextualization of reading expectations among their students: “at the same time as 
instructors ask for more explicit guidance with reading pedagogy, that pedagogy is rarely 
included in composition research, graduate composition courses, or first-year writing 
program development material” (Adler-Kassner). Yet despite this lack of research and 
pedagogical support, “critical reading” is clearly called for in the WPA Outcomes 
Statement for composition courses.  
David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky have more recently engaged this issue 
in their classroom text, Ways of Reading, that attempts to engage composition students in 
an active relationship with the essays in the book through interpretive questions and 
processes that help students read both within the context of the essays and “against the 
grain” of the text to better understand framing, expectations, and cultural processes 
(Bartholomae 10). The essays, however, are challenging for even advanced readers, and 
though it offers a “strong reading” pedagogy that introduces hermeneutics to writing 
teachers and students alike, it does not accommodate actual student hermeneutic 
processes. Nevertheless, Bartholomae and Petrosky fully embrace the balance of 
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interpretive reading and reflective writing as supportive hermeneutic acts, and we are 
seeing more composition scholars look toward the benefits of hermeneutics as a method 
for dealing with “the radical situation of our modern world, one in which communication 
is rendered difficult by the multiplicity of discourses” (Brauer 72). 
Teachers as Peers, Students as Equals  
A crucial element in a successful environment of interpretation and learning is 
resistance to the privileging of teacher discourse and knowledge over that of students. In 
his canonical text Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire challenged the “banking system” of 
education pedagogy by calling for a more equitable relationship between students and 
teachers. Freire recognized the value of identity-development and discourse construction 
skills that occur when teachers and students work together to question and challenge 
discourses and narratives through a political lens. When students and teachers work 
together to unfold the world and examine the influences of narrative and discourse on our 
identity development and cultural landscapes, then both become active participants in the 
creation of knowledge on an even footing. 
This is particularly valuable in the sphere of a composition classroom, and it’s 
important to frame this discussion of a hermeneutic pedagogy in the term of 
“composition classroom” rather than “Freshman English” because of the inherent 
languistic “otherness” that the latter engenders. In addition, the concept of “composition” 
extends well beyond the construct of putting words on paper. Composition is inclusive in 
framing multiple modes of creation, from argumentative essays to identity development 
and all other creative acts. The composition classroom is place where we compose not 
only texts and arguments, but ideas and identities. New students of composition may 
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enter the academy with varying levels of linguistic skills formed from a myriad of 
phenomenological experiences, but virtually all of them enter it as voting age adults. That 
means regardless of linguistic skill, experience, knowledge-level, or any other metric, 
these students are fundamentally equal to the teacher in a democratic society in the one, 
and perhaps only, area that really counts. The individual vote.  
Composition teachers may enter this sphere with training, education, and 
knowledge that they hope to share and develop among their students, but in a democratic 
society, each individual’s voice has real influence in the voting booth. As equals then, it 
is important that teachers refrain from viewing themselves as somehow privileged over 
their students. Rather, successful composition teachers in hermeneutically focused 
classrooms serve their students best when they work as peers in the process of discovery 
and identity development necessary for critical consciousness to emerge. Teachers must 
remember that equal to me does not have to mean same as me, and in an environment 
where all voices are valid and exploration is encouraged, student agency and notions of 
equality can flourish. 
That being said, teachers should not view a hermeneutic classroom as an 
environment where their own interests, opinions, and influences should be avoided. On 
the contrary, teachers who bring their own passions into the composition classroom for 
examination and discussion with the students are more likely to generate learning 
environments where the students become passionate as well. Robert L. Fried describes 
the value of this approach in The Passionate Teacher: A Practical Guide: 
To be a passionate teacher is to be someone in love with a field of 
knowledge, deeply stirred by issues and ideas that challenge our world, 
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drawn to the dilemmas and potentials of the young people who come into 
class each day – or captivated by all of these. A passionate teacher is a 
teacher who breaks out of the isolation of a classroom, who refuses to 
submit to apathy or cynicism... Only when teachers bring their passions 
about learning and about life into their daily work can they dispel the fog 
of passive compliance or active disinterest that surrounds so many 
students. I believe that we all have it within ourselves to be passionate 
teachers, and that nothing else will quite do the trick (Fried 1). 
Composition teachers who bring to the classrooms their own areas of interest and 
research to share with their students while also encouraging those students to explore and 
explicate those passions, to challenge the narrative frames and discourses of them, and 
accept the validity of student criticism of those passions, generate a zone of proximal 
development where students feel empowered to challenge discourses in their own areas of 
their lives and cultures yet have coaching available as needed. It also generates passion in 
those students for their own interests and encourages them to bring those passions to the 
composition classroom and all other communities. In short, teachers should embrace their 
own interests and encourage students to do the same. This is a hermeneutic environment 
of education. 
Dewey, Arendt, Ricoeur, and Composition Pedagogy 
At this point it would be prudent to summarize the key points illustrated in the 
theoretical underpinnings of an applied rhetoric of the self, the citizen, and the writer 
based on the three theorists highlighted in this work. Their theories and ideas regarding 
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human motivation to act in pursuit of freedom and democratic discourse will be useful for 
understanding their pragmatic application in a hermeneutic pedagogy.  
John Dewey 
Dewey promoted the idea of civic literacy as a primary function of education with 
a focus on critical thinking skills through self-reflection and an understanding of the 
acquisition of the mind. Dewey argues that critical thinking is only possible through self-
reflection and examination of one’s own beliefs, biases, and arguments that occurs 
through active engagement with them. Contrary to the assumption that knowledge is the 
goal of education, Dewey believed that it is actually the process of acquiring knowledge 
that is most valuable in educational pedagogy. Inquiry, or explorative action as Dewey 
defines it, exists to help mitigate doubt and improve chances that action will be 
successful. Thus, educational pedagogies that help students develop the capacity for 
inquiry will be more successful than those focused on knowledge acquisition. For Dewey, 
to “inquire” is to be aware of the physical world and the problems it presents both 
physically and philosophically. This examination of the physical world is a process of 
thought and reflection that helps students develop both a critical sense of the self and 
reflective sense of others who inhabit the world.   
Successful inquiry of the physical world is not something that is taught by a 
teacher, but rather is a process that both teachers and students engage in together where 
teachers serve as guides and peers in a journey of exploration. Social interaction, 
particularly, is necessary for successful critical skill development as students learn the 
discourse skills necessary for success in a democratic society. The experience of social 
action is the grounding mechanism for establishing common awareness and agreement on 
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common ideas within and between social groups through inquiry, acceptance of the other 
as equal, and recognition of opposing viewpoints as valid. Dewey believe that consensus 
construction, the primary mechanism for successful democratic action in a society, comes 
not from conceding arguments but from achieving agreement through discourse and 
debate. In other words, there is no “win” in democratic debates, there is only consensus. 
All other outcomes are failures.   
Dewey argues that reflective thought is an active process that can be learned. A 
learning environment that promotes purposeful conscious engagement with the self and 
the other in a way that both challenges cultural norms and accepts the validity of those 
norms achieves the kind of active reflective sphere necessary for the development of 
critically engaged citizens. This learning environment should be one that explores 
cultural screens, confirmation biases, rhetorical fallacies, and other hermeneutic 
processes that stand in the way of critical self-reflection. Though critical self-reflection 
and objective critical inquiry are different things, they share many of the same processes, 
and without the encouragement and expectation to practice reflective personal inquiry 
regarding beliefs and assumptions, then critical thought of the external world will always 
be clouded by unexamined personal biases. 
The abilities to both think reflectively and observe objectively have social origins. 
Dewey’s subjectivity calls for active social engagement for the development of critically 
aware citizens, and the composition classroom is an ideal environment for developing 
that skill. Dewey also argues that social engagement is possible, in part, due to 
commonalities that exist in all of us. There is an inter-connectedness between humans, 
between humans and nature, and between humans and culture that link us together 
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whether we are aware of it or not. Exploring these connections is as important as self-
reflection for the development of critical discourse. Developing and maintaining 
individual freedom in a complex society comes not from rejection of other viewpoints, 
but from engagement, validation, and consensus building.  
Hannah Arendt 
Having experienced first-hand the dangers of an unchallenged democracy, Arendt 
set out to understand how otherwise well-meaning and intelligent people could become 
part of what she termed “the banality of evil.” Having studied with Heidegger at the 
University of Marburg, Arendt was well versed in hermeneutic philosophy and used her 
knowledge and experience to examine how and why human beings become politically 
engaged, critically thinking citizens of a democracy. Arendt was concerned not only with 
the reasons students should be taught critical thinking and democratic discourse, but also 
with what factors lead students to desire such an education. Where Dewey was concerned 
with how people engage in critical thinking, Arendt wanted to know why they would 
want to and how to connect them to that motivation. This is a very practical application 
of hermeneutic theory for composition teachers to consider.  
For Arendt, people are motivated to critical thinking and action by the desire for 
relevance and permanence, as well as the desire to ensure the continuity of cultural 
traditions and expectations. That action is manifested politically through narrative, but 
narrative is susceptible to cultural screens. Arendt recognized that narrative history we 
use to enforce cultural norms is not the same thing as objective history. Instead, we use 
narrative to carry forward valued cultural ideas and expectations based on people and 
events as we choose to see them, not as they actually were. This prompted Arendt to 
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argue that solutions we seek to resolve our problems and political differences will always 
be affected by the subjective interpretations and cultural screens of the people asking the 
questions. Thus, two important elements of a hermeneutic education are interpretive 
readings of narratives that examine cultural biases inherent in the story and a careful 
examination of our own cultural screens through self-reflection and interpretation of the 
self. 
Arendt argued that active and effective critical discourse is achieved not by 
seeking out similarities in relative positions, but by examining the differences in them to 
understand the underlying cultural biases that generate those conflicts. Arendt couched 
the struggle between healthy democratic governance and totalitarianism as the difference 
between progress and tradition. Without tradition to anchor our morals regarding the 
progress of civil rights for example, we must find new moral anchors in the value of 
human experience itself by recognizing the validity of each individual’s 
phenomenological experiences with an outcome grounded in the goal of equality for all.  
Thus, composition classrooms should not seek out commonalities among an increasingly 
culturally diverse student population, because that practice is reductivist. Rather, an 
effective hermeneutic classroom is one in which the teacher seeks to understand and 
validate the unique, individual differences among those students and guide them toward 
an understanding of one another. 
There are three elements to an active life, what Arendt calls the vita activa: Labor, 
work, and action. Labor is the effort of living, and belongs in the private realm. Work is a 
bridge between the private realm and the public realm and is the substance of which our 
communities and made. It is action in the sense that it is doing something, but it is not 
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action because it is focused on utility rather than meaningfulness. A fully realized person 
capable of representing his or her culture in the public realm, however, is a person who 
engages in meaningful action for the purpose of affecting his or her social world. This 
means action is a public act and takes place among others in a social sphere. Action, 
therefore, as the principal means of defining and expressing the political self corresponds 
exclusively to the condition of plurality, which is the essence of all political life. Bridging 
the concept of valid individual experiences to the common political realm through active 
engagement with others is the point and purpose of hermeneutic practice in the 
composition classroom. 
 The academy was created to help protect the process of democracy, and it is that 
foundation that we must embrace if our goal is to help students become critically 
conscious, self-reflective citizens of their world. This necessity of action for freedom to 
exist is the foundational argument for a hermeneutic pedagogy that bridges the desires for 
freedom by the new citizens in our classrooms with the necessity of an active and 
engaged citizenship in a functional democracy. However, action in the public sphere is 
hindered because our modern culture has removed the barrier between the public and the 
private world. Action, rather than highlighting our unique qualities, has instead been 
replaced by conformity to norms and expectations. Where in ancient society individuals 
were expected to differentiate themselves in public, modern culture has flipped those 
spheres such that individuals seek conformity in public and only differentiate themselves 
to family and friends in the private realm.  
Arendt argues that differentiation is inherent in every individual as a condition of 
birth, and each person has the capacity for original thought and new political action in the 
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pure form of freedom regardless of whether each person achieves that potential over the 
course of his or her life. This bringing into the world of something wholly new and free 
of external demands is the nature of Arendt’s natality. The academy is an educational 
institution that could, and should, lend itself to the creation of the type of public space 
that Arendt imagined as many current composition scholars argue. Thus, the composition 
classroom is a natural extension of the community, and since the writing classroom does 
not belong to the realm of necessity and is freely entered into by students from multiple 
communities and cultural backgrounds, it is ideally located in the nexus of engagement 
among these communities with the students themselves serving as representatives of 
them. The role of a composition teacher in a hermeneutic classroom is to help students 
see and understand those differences in one another, to embrace them as valid even if 
they disagree with them, and to use critical interpretation of narratives and self-reflection 
to engender consensus building. 
Paul Ricoeur 
Ricoeur was concerned with how identities are created through narrative and the 
role of self-reflection in their development. Like Dewey and Arendt, Ricoeur believed 
that consciousness is intrinsically connected to the physical world and vice versa. We are 
not free-floating consciences separate from our bodies, as Descartes argued. Rather, we 
are individual “beings-in-the-world” who have meaning because the world has meaning, 
and the world has meaning because humans are naturally meaning making creatures who 
exist in the world. It is the hermeneutic circle. Ricoeur uses this subjective theory to 
argue that all people exist equally as beings in the world, with each one of us making our 
meanings while simultaneously drawing meaning for ourselves from that which is created 
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by others in and about the world. In other words, to reduce the validity or equality of an 
other who exists in the world, for whatever reason racial, cultural, gender, sexual identity, 
etc., is to reduce our own relative value because our own meaning is drawn from the 
meanings of the world created by those others.  
Ricoeur’s subjectivity posits that all people interpret the world uniquely based on 
their previous experiences in it and use adopted signs, symbols, and discourse developed 
for that purpose. Yet since those signs, symbols, and discourse systems share 
commonalities among all people, then there are areas of commonality in the interpreted 
meaning and understanding of the world as well that can be applied toward consensus 
building. This subjective intentional consciousness has the power, through individual 
action within the group and in support of the group, to shape our world as we live and 
understand it. This intersubjectivity between the self, the world, and the other is the basis 
of action. Students can’t be anything else but engaged whenever they connect, in 
whatever fashion, with another or group of others. The writing classroom is an ideal place 
for this group participation to flourish in support of critically thinking engaged citizens, 
especially if composition teachers remain conscious of the connections and differences 
among our students that hermeneutic principles imply. 
Ricoeur also recognized the role that narratives play in the construction of our 
identities, and our identities are represented in our discourse and our cultural screens. He 
argued that identity consists of two parts, the stable idem identity and the mutable ipse 
identity. The idem identity is constructed of our traditions, phenomenological 
experiences, and cultural backgrounds. The ipse identity is the part of us that projects 
ourselves into a future and attempts to affect that future through action. Where these two 
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identities conflict is the space of self-reflection, and it takes critical examination of our 
narratives for progress and growth to occur, both within ourselves and in our 
communities. Thus a critical element of hermeneutic education is the practice of critical 
reading and narrative interpretation.  
Because our world and our identities are interpreted creations based on our 
previous experiences, and because each of us possess cognitive dissonance and the 
capacity to incorrectly interpret the world, then all people are innately fallible. That’s not 
to say all interpretations have some element of fallibility, though they might, but it does 
mean that acceptance of our own innate fallibility requires each of us to accept the other 
as fallible. Comparative analysis of interpretations and discourse centered on consensus 
creation are the tools of effective action in a democracy. This can only happen where 
people engage one another in a sphere of open communication. Thus social engagement 
is another necessary element in a hermeneutic education. 
Finally, two elements crucial to developing the motivation of students to become 
actively engaged citizens are attestation and reflexivity. The confidence to project oneself 
into the world based on the idea that those actions have the potential to affect, change, 
and improve the world we live in is attestation. Reflexivity is the developed capacity to 
interpret the world in such a way that the interpretation reflects both the object being 
interpreted and the identity of the person doing the interpretation. The ability to recognize 
our own cultural screens and phenomenologies as lenses through which interpretation 
occurs improves the value of the interpretation and brings it closer to objectivity. When 
social engagement and discourse with equally valid other interpretations are added, then 
consensus becomes possible. This is the goal of a hermeneutic composition classroom. 
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Four Essential Elements of a Hermeneutic Pedagogy in Composition Classrooms 
There is clear overlap in the work of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur that guides an 
effective pedagogy of hermeneutic education and composition practices. Implementing a 
hermeneutic pedagogy in a composition classroom is as much about understanding how 
and why students are motivated to action as it is about actual classroom practice. When 
teachers of composition are trained to recognize and deconstruct cultural screens while 
also embracing those screens as valid representations of each student’s “being-in-the-
world,” then a new cultural sphere is created where interpretation, self-reflection, action, 
and consensus can flourish.  
Based on the work of the three principle theorists in this dissertation, a 
hermeneutic pedagogy that incorporates self-reflection, interpretive reading, social 
engagement, and discourse development can give students both the understanding and the 
skills necessary to become critically engaged citizens of their democracy.  Fortunately for 
the academy, each of these skills and individual pedagogies exist in some form or 
practice in many composition classrooms already. What is important is for teachers of 
composition to recognize their specific values and bring them all together in the course of 
a single semester with the specific goal of developing socially engaged, critically 
conscious citizens of a democracy.  
Pedagogies of Self-Reflection 
The capacity to self-reflect and become interpreters of our own identities and the 
narratives we use to construct them is the first crucial skill to develop among students in a 
composition classroom. This is more challenging in practice than in theory because new 
students in today’s  modern academy often have little exposure to the practice. It is 
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particularly challenging for students to comprehend the reflexive and inclusive nature of 
discourse that argues for the validity of all perceptions and acceptance of the other as 
equal while simultaneously accepting the fallibility of all perceptions.  
Fortunately, self-reflection and self-assessment have recently become more 
common in the modern composition classroom thanks in part to the work of Bell Hooks, 
Kathleen Blake Yancey, Linda Flowers, Robert Yagelski, and others. Of particular 
interest for practicum purposes is Yancey’s book Reflection in the Writing Classroom 
published in 1998 and still extremely useful for developing class curricula around her 
notions of reflection-in-action, constructive reflection, and reflection-in-presentation. 
However, as Jeff Sommers recently acknowledged, reflection for students in a 
composition classroom is challenging “because they are often asked to reflect in this 
manner as a one-time-only task” (Sommers 100). This is due to a number of factors, 
including the difficulty people have in describing their own cognitive processes, the 
desire by students to please the teacher instead of truly reflecting on their biases, and the 
limited experience teachers have in self-reflection of themselves. As a result, reflection 
practices in composition classrooms are too often relegated to a one-time effort on 
portfolio cover memos or as reflective essays designed to meet a rubric rather than 
understanding one’s actual biases and cultural screens in an effort to connect with others 
in the classroom.  
Another area of reflective practice in the composition classroom has centered 
around autobiographical writing. This practice has been examined and promoted by 
researchers like Peter Elbow, John Trimbur, Kurt Spellmeyer, and Bonnie Lenore Kyburz 
in recent years. The promise of this form lies in the opportunity for students to convert 
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their perceived notions and narratives about themselves into writing using the signs, 
symbols, and language that serve as filters between the self and the world. This process 
of writing forces students to codify their experiences and beliefs for an external audience, 
a healthy practice of reflection. As Kyburz argues, “the work of self reflection and 
conscientization [are] delicately and importantly symbiotic and...are intensely useful for 
students of first-year composition” (Kyburz 139).  
The strength of this form lies in teaching it not as genre, but as rhetorical strategy 
that encourages students to think about their experiences, their cultural expectations, and 
the world that has shaped them. The weakness of this form relative to self-reflection is 
that while it may help students recognize the forces that have shaped them, it does little to 
challenge those forces. James Berlin identifies the autobiographical form as exclusively 
expressionistic such that it primarily serves to “authentic and affirm the self” rather than 
challenge it (Berlin 147). Furthermore teachers of writing may be unwilling to critique 
self-reflective writing for fear of undermining their students’ voices or appearing to cast 
judgment on the quality of a student’s prior experiences.  
Fortunately, from a purely hermeneutic perspective, there are two effective 
strategies for teaching critical self-reflection in a composition classroom that overcome 
these limitations while building an appropriate structure necessary for engaged critical 
examination. These strategies are learning to recognize the effects of cognitive 
dissonance on our value systems and understanding the role of confirmation bias in our 
identity development. 
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 Cognitive Dissonance and Confirmation Bias 
Perhaps the most important, yet rarely utilized, practice in the composition 
classroom is learning to recognize cognitive dissonance that exists in every one of us.   
The concept of cognitive dissonance was first introduced in Leo Festinger’s 1956 book 
When Prophecy Fails, which examined why cult followers did not alter their beliefs when 
their prophesies failed to come true, and it was explicated more fully in his 1957 work A 
Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. According to Festinger, a person experiences cognitive 
dissonance when he or she holds two psychologically conflicting cognitions (Festinger). 
In the mid-1990s, cognitive dissonance research evolved further in the work of Elliot 
Aronson, Robert-Vincent Joule, and Jean-Léon Beauvois to examine the dissonance one 
experiences when engaging in a behavior that is counter to what one considers 
appropriate within one’s narrative identity. For example, an otherwise health-conscious 
person may occasionally engage in binge eating, or smoking, or heavy drinking. Another 
example may be someone whose personal identity is one of reason and non-violence yet 
sometimes acts irrationally or violently under stressful conditions. Cognitive dissonance 
is one of the few psychological phenomena that exist in every person from every culture. 
It is a fundamental human trait, and that is precisely what makes it a useful tool for a 
hermeneutic pedagogy. Indeed, these dissonant behaviors and cognitions are quite 
common, especially among college students whose narrative identities may still be in the 
nascent stage.    
Without delving too deeply into the realm of social psychology, there is one 
element of cognitive dissonance research that is useful for our purposes in developing 
engaged, self-reflective, critically thinking citizens of a democracy, and that is the 
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tendency to seek consonance when one encounters dissonance. According to Festinger, 
cognitive dissonance stirs feelings of frustration, “disequilibrium,” anxiety, and even 
anger, and the reaction to these feelings is to reduce the dissonance by seeking to resolve 
the conflict: “Cognitive dissonance can be seen as an antecedent condition which leads to 
activity oriented toward dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity oriented 
toward hunger reduction” (Festinger 3).   
The methods we use to resolve dissonance involve changing the original 
cognition or acquiring more information and knowledge to help in our decision making, 
and once we begin moving toward consonance, we tend to ignore information that 
conflicts with our new belief systems, a process known as “confirmation bias,” coined by 
cognitive psychologist Peter Wason. However, there are a number of political issues for 
which many people hold simultaneously conflicting feelings and beliefs that may 
continue to go unresolved even when experiencing dissonance on that issue, including 
war, reproductive freedom, gun rights, freedom of expression, taxation, religion verses 
science, etc.   These are all politically divisive issues that we first seek to resolve 
internally before we engage in debate about them externally, and how we resolve these 
types of issues within ourselves is often situational, yet still requires self-reflection and 
internal debate before a direction toward consonance begins.  
Yet this psychological phenomenon of dissonance to consonance combined with 
confirmation bias also lies at the heart of political division and discourse dysfunction, 
since our natural tendency is to reject or ignore all opposing arguments to our newly 
achieved consonance. All of these issues of cognitive dissonance can help us understand 
how students respond, or fail to respond, to instruction in the classroom, and helping 
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students understand this phenomenon and overcome it through critical self-reflection and 
the acceptance of the human condition as innately flawed is a key step in the 
development of engaged critically thinking citizens that a hermeneutic pedagogy is 
designed to create.  
Techniques for teaching cognitive dissonance involve presenting students with 
valid arguments and experiences from two sides of a contentious issue. The experience of 
war, for example, serves as an excellent example, though any topic of interest to the 
teacher could work. In my classrooms, I begin by providing students with a long list of 
adjectives on a sheet of paper. Then I provide them with a photograph of the flag raising 
at Iwo Jima during the second world war and tell them the story of that battle and the 
heroism of American soldiers involved, including the deaths of three of the six flag 
raisers on that island during the ensuing battle. I then ask students to write a list of 
adjectives that reflect their feelings on the story. They typically respond with words like 
strength, honor, heroism, valor, pride, etc.  Those are all accurate feelings that reflect the 
students’ relationship to the narrative. Then I provide the students with the famous 
photograph of Vietnam war survivor Kim Phuc, who as a nine year old child was 
severely burned by Napalm and is seen running naked down a road. I tell them the 
horrific tale of those children and villagers killed and burned during that battle and ask 
for a response. The words they associate with war in that instance include sadness, 
unnecessary, horrific, tragic, etc.  I have them compare the two adjective sets side-by-side 
and help them see that within themselves exists this dissonant relationship with war. Both 
relationships are valid and entirely contradictory. There are any number of similar lessons 
over topics ranging from abortion to immigration to civil rights, and teachers who engage 
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students in substantive discussions on these issues for the purpose of identifying and 
validating the differences in student opinions rather than seek commonalities will help 
students recognize dissonance both within themselves and in others around them. The 
emphasis of the exercise should be on validating the other and recognizing one’s own 
internal dissonance. This helps students begin to build an understanding of the other as 
equal while reflecting on their own internal values and narratives. 
Recognizing confirmation bias and its role in the development of self-identity is 
another valuable hermeneutic pedagogical tool. For this practice, the work of Peter 
Wason who coined the term proves valuable. The Wason Rule-discovery test presents 
students with a set of numbers, for example 2-4-6. Then the teacher asks students to 
develop a hypothesis about the rule by presenting additional numbers in the sequence. 
Students usually offer up 8-10-12, or 22-24-26 as additional sets in the sequence, which 
the teacher responds as correct sets. Then the students write down their hypotheses of the 
rule, which are often incorrect. Seeing a set of even numbers ascending in order directs 
students to present another set of numbers in similar order, which are correct sets yet do 
not represent the actual rule. Students assume the rule is ascending even numbers when 
the actual rule is simply ascending numbers. Any set of 1-2-3, or 4-23-72 would be 
correct as well, yet once students assume they have a rule worked out based on their 
approved sets, they stop testing their hypotheses. Students rarely present 3-2-5 as a set, 
which would be incorrect, or even 6-22-85 which would also be correct. The students 
seek to be “right” rather than examine their hypothesis by attempting to prove their own 
rules wrong. This is due, in part, to Wason’s argument that people do not want to face the 
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possibility that their beliefs are wrong, so they rarely examine their beliefs beyond 
information that confirms those beliefs. 
In our political realm, the space where we expect students to engage as citizens 
for the preservation of democracy through critical thinking, the evidence of confirmation 
bias is readily apparent. Both conservatives and progressives are convinced that the 
available evidence supports their ideologies and values, yet both sides are often unwilling 
or unable to seek out evidence that contradicts their own beliefs. In 2006, Drew Weston 
of Emory University released a study of 30 men who underwent MRI scans prior to the 
2004 presidential election between George Bush and John Kerry. In the study, Weston 
selected 15 men who identified as strong Republican and 15 who identified as strong 
Democrat. He then presented comments made by both candidates there were 
contradictory to other statement each man had made. In all cases, men who were both 
strong Republican and strong Democrat were highly critical of the other party’s candidate 
but found reasons to let their own candidate off the hook. The MRI scans clearly showed 
that “none of the circuits involved in conscious reasoning were particularly engaged,” but 
rather the circuits associated with emotional reward and those with resolving conflict 
were engaged instead (Weston). In essence, we are hard-wired to seek confirmation of 
our beliefs, and overcoming this hard wiring requires teachers to help students recognize 
confirmation bias in themselves such that they can accept it in others, and through this 
mutual recognition acknowledge both the challenges and opportunities for developing 
consensus through discourse and debate.  
Recognizing and challenging cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias are just 
two effective tools for helping students begin the process of self-reflection that go beyond 
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the simple autobiography or reflective cover memo. These tools and active discussion 
and participation with them in a composition classroom as a foundational and semester-
long exercise are critical for developing students who are capable of the kind of self-
reflection necessary to develop critical consciousness. Helping students recognize these 
biases in themselves can also be explored further through classroom assignments that 
require them to first write autobiographical or position papers on any given subject of 
interest to the teacher, then require a follow-up analysis of the cognitive dissonance and 
confirmation biases present in the first paper, perhaps with a third assignment that 
effectively argues a counterpoint to their first paper. Grading students based on the 
relative strength of their opposing arguments or effective self-reflections can provide 
students with the exercise and practice in the kinds of critical consciousness promoted by 
Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur that we hope to instill in engaged citizens capable of critical 
discourse and consensus building. 
Interpretive Reading 
As Adler-Kassner and others have pointed out, the practice of engaged 
interpretive reading as a composition classroom practice has largely been relegated to the 
background in favor textual genesis. Yet helping students learn to read across-the-grain, 
as Bartholomae and Patrovsky envision, is a key element in composition skill 
development because it helps students recognize the biases, cultural screens, and 
metanarratives that exist in both reading assignments and other student papers. 
Reintegrating critical analysis in the composition classroom as a primary pedagogical 
tool will help students balance the generative and interpretive skills necessary for 
effective critical engagement.  
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When composition teachers encourage students to engage with a text both as 
audience and cultural detective, then the practice of interpretive reading can unfold. As 
Brauer points out, a student’s relationship with a text is rooted in the “visceral experience 
with the language of the text as well as the various factors that determine his or her 
historical situatedness” (Brauer 74). In other words, a student reading an article about 
global warming or the American healthcare crisis, for example, will always be affected 
by that student’s experiences and relationships with those issues in the present. If a 
middle-class student has a relative whose life was altered by cancer and the consequent 
medical bills associated with it, then his or her relationship to healthcare availability will 
be vastly different than a student with no experience, or even a student from a wealthy 
family with different economic realities.   
Teachers of composition should seek to explore these situated differences as they 
relate to students in the classroom not through logical or propositional reason, but rather 
through participatory effect and understanding. How we perceive a text viscerally is 
rooted more in our emotional and cultural relationships to a topic than it is to our 
cognitive reasoning abilities. As Kells argues, “We need to be teaching students across 
contexts how to pay attention to texts – critically, reflectively, and ethically. Equally 
important, we need to be listening to our students concerning the consequences of texts 
on their lives and spheres of belonging” (WAC: Reflections 93). This is the hermeneutic 
approach that brings broader understanding to the text.   
Too often, composition teachers focus on authorial intent or historical relevancy 
in a text. While these elements are valuable for understanding the exigence of a text, they 
are less valuable for the purpose of helping students generate an understanding of 
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themselves and the cultural screens and biased lenses through which they engage the text 
themselves. This is important in a hermeneutic classroom whose goal is critical thinking 
and active engagement in the world as it is today rather than the world as it is imagined 
from a purely literary perspective, or what Lakoff defined as “frames.” In addition, the 
question of meaning in any given text is never static, as we have explored fully in 
Ricouer, but is always affected by the reader’s phenomenological experiences and 
cultural screens. This is in turn affected by the teacher’s expectations, the students’ desire 
to please the teacher, and the cultural and social pressures in the group setting to conform 
to consensus rather than challenge agreed upon interpretations. This can be mitigated 
through discursive analysis assignments in which the students first attempt to identify and 
explicate the cultural biases inherent in the text on their own, then openly discussing their 
findings in a group setting where all analyses are granted validity. The teacher can then 
seek to identify both intersections and diversions of analyses and help the students work 
toward consensus through the act of comparative interpretation.  
This can also be accomplished in the classroom by first collecting student 
analyses of a text through writing assignments and then producing a complete list of 
those analyses for class discussion. The process of discovery for the students then 
proceeds from a systematic comparison of these examples in open discussion with a goal 
of determining what is credible and what is not credible, and which analyses contain 
potential bias themselves. Ideally, there will be conflicting analyses that present the 
opportunity to examine cognitive conflicts where multiple interpretations share equally 
valid reasoning. This creates the opportunity for discovery and consensus building 
through discourse and debate. “The symbiotic relationship between text and 
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audience...evolves as preconceptions come into contact with other ideas. This contact is 
transformative, as neither audience nor text remains unchanged as a result of the 
hermeneutic encounter” (Brauer 75). 
It is useful in interpretive reading to recall Arendt’s process of “fragmentary 
historiography” as Benhabib describes it. The goal is to look for opportunities in a text to 
reorient our historical understanding and cultural expectations that seek out alternative 
orientations and unique viewpoints as well as potentialities for alternate outcomes. When 
teachers give students the rhetorical authority to challenge the adherence to textual events 
as they are described and instead provide alternative outcomes, then students gain the 
skills necessary for critical interpretation.  Additional work in this area was advanced 
through the observations and analysis of Paolo Freire who argued in favor of oppressed 
people to “read the word and the world” (Freire). Other scholars who have embraced the 
kind of critical reading and cultural analysis advanced by Freire argue that readers who 
become aware of how texts manipulate their cultural screens and expectations can 
become critical consumers and producers of text who challenge dominant meanings and 
realize that there is more than one way to read texts and their world.  
 Writing teachers who emphasize interpretive reading in the classroom and 
encourage a dialogic encounter with the text where students recognize their authority as 
critical observers to challenge the narratives and assumptions of the author create an 
environment that frees them from their assumptions while embracing the hermeneutic 
value of other voices and other perspectives. Because interpretation of a text and the 
authorial intent of the text are both bound to historical understanding and cultural 
expectations of the reader and author respectively, the epistemic process of interpretation 
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never ends. There is no “true” interpretation of a text since culture and historical 
understanding are both mutable entities. Thus, interpretations of a particular text will 
change over time. As Ricoeur writes, “if reading is possible, it is indeed because the text 
is not closed in on itself but opens out into other things. To read is, on any hypothesis, to 
conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of the text” (Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences 158).  
Interpretive reading as a primary function of the composition classroom instead of 
a background practice not only allows students to understand the assumptions and biases 
of the writer, but also allows them to recognize the cultural screens and biases in 
themselves that come into conflict with the text. Indeed, conflict with the text is the goal 
and should be encouraged and developed as part of the composition process. It teaches 
students critical interpretation skills for the world at large and for themselves. It paves the 
way for self-reflection and external critique and must be an integrated function of 
composition classrooms. As Adler-Kassner points out, “carefully considering what we 
ask students to read, how we ask them to read it, and why, is an essential aspect of 
writing program administration” (Adler-Kassner 35).  
Social Engagement 
The third aspect of a hermeneutic pedagogy for the composition classroom 
involves social engagement. Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur all three argue that active 
engagement with others in the group is the point and purpose of what it means to be a 
functional human being in society. This is an area of composition pedagogy that has 
received some attention in the work of Patricia Bizzell and discourse communities, Ken 
Bruffee’s collaborative learning models, and Charles Bazerman’s conversational model. 
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Unfortunately there is not much direct research on the effects of social engagement in the 
classroom and student identity development. Nevertheless, if Dewey, Arendt, and 
Ricoeur are correct in their arguments that all identities are socially constructed, then 
helping students engage with one another in discourse communities is helping them 
construct their identities. When that occurs in a hermeneutically focused composition 
classroom where self-reflection, critical interpretation, and acceptance of others as valid 
and equal voices are embraced, then we cannot help but construct critically thinking 
citizens of a community. 
Any environment that provides opportunities for students to engage in critical 
discourse with other students is a sphere where identity development occurs. This is 
particularly useful in the modern multicultural environment of the composition classroom 
because it helps students recognize others as equal and valid even though the other is 
unique. This may be challenging for students with little experience in reasoned civic 
discourse, but a healthy environment guided by a teacher with a knowledge of how 
hermeneutics shapes identity development is an ideal space for this mutual recognition to 
occur. As Ricoeur argues,  
Properly to understand myself in and through the capabilities and 
vulnerabilities that constitute me, I must unmask the many temptations I 
have to deny our mutuality. I must learn that even though you and I are 
irreducibly different from each other, as human beings we both have the 
same basic constitution. Our common constitution demands mutual 
recognition. Nonetheless, because our vulnerabilities are never eliminated, 
we must constantly struggle to achieve it. This is “a struggle against the 
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misrecognition of others at the same time that it is a struggle for 
recognition of oneself by others” (The Course of Recognition 258). 
Viewing the composition classroom as an engaged community has been the thrust 
of post-structuralist theorists dating back more than three decades. Patricia Bizzell builds 
on the work of Richard Rorty, Stanley Fish, and Thomas Kuhn who all argue that 
knowledge is “socially or rhetorically constructed by the language using practices of 
discourse communities” (Bizell 167). Though Bizzell was initially concerned with 
helping students construct an academic discourse for the purpose of participating in the 
academic community, she acknowledges that the process of discourse development for 
students is part of building a “democratic shared language” that helps students achieve 
critical consciousness. This idea of democratic shared language has clear connections to 
John Dewey’s notion of active communication within a community, or what he called a 
democratic shared partnership.  
The transformative approach to composition pedagogy gave way in the 80s and 
90s to a distributive approach in Writing Across Curriculum (WAC) programs that 
sought to bridge student-centered discourse with academic discourses across the 
disciplines. Built largely on the work of Robert Parker and Vera Goodkin in The 
Consequences of Writing who sought to bridge thinking and language grounded in Piaget 
and Vygotsky, WAC programs have been widely adopted across the academy in the past 
few decades because of their promise to help students connect their voices to the 
embedded academic discourse. However, the down-side to Writing Across Curriculum is 
that such programs by their nature tend to privilege academic discourse at the expense of 
cultural and linguistic identities, serving to indoctrinate students to a specific style of 
 Haley 174 
 
 
 
language and writing rather than seek to validate their unique voices as equal members of 
a society. Criticisms like those of David Russell that WAC programs tend to “exclude 
others on the basis of their linguistic performance,” (Russell 62) as well as promote “the 
myth of transience,” (Russell 53) demonstrate the challenges faced by such a movement 
in the established structures of academic environments. While Writing Across 
Curriculum programs seek to give students greater voice in their curricula, they 
ultimately fail to accommodate the actual social engagement necessary to accept others as 
valid and equal, especially those with linguistic differences to established academic 
discourse, or to help students develop a critically engaged identity necessary for the 
support of a democratic culture. Kells argues, “historically WAC has not been called to 
interrogate the knowledge-making systems and discourses students seek to acquire. WAC 
replicates and reaffirms dominant discourses by socializing new writers into established 
systems without cultivating critical awareness of the ways that literacy practice remains 
embedded in ever-shifting sets of economic, political, social, cultural, and linguistic 
factors” (WAC: Reflections 93). 
Fortunately, there have been two significant evolutions of this distributive 
approach in composition pedagogy in the past few years that show promise for what Juan 
Guerra terms a reconstitutive approach to the teaching of writing. The first is the 
evolution of Writing Across Curriculum into Writing Across Communities spearheaded 
by the graduate-run program at the University of New Mexico. This evolutionary effort 
still embraces the underlying socio-linguistic and identity-construction philosophies of 
Vygostsky’s social development theory that supports Dewey’s, Arendt’s, and Ricoeur’s 
notions of social interaction preceding development of critical consciousness. Critical 
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consciousness and cognition are, after all, the end products of socialization and active 
discourse.  
Writing Across Communities encourages composition teachers to help students 
build identification and understanding of cultures of influence both within the academy 
and without while granting students the rhetorical authority to challenge the privileged 
discourses they are learning about. One of the strengths of this ethnolinguistically diverse 
model is its reliance on peer-oriented teaching and administrative efforts to recognize the 
value of the voices of students without reducing the value of their own and vice versa. 
Within the Writing Across Communities initiative, “communicative competence depends 
upon complex strategies of shuttling between ideas and audiences, a challenging, 
culturally-dependant process” (WAC: Reflections 96). Dewey also makes this argument 
clearly, “the great waste in the school come from [the student’s] inability to utilize the 
experiences he or she gets outside of the school in any complete and free way within the 
school itself; while, on the other hand, he or she is unable to apply in daily life what he is 
learning at school” (The School and Society 89). 
Strategic implementation of Writing Across Communities initiatives include 
examples like Adler-Kassner’s “Celebration of Student Writing” started at Eastern 
Michigan University and adopted by Appalachian State, Bellevue University, Texas 
A&M, The University of New Mexico, and a number of other schools. This event brings 
students together to write collectively, engage in open discourse about writing goals and 
processes, and present their voices to the community at large. The popularity of these 
programs among students is a testament to the motivational value of social engagement in 
the composition classroom for the development and socially-constructed identities.  
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In addition, UNM’s Civil Rights Symposia connects community activists and 
civil rights leaders with students in the university in open forums of discussion and 
debate. Other programs like community writing centers supported by university students 
and staff, service-learning programs, student learning communities, and peer tutoring 
efforts,  as well as events that bridge civic, academic, and professional communities in 
support of diverse viewpoints and multi-linguistic literary practices all serve the kind of 
social engagement practices necessary for a hermeneutic education.  
This emergence of Writing Across Communities as a bridge between students and 
civic engagement is supported, in part, by the second recent development in composition 
pedagogy practices, the Apocalyptic Turn.  Paul Lynch, in a sweeping essay published in 
May, 2012 identifies the apocalyptic turn in composition studies as one that foregrounds 
the kind of social engagement and critical discourse necessary to tackle the new realities 
of a changing world, from the effects of global warming to natural disasters and even 
terrorism. Indeed, a number of composition scholars in the past decade have sounded the 
alarm over the growing size and frequency of natural disasters, the wholesale destruction 
of the environment, loss of ecologically sustaining coral reefs, and other important 
developments in an increasingly interconnected world, and these scholars are urging the 
field of composition to begin reconsidering what composition actually means for our 
students and for their future. In addition to Lynch, established scholars such as Kurt 
Spellmeyer, Lynn Worsham, Marilynn Cooper, Patricia Bizzell, and a growing chorus of 
others are “urging composition to reckon with the world in which it lives” (Lynch 463). 
There are certainly skeptics and critics of this apocalyptic turn who argue that the 
composition classroom is no place to try and save the world. None other than Stanley 
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Fish, one of the foundational theorists of social constructionism, argues in his book Save 
the World on Your Own Time that the university should focus primarily on academic 
development and avoid taking on the issues relevant to our social, political, and economic 
world: 
I am not saying there is no connection at all between the successful 
practice of ethical, social, and political virtues and the courses of 
instruction listed in the college catalogue; it’s always possible that 
something you come across or something a teacher says may strike a cord 
that sets you on a life path you may not otherwise have chosen. But these 
are contingent effects, and as contingent effects they cannot be designed 
and shouldn’t be aimed at (Fish, Save the World on Your Own Time 13). 
A number of reviews and arguments against Fish’s position have populated the 
journals, and Donald Lazare’s review and rebuttal of Fish’s book in College English is 
both detailed and vigorous. Yet even Lazare agrees reluctantly with Fish’s argument that 
“respecting the voices of others is not even a good idea. You shouldn’t respect the voices 
of others simply because they are others” (Save the World on Your Own Time 54). Lazare 
basis this abandonment of linguistic and multi-cultural validation on his experiences 
teaching mostly privileged white, mostly conservative, students who resist challenges to 
dominant narratives, and who overpower classroom discussions with belligerent, ill-
informed opinions that drown out everyone else’s voices (Lazare 531). Yet both of these 
critics are addressing the problems associated with social engagement in non-hermeneutic 
focused classrooms. In a setting that emphasizes self-reflection with an understanding of 
cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias, as well as interpretive reading skills focused 
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on recognizing and challenging dominant narratives, then the success of students 
regardless of their political identifications or beliefs is contingent on their abilities to 
unfold their identities, not impose their ideologies. In a hermeneutic classroom, there are 
no right answers and no arguments to “win,” there are only insightful questions, and 
student success is judged based on their efforts to form consensus through discourse and 
reason. 
Patricia Bizzell takes up the argument of social engagement and social justice in 
the composition classroom in her 2009 College English article “Composition Studies 
Save the World!”  In this short essay, Bizzell argues that composition studies may not 
have saved the world in the past few decades, but they have improved it. She points to the 
evolutions of composition pedagogy that first sought to eliminate the structuralist dictates 
of academic standards that punished linguistically diverse voices as “deficient” and 
instead sought to improve composition pedagogies “for teaching clear writing and cogent 
argument in ways that respected students’ intelligence” (Bizzell 176). She also identifies 
the past work of scholars in the field of composition who sought to bridge the academic 
discourse community – a predominantly white, male, heterosexual community – to the 
discourses of multi-cultural, feminist,  gay, and “other” voices that experienced 
educational obstacles in the academy. While it may not have saved the world, it did open 
the doors of a previously exclusive community to an increasingly diverse society seeking 
the benefits of higher education. Further scholarship in composition and linguistic justice 
led to the adoption of ESL studies and research that improved access to higher education 
for an even broader range of students. Composition studies definitely improved the world 
for these audiences. 
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Rejecting the notion that new students of the academy can only find success by 
abdicating their unique socio-linguistic identities and becoming “brains-in-a-jar” for the 
composition classroom to “shape like a lump of clay,” (Bizzell 184) Bizzell succinctly 
summarizes the strength of social engagement: “we were not working with blank slates 
on which we could inscribe whatever discursive conventions we favored. We were 
working with people who brought their own rich discursive resources to the academy; 
who did not want to give up their own ways of thinking and using language in order to 
succeed in the academy; and who found, indeed, that they brought resources that could 
address academic problems in ways not available to traditional academic discourse” 
(Bizzell 178).  
This clarifying argument brings us back to the apocalyptic turn and the arguments 
by Lynch, Spellmeyer, and others that composition should be conceived of “in the 
broadest possible sense” (Lynch 465) to begin addressing the real world needs of our 
students and their communities today and in their future that “pursues a way around the 
old choices (rhetoric versus reality, style versus substance, the cave versus the sun) that 
have restricted our work for so long. This more inclusive project seems particularly 
important for composition, a discipline of comprehension and speaking that finds itself 
confronting the incomprehensible and the unspeakable. How do we compose when the 
composition of the world in which we write is changing so rapidly?” (Lynch 465).  
This apocalyptic turn in composition champions the hermeneutic processes of 
contemplation, connection, discourse, interpretation, and consensus construction that are 
also fully supported in the social engagement paradigm of Writing Across Communities. 
Speaking more broadly, the kind of social engagement practices discussed here also 
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support the broader objectives of the academy to develop critically engaged citizens of a 
democracy. Though some critics like Fish dismiss this effort as antithetical to the 
purposes of the composition classroom, it is clear that our world is changing in dramatic 
ways, and if we are to prepare these students to be critically engaged citizens of this 
dramatically changing world, we must adopt what Marilyn Cooper terms a “pedagogy of 
responsibility” in which students understand that “their rhetoric can contribute to the 
effort to construct a good common world” (Cooper 443). This can best be accomplished 
in a hermeneutically focused, socially engaged composition classroom.  
Discourse Skill Development 
 The fourth important element of a hermeneutic composition classroom is the 
development of student discourse skills. Specifically, the discourse skills necessary for 
navigating the academic discourse community as well as society beyond the college 
curriculum. The term discourse skill development is used here as opposed to writing skill 
development because, while related and overlapping, they cover two different but 
complementary areas of composition. Discourse skills include the full range of social 
engagement practices including argumentative debate, active listening, group discussions, 
collaboration, peer editing, and even public speaking skills. Essentially, any action in a 
public sphere in which a person engages in whatever fashion with another or group of 
others is discourse. This includes writing as well, though the development of student 
writing skills in the composition classroom has its own specific practices. What we are 
primarily concerned with for the purposes of a hermeneutic pedagogy of composition are 
the broader discourse skills of engagement, and particularly with the study, interpretation, 
analysis, and construction of syllogistic reasoning and other rhetorical forms of influence.   
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 Before we discuss the hermeneutics of discourse skill development, however, I 
would like to briefly discuss a concern surrounding the specifics of writing skill 
development.  While Stanley Fish’s dismissal of social engagement practices may be 
reductive and flawed, there is one specific area of criticism that Fish includes in Save the 
World on Your Own Time that deserves acknowledgement, and that is lack of attention 
paid in modern composition pedagogies to the basic skills of writing. The composition 
classroom, while rightfully emerging as a sphere for the development of a reflective 
personal identity and  democratically engaged citizenship, is still a place where writing 
needs to occur.  
 We do our students no favors if we empower their voices as change agents of 
their world yet fail to provide them with the fundamental skills necessary to communicate 
their voices in writing. More than two decades ago, Peter Elbow sounded this alarm in 
resistance to the emerging academic discourse community pedagogies of the time: 
“When students leave the university unable to find words to render their experience, they 
are radically impoverished” (Elbow 137). Unfortunately, in the intervening years that 
Elbow’s article appeared in College English, there has been no research published in that 
journal that provides insight into best practices for developing specific writing skills in 
the composition classroom. Only one article published in the last decade, Mike Duncan’s 
“Whatever Happened to the Paragraph?” addresses such skill development in any way. 
Outside of a few ESL journals and perhaps one or two articles in Writing Center 
journals, basic skill development as an area of pedagogical research has largely gone the 
way of the buggy whip. Perhaps this is due to the rejection of structuralist pedagogies that 
disenfranchised linguistically-diverse students and “teaching to the form” criticisms that 
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many scholars believe “chokes the life out of writing,” or “turns students into intellectual 
automotons” (Birkenstein 18). However, focusing on skill development in the 
composition classroom as an equal and important element in a hermeneutic pedagogy is 
not analogous to bringing back the five-paragraph essay or forcing students to write to a 
specified formula. On the contrary, skill development in writing is a necessary and 
important element in creating critically engaged citizens of a democracy because it 
empowers students with the knowledge, confidence, and skills to effectively engage in 
their communities as well as find success in the academy.  
The lack of research or scholarly articles surrounding best practices for skill 
development in composition classrooms may also be a simple result of our privileged 
community. As composition scholars, we are writing primarily for other composition 
scholars who are often removed from the day-to-day student teaching practices relegated 
to graduate assistants or adjunct faculty. Our interests lie in theoretical development and 
discourse studies of varying cultural communities, and writing or reading about basic 
skill development techniques and strategies is low on our priorities. These strategies and 
techniques are more often relegated to composition pedagogy courses for new teaching 
assistants, though even in those courses the focus is generally more on lesson plan 
development and teaching strategies than on “which” methods work best for specific skill 
development.  
Instead, writing skill development has primarily become the purview of scholars 
preparing textbooks that writing programs adopt, usually as a mandatory text across all 
sections, that composition teachers use with mixed success to help students develop their 
skills in various genres. While these textbooks are grounded in solid pedagogical theories 
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about composition practices and written by experienced teachers and scholars, their 
audience is primarily first-year students rather than other composition scholars. As such, I 
fear that valuable and important research in the area of student writing skills and best 
practices, particularly in the age of the Internet, may be falling behind the evolving needs 
of modern composition students.  
 For discourse skill development in a hermeneutic classroom, there are three 
strategies I have found through trial to error to produce the best results in my students. 
These are a study of syllogistic reasoning including the recognition of logical fallacies, a 
study of the rhetorical triangle including a hermeneutic counterpart that enriches and 
informs the classic Aristotelian appeals, and classroom practice in debate and consensus 
construction.  
Recovering Syllogistic Reasoning in Composition Classrooms 
In the ongoing debate between process and post-process pedagogies, ignoring for 
the moment the inherent oxymoron of “post-process pedagogy,” scholars across the field 
seem stuck in a dichotomy between product-oriented and social-oriented writing 
pedagogies for student writing. Others have attempted to wade through this chasm using 
linguistic gymnastics and pedagogical semantics, such as Paul Lynch’s embrace of 
“casuistry” and Sidney Dobrin’s “Beyond post-process” arguments (Lynch; Dobrin) 
Regardless of which side of this debate composition scholars stand, the debate itself 
seems to dominate the field, consuming most of the available oxygen in the room of 
composition scholarship without reaching workable solutions regarding best strategies for 
classroom teaching. In the midst of this debate, however, James Crosswhite has 
reemerged in recent years to recover the neo-Aristotelian structures of discourse 
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development without falling victim to either the process pedagogy’s failures to teach 
basic and necessary skills and conventions nor to post-process pedagogy’s inability to 
provide a generalizable writing process in the classroom.  
In The New Rhetoric Project¸ Crosswhite recovers the Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca rhetorical traditional model that is concerned “with reasoning about practical 
matters in conditions of uncertainty” (Crosswhite 302). This recovery is timely and 
robust in its support of the apocalyptic turn and the needs of composition students to 
develop voices that are both their own and possess the kind of rhetorical reasoning skills 
necessary for validation in the civic community. Post-process theory may have much in 
common with the hermeneutic goals of identity construction and agency validation with 
its focus on interpreted, situated, and public writing, but it ultimately fails to provide the 
guidance necessary to help students craft legitimizing arguments in the public sphere. 
That is why teaching discourse skills is such an integral part of a hermeneutic pedagogy. 
While self-reflection, interpretive reading, and social engagement are crucial for helping 
students develop critical consciousness in support of an active and healthy democracy, 
those students still need effective discourse skills to productively shape their own 
communities and the broader world. In writing, as Crosswhite reminds us, “all 
argumentation takes shape and develops out of a relation to an audience, and the quality 
of an argument is a function of the quality of the [audience] that would assent to it” 
(Crosswhite 302). This connection between the audience and the speaker is an important 
function of the hermeneutic circle. 
Teaching students syllogistic reasoning in a composition classroom does not 
privilege academic discourse at the expense of their own ideas or voices in the writing 
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process. On the contrary, it is a valuable skill development in the formation of their 
public identities that provide students with the ability to connect to and influence their 
intended audiences through the shared acceptance of logical, deductive reasoning. In 
addition, the shared exploration of logical fallacies and their common usage in the public 
sphere, and particularly in the political sphere, helps students connect their classroom 
work to their broader communities. It is also a highly useful tool in the practice of 
interpretive reading. If a composition teacher in a hermeneutic classroom supports the 
peer model of collective investigation and discovery, then the classroom avoids Freire’s 
banking model and validates student agency while also helping students discover new 
strategies for more effective communication.  
The Rhetorical Triangle and the Hermeneutic Mirror 
Crosswhite argues in his discussion of the relationship between audience and 
speaker that the power of syllogistic reasoning lies in its “valorization of audience, of 
receptivity as a kind of rational agency” (Crosswhite 302). This recognition of audience, 
this recovery of audience in the rhetorical tradition, is important for understanding how 
the rhetorical pyramid and its hermeneutic mirror function in the service of discourse 
skill development in the composition classroom and communities beyond.  
The rhetorical pyramid, also known as Aristotle’s appeals of ethos, logos, and 
pathos, was brought into the field of composition theory by James Kinneavy in his 1971 
book A Theory of Discourse: The Aims of Discourse. He referred to it as the 
“communications triangle” and grounded his recovery of this liberal traditional model of 
discourse in the modern language theories of Karl Buhler, Roman Jakobson, and others 
(Rickert 37). Kenneavy’s communications triangle differs from Aristotle’s only in the 
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symantics of the key terms. In the place of ethos, logos, and pathos, Kinneavy inserted 
speaker, reality, and listener respectively, but the overall rhetorical structure is the same.  
Kinneavy’s goal was to provide a foundational model around which the entire 
discipline of English studies could be structured, providing a stable framework for 
composition practices in what he viewed as a chaotic realm of composition theory. The 
endurance of the triangle as a teaching model in composition classrooms to this day is a 
testament to his success in that endeavor. Timothy Crusius points to the pyramid’s 
“memorable, easily graspable schema...capable of almost endless application” as its 
defining strength (Rickert 37). Kinneavy also recovers Kairos as an important element in 
the process of communication, constructing it as the proper situational or opportune 
moment when discourse occurs. Today, the rhetorical triangle still appears in some form 
or another in even the most recent composition textbooks like Writing Today, published 
in 2010, that guide students through the use of reason, authority, and emotional appeal in 
the construction of arguments.  
This argumentative framework is not without its critics, however, who argue the 
triangle is overly prescriptive, formulaic, and static, and that it is “essentially moralist and 
could lead its adherents away from genuine pluralism” (Hunter 280). Post-process 
theorists, anti-foundational as they are and skeptical of any blanket assertion, are 
particularly critical of Kinneavy’s argument that “the aim of discourse determines 
everything else” (Fulkerson 43). In particular, Fulkerson takes issue with the privileging 
of the writer, or speaker, that Kinneavy implies in his argument “that a general aim, such 
as persuasion, determines the shape, logic, and verbal texture of a discourse” (Fulkerson 
44). In this respect, I agree with Fulkerson. The pyramid is rhetorically focused in the 
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sense that it projects ethos, logos, and pathos onto an audience and the assumption is the 
relative value of those elements alone are sufficient for persuasion. Yet that is only half 
the equation in any act of discourse. As Crosswhite argues, receptivity has a rational 
agency as well, the degree to which an audience is receptive to these three appeals has as 
much to do with their effectiveness as their relative value does. 
I recognized this imbalance while teaching the rhetorical triangle to my first-year 
composition classrooms in 2008 and set about examining the hermeneutic elements of my 
student audience that were necessary for effective discourse. What I discovered is that the 
rhetorical pyramid has a hermeneutic mirror in the audience, and the relative values of 
each of the three appeals are only as effective as their reflections in the members of that 
audience. Ethos, or authority, is only as effective as the confidence the audience has in 
that authority. Logos, or reason, is likewise balanced by the knowledge necessary to 
recognize the quality of that reason. Pathos, or emotion, is only as valuable as the 
inspiration it generates. This is why hostile audiences are so difficult to persuade. If there 
is a lack of any one element of the hermeneutic mirror, then the effectiveness of the 
appeals will always be mitigated regardless of their own value. Kairos serves as a bridge 
between the two, remaining unchanged in its concept. 
Teaching both the rhetorical pyramid as an effective structure of argumentation 
and influence, as well as the hermeneutic mirror in a composition classroom helps 
students improve their discourse skills both as speaker/writer and audience/reader. 
Crosswhite’s argument would seem to support this hermeneutic addition to the rhetorical 
form: “Validity is a result of a process of validating that includes attending to the 
particular situation in which argumentation proceeds, from anticipation by an arguer, 
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through experience by an audience, to an aftermath of evaluation within a historical 
rhetorical community that will have its own measures of the strength of arguments” 
(Crosswhite 304). 
Classroom Practice in Debate and Consensus Construction 
In addition to the recovery of the rhetorical forms for the development of 
discourse skills, actual practice in those skills under the guidance of a teacher-
collaborator is a third effective strategy of discourse skill development. Such social 
engagement in the classroom, and particularly in a peer-oriented classroom, is the best 
way to coach and guide students in the development of civic discourse, both as 
influencers of their world and as active audience. As this dissertation has argued 
throughout, supported by Dewey, Arendt, Ricoeur, Vygotsky, and others, learning and 
knowledge are social constructions developed through the exchange of ideas and open 
discourse. If this is the case, then a student-centered classroom with a teacher-as-
collaborator model provides at atmosphere of social engagement necessary for critical 
consciousness development.  
Fortunately, there is a wealth of scholarship on student centered learning anchored 
in the constructivist educational theories of  Dewey, Vygotsky, Piaget and others who 
argue that students are better able to understand information they have constructed by 
themselves. This is supported in turn by Arendt’s and Ricoeur’s subjectivist notions that 
the actions of students in this discursive sphere only become meaningful when considered 
in relation to the actions of their peers. Moreover, foundational composition scholars such 
as Peter Elbow, Ken Bruffee, John Trimbur, James Berlin, Patricia Bizzell, and a score of 
others have embraced the student-centered classroom as a sphere in which students can 
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develop community, practice discourse, and direct the learning experience to best meet 
their needs. Such widespread promotion and acceptance of this model seems to 
demonstrate it is one of the few pedagogies that scholars from across the field embrace 
regardless of their other pedagogical ideologies. 
There are a few voices of dissent, however, that have questioned the actual 
effectiveness of student-centered learning in practice. E.D. Hirsch Jr. cites a number of 
studies that indicate a significant number of students who prefer or have more success in 
traditional teacher-oriented classrooms (Hirsch), and Marshall Gregory criticizes the 
tendency of student-centered classrooms to teach down to student comfort levels rather 
than challenge them academically (Marshall). Yet these voices are few and far between. 
Today, student-centered classroom pedagogies have expanded to include sub-fields of 
study such as peer editing and group writing.  
I have found the most success in my student-centered classrooms when I can 
physically arrange the desks so students can see each other rather than all facing me. I 
then engage students in discussions related to the class readings, current events, popular 
culture topics of interest, personal narratives, etc. As a facilitator rather than a lecturer, 
my goal is to help these students apply the hermeneutic strategies of self-reflection and 
critical discourse we have already studied and examined in previous classes, as well as 
ask questions that help them recognize cognitive dissonance issues and confirmation 
biases in their discourse. Interpretive reading is supported by careful textual analysis and 
open discussion, and discourse skills in syllogistic reasoning are practiced and coached 
both by myself as the facilitator and by other students. 
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It is important, however, to include variety in the student-centered processes. 
Some days involve a full discussion or debate about relevant issues by the entire 
classroom, other days have students working together in groups of three or four on 
argument development for their writing assignments, collaborative writing, or peer 
editing. Still other days include presentations by myself or one of the students related to 
the topic of examination or debate. All students produce at least six writing assignments 
during the course of the semester, and sometimes more, and all students are graded in 
part on their classroom engagement.  
The most important outcome of student-centered strategies for discourse 
development is the ability by students to construct consensus in debates over issues 
where there is divergent opinions or beliefs, and we do not shy away from contentious 
social issues in the classroom. The very issues that one seeks to avoid in polite 
conversation, from religion to politics to social justice are often explored, interpreted, 
examined for cognitive dissonance and confirmation biases, and discussed in often lively, 
but always cordial, debate. My students learn the first day of class the fundamental rule 
of healthy civic debate, that there is no “winning” an argument in healthy democratic 
discourse, there is only a search for consensus. All other outcomes are failures.  
A Combined Strategy Approach 
The advantage of adopting a hermeneutic pedagogy for the composition 
classroom lies in the already existing practices of the four essential strategies in most 
writing programs today. The key differences lay in the understanding of hermeneutic 
theory and the primary goal that these strategies seek to attain, namely the construction of 
socially engaged, critically conscious citizens of a democracy. It is also very important 
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for composition teachers and writing program administrators to understand that these four 
strategies work together to inform, support, and construct one another, and all four of 
them must receive equal attention throughout the course of each semester. Failure to 
embrace any one of them undermines the success of all of them.  
Onward Toward Freedom 
The academy today is facing seemingly insurmountable challenges. Increasing 
economic disparity; ecologically destructive climate change; a decreasingly stable 
government under duress from extremist, intransigent elements within and multi-national 
corporate hegemony without; global terrorism; and increasingly powerful and frequent 
natural disasters. Enrollment has increased significantly as more people seek the 
advantages of higher education, yet the lack of government financial support to meet this 
increasing demand means university resources are strained, and class sizes are increasing 
while faculty and staff face pay freezes, furloughs, or even layoffs. In addition, increasing 
pressure from special interest groups and corporate forces outside the academy to seize 
control of university resources and dictate education standards is undermining the 
foundations of the academy itself.  
We must stop and examine what things we do still have control over, and assess 
how we can re-invigorate the academy’s original, and still most valuable function of 
preparing good citizens of a democratic society. I believe the composition classroom is 
ideally suited to this task at this time of critical need. According to the most recent 
statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau, 30 percent of American adults now hold at least a 
bachelor’s degree (Census Bureau), and 41 percent of all adults age 18-25 are currently 
enrolled in a degree granting institution (Department of Education), both all time records. 
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Considering that the majority of universities require all students to enroll in at least one 
composition course, then composition teachers can be among the most influential actors 
for developing new citizens capable of improving their communities and shaping the 
world through effective discourse, action, and other forms of civic engagement. Words, 
after all, will always have more power to enact real and lasting change in a society than 
violence.  
 “Only writing, in freeing itself, not only from its author, but from the 
narrowness of a dialogical situation, reveals this destination of discourse 
as projecting a world” (Ricoeur, From Text to Action 218) 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
My purpose in writing this dissertation is two-fold. First, I hope to recover the 
rich philosophy of hermeneutics and bring it into the broader conversation of rhetoric and 
composition studies by demonstrating its value alongside currently prominent 
philosophies. Second, I want to explore and apply the unique qualities of hermeneutic 
theory to the composition classroom in an effort to address some of the pedagogical 
challenges faced by scholars in the field.  
My goal is not to undermine the extant discourses of rhetoric and composition 
studies, but rather to enrich them and provide a new way of thinking about how students 
learn writing.  Hermeneutics as an applied rhetoric has largely been ignored in favor of 
pedagogies that privilege the academy and teachers over students, though recent 
developments in student-centered practices have begun to emerge. Those student-
centered practices have been partially informed by a handful of scholars who have 
explored the connections between hermeneutics and higher education over the past two 
decades, including discussions in hermeneutics and composition theory specifically 
(Grondin, Kent, Crusius, Mailloux).  
These efforts have helped the field of composition and rhetoric gain better 
insights into student motivations toward civic engagement and the role narrative plays in 
enforcing cultural norms. However, this work has mostly demonstrated the viability of 
hermeneutics for composition studies but has otherwise failed to articulate a practical 
implementation (Brauer). That is the gap in the literature that this dissertation hopes to 
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fill, providing both a theoretical underpinning of a hermeneutic pedagogy as well as a 
pragmatic strategy of implementation in the composition classroom.  
The theoretical underpinning for this dissertation is developed from the work of 
three 20th Century theorists, all of whom contributed significantly to the fields of both 
education and hermeneutic philosophy. John Dewey’s hermeneutic contributions occur 
through his development of what he called instrumentalism, but is more widely 
associated with American pragmatism. Numerous scholars have directly compared 
Dewey’s philosophy to hermeneutic philosophy, and Dewey’s early influences by 
hermeneutic philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel are evident throughout 
his works. Hannah Arendt was educated and trained in the German Hermeneutic tradition 
with Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, and two of her most significant works, The 
Human Condition, and The Life of the Mind are primarily concerned with areas of 
hermeneutic philosophy. Paul Ricoeur embraced both phenomenological experience and 
hermeneutic interpretation to develop his philosophy of the will as well as his 
examination of narrative in support of that work.  
John Dewey was an American educator whose progressive educational theories 
and systems implemented across the United States and around the world can be 
connected to the some of the greatest achievements in social, political, economic, and 
technological advancements in the history of mankind. His pedagogical influence in 
shaping American education policies and practices helped pave the way for nearly every 
20th Century American social revolution, from the New Deal to the Great Society 
Programs to the Civil Rights Movement. John Dewey was an educator and a writer. He 
 Haley 195 
 
 
 
was one man, and he changed the world with only his words and his ideas in lasting ways 
that Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin never could with their all their armies and weapons. 
Hannah Arendt witnessed first-hand the threat and danger of totalitarian rule and 
the collapse of the German democracy. She worked to protect and rescue Jews from the 
holocaust and was forced to flee Europe. When she returned to cover the Nuremburg 
trials, she struggled only to understand how otherwise good people could come to support 
or become part of what she called the banality of evil. Arendt was not interested in 
vengeance or blame, but rather sought to forever prevent again the kind of totalitarian 
horror that consumed a democracy with the tacit acceptance of its people. Her 
philosophies and ideas are as valuable today in these uncertain times as they have ever 
been, and they provide an excellent foundation for a pedagogy of resistance to extremism 
and oppression.  
Paul Ricoeur also endured the horrors of World War II, first as a soldier in the 
French army and then as a prisoner of war in a German concentration camp for five 
years. He was well aware of the propaganda and misinformation campaigns used by the 
Nazi party to seize the reins of power, destroy democratic discourse, and disenfranchise 
whole populations of their basic human rights and dignity. He was most interested in the 
ways that our previous experiences shape our comprehension of the world, and he was 
driven in part to understand how narratives can be used to influence our beliefs and 
behaviors so he could provide the understanding and tools necessary to challenge them.  
Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur all recognized that political institutions are only 
effective in protecting social institutions like the freedom of religion, economic equality, 
freedom of speech and assembly, and basic human rights so long as those political 
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institutions serve and unite the people in a bond of common purpose. Stable political 
institutions that serve the needs of a society and protect the interests of the people also 
have an enduring power that makes it possible for the citizens who support it to live 
secure and productive lives. These theorists recognized the mutuality and 
intersubjectivity between healthy political institutions and the well-being of the people.  
When the well-being of the people is not served, however, then those institutions 
can lose both the support of the people and the power of serving them that defines their 
purpose, leading to instability and the potential for collapse. The same can occur when 
those institutions are undermined by forces intent on destabilizing them for whatever 
purposes, whether ideological, economic, or political. Regardless, there is a clear 
connection between the preservation of political institutions in a democratic society and 
the well being of the people of that society. Thus, Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur were all 
concerned with ensuring the stability of the democratic political institutions through civic 
engagement and action on the part of critically conscious citizens who constantly 
challenge these institutions to serve their needs.  
What these theorists understood, however, is that the realm of civic engagement is 
primarily a public sphere dominated by rhetorical practices of influence as well as 
hermeneutic practices of interpretation. Since both rhetoric and hermeneutics are 
susceptible to logical fallacy, false promises, sophistic manipulation, threats, etc., then 
the public sphere is always an unstable space in constant need of engaged citizens 
educated in the skills of rhetoric and dedicated to the purpose of speaking and acting 
against those destructive forces. 
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All three philosophers witnessed the rise of Totalitarianism in democratic 
countries of Europe and all three were concerned with the processes and politics that led 
to such tragic developments of the war and the Holocaust. The common heuristic drawn 
from their observations and philosophies is the role education plays in developing 
critically engaged citizens. Their examinations of identity-development, civic 
engagement, critical thinking, narratives, and culture, among other areas, help us see how 
individuals develop as unique ‘selves,’ as citizens, and as writers.   
 This provides a framework for the development of a hermeneutic pedagogy 
applicable to the composition classroom. The framing questions for this pedagogy are 
hermeneutically focused: 
1. How do we take advantage of gaps in student learning and cultural 
differences to achieve common outcomes in critical thinking about 
philosophies of social justice, equality, and civic responsibility?  
2. What are the unique differences in student educational experiences 
that we can draw upon to enhance and validate student 
phenomenologies in our approach to transcultural modalities of student 
discourse and writing?  
These questions are unique in that they depart from traditional educational tendencies to 
seek lowest common denominators among students for the purpose of bridging 
differences. Instead, a hermeneutic pedagogy seeks out unique differences among 
students for the purpose of exploring biases, cultural screens, and meta-narratives that 
shape us both as individuals and groups. If we begin with the proposition that all people 
are equal, where equal to me does not have to mean same as me, then a pedagogy can be 
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constructed based on the theories of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur that provides practice in 
developing the essential personal skills necessary for critically conscious, active citizens 
to emerge: self-reflection, interpretive reading, social engagement, and discourse. The 
ideal setting for this pedagogy is a student-centered classroom where teachers work as 
facilitators of student learning, as coaches, and as peers to their students with outcomes 
focused on validation of others and consensus building.   
Opportunities for the Academy and Composition Classrooms 
A survey conducted in 2011 by The Institute for College Access and Success 
found nearly 80 percent of all high school students in America believe college education 
and training are more important today than for previous generations (Success), and 90 
percent of young people say they want to go to college (Kazis). Despite this interest by 
students in receiving a college education, however, three-quarters (75 percent) of students 
entering college in the fall of 2011 were unprepared for college-level studies according to 
the testing organization ACT (Wolfgang). This appears to be a glaring disconnect 
between modern students who desire a college education and the perceived readiness of 
these students to obtain that education, and statistics for students completing a college 
degree within six years of starting college supports the data.  The U.S. Department of 
Education’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports the graduation rate 
for first-time students entering four-year institutions in fall 2002 was 57 percent.  That 
means more than four in ten of our students are failing to matriculate in a timely manner 
if at all, and that’s simply unacceptable if we are truly in the business of preparing new 
citizens for the challenges of preserving our democracy. Fortunately, work in this area 
through the NSSE program is helping the academy recognize which educationally 
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purposeful activities are most successful for students. The key findings of the research by 
the NSSE supports the arguments developed in this dissertation, particularly in the 
essential skills of self-reflection, interpretive reading, social engagement, and discourse 
development. 
 One of the strengths of the academy in the past has been its generally conservative 
nature in avoiding rapid repositioning as cultural forces have shifted around it. That 
unwillingness to change however can be a problem when the technological and cultural 
needs of the population it is intended to serve are outpacing the academy’s capacity for 
such repositioning. We are, as a culture and a species, in the midst of a massive and rapid 
alteration, driven by political, economic, and ecological instability on one hand, and on 
the other by technological advancement and an unprecedented worldwide access to 
knowledge systems that have never before existed. 
 The Internet that came to life a mere fifteen years ago has developed into a 
worldwide communications platform that provides two-way media access and an 
increasing panoply of outlets from social media sites like Facebook and Twitter to 
personal web pages, email, online news sources, and video sites like Youtube. Add to that 
the mass proliferation of new smart phone technologies capable of voice, video, and text 
messaging, and the world of instant knowledge available to students today is almost too 
large to comprehend. Modern students have instant access from virtually anywhere in the 
world to the kinds of information that was previously only available in physical campus 
or public libraries.  
This represents a sea change in what composition teachers are faced with when 
engaging new student writers. We no longer need to acculturate our students with the 
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necessity of writing as a form of communication, they understand and embody that 
process in ways we are only beginning to study, much less understand. Rather, we are 
faced with a student population already prepared to produce the written word, but lack 
the discourse skills, interpretive strategies, and critical reasoning necessary to discern 
what is and isn’t credible knowledge among those expanding resources, and that is where 
our challenge lies in developing a new pedagogy for the modern composition classroom.  
I see a hermeneutic pedagogy as a potential solution to the problem of promoting 
“critical thinking” skills in the dramatically and rapidly changing environments of the 
academy and external communities experienced by new composition students. At a time 
of deep misgivings about the direction of our nation and the problems we face as a 
society, we wonder what we can do to affect change and shape our world, and we wonder 
what impact we can have from inside the academy on these seemingly insurmountable 
problems.  
It is tempting to avoid this problem by situating the ideas presented in this 
dissertation solely in the field of rhetoric and composition and limiting its scope and 
potential with the argument that it’s not going to save the world. Perhaps it should even 
restrict its discussion to the field of rhetoric and composition specifically and avoid issues 
of democracy, national politics, and the academy as a whole. But to do so would be to 
reject the very basis of hermeneutic philosophy, that of the hermeneutic circle. Our work 
in rhetoric and composition has meaning only because that greater world has meaning, 
and because we are preparing our students to active members of that world of greater 
meaning. Likewise, the greater world has meaning only because of the kind of work we 
do in our classrooms every day throughout the academy and around the world. It is not 
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possible to legitimately discuss the role that writing plays in our students’ lives without 
also discussing how their writing shapes both themselves and their world. That is, to me, 
the very point of it all. Thus, my main contribution has been to argue for and present the 
framework of a hermeneutic pedagogy of composition designed to help new citizens of 
our democracy develop into active, socially-engaged, critically consciousness members 
of their communities and of society at large.  
Writing as a Learned Skill 
“Writing cannot be taught.” This is a claim made by such luminary writers as 
composition scholar Thomas Kent, poet Theodore Roethke, crime writer Lawrence 
Block, and even horror novelist Stephen King. It’s a common meme that pops up from 
time to time and just as often is dismissed by composition teachers as merely the 
narcissistic glibness of some writers who want to claim their genius is innate and 
unavailable to those without it. Personally, I have been a writer since my second semester 
of college at San Jose State University in 1990, some 23 years ago when I bought my first 
computer and discovered the joy of filling the flashing screen with words and never 
having to hit the return arm or reload the paper again.  
I switched majors and earned my degree in writing from that same school and 
then went on to a very successful professional writing career that included stops at USA 
Today newspaper, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, 3M, Canon, Dell, and a host of trade 
magazines, advertising agencies, and freelance work. Writers do tend to get around. Now 
as my graduate school adventure comes to an end after seven glorious years of 
educational bliss and the conclusion of my dissertation on the topic, I feel I finally have 
the authority to respond to the argument that “writing cannot be taught.”  
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It’s true. It can’t. 
However, writing can be learned, even great writing. This I know is true too. 
What my research and work in hermeneutic philosophy has convinced me of is that 
writing is fundamentally a hermeneutic process. When we write, we are interpreting our 
world using the signs, symbols, and language skills developed just for that purpose. Our 
compositions skills, style, voice, and overall quality increase with practice, and like any 
other skill, it requires practice to improve. Composition classrooms can provide structure, 
opportunity, encouragement, and lessons in grammar and syntax, but the onus is on the 
student to learn, and there is no amount of lecturing, workshops, or pedagogical models 
capable of instilling that skill from the outside in. This is why I talk about composition 
teachers as facilitators, coaches, and peers. It’s also why I discuss composition in the 
broadest possible terms to include all forms of discourse and social engagement as part of 
the learning process. In a hermeneutic composition classroom, students are not just 
composing essays, they are composing themselves.  
That’s why one of the unique advantages that hermeneutic theory brings to the 
realm of composition studies is its focus on learning rather than teaching. Hermeneutics 
privileges the learner, because it is a philosophy that develops from our innate human 
capacity to make meaning of the world around us through exploration and interpretation. 
What a hermeneutic pedagogy offers composition students is a specific set of strategies 
for developing these explorative and interpretive skills in ways that help students unfold 
their own identities through self reflection and recognition of the cognitive and cultural 
screens that limit them. It also encourages students to develop their own passions and 
interests as part of the learning process while still providing social engagement and 
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discourse training, including the basic writing and argument skills, necessary for 
navigating the academy and broader communities.  
What a hermeneutic composition pedagogy offers the academy is the 
development of socially engaged, self-reflective, and critically conscious new citizens 
who can serve the interests of the academy through active engagement in their 
communities, both as students and as future graduates whose skills in discourse and 
engagement will only continue to improve with practice. What a hermeneutic pedagogy 
offers our democracy are students trained to recognize failed syllogisms, rhetorical 
fallacies, and sophistic manipulations that threaten the public sphere and the political 
institutions that support it. It also provides these new citizens with the critical 
interpretation skills necessary to actively challenge the kind of destructive rhetoric 
employed by extremist elements that are ever present in society.  
This is a very promising, and, in my experience developing and employing these 
strategies in my own classrooms, highly effective pedagogy for training composition 
students in all of these skills. However, I do not claim that a hermeneutic pedagogy is 
magic bullet for addressing all of the problems faced by composition programs or its 
teachers. There are still a number of issues that this pedagogy does not address, including 
students who are unwilling to engage or who are intent on only getting past the class 
requirement with no interest in learning. Nor do these strategies adequately account for 
multi-linguistic environments where student-centered learning and social engagement run 
up against fundamental language barriers.  
In addition, while individual student assessment in the classroom provides more 
flexibility for composition teachers to focus beyond basic writing production to the 
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development of skills like self-reflection, interpretive reading, discourse production, and 
class participation during social engagement exercises, I have not considered how the 
broader writing program, department, and university assessment needs might be met 
under this pedagogical shift.  
For such a new idea to flourish beyond a few classrooms, there will also need to 
be research designed to examine whether a hermeneutic composition pedagogy actually 
improves text production, discourse, and critical thinking skills over standard classroom 
techniques. While my own experience suggests that it does, and does so significantly, and 
the anecdotal evidence and testimonies from my students support this belief, writing 
programs may be hesitant to experiment with such an unusual system without at least 
some measurable data, especially considering the necessity of training the composition 
teachers in basic hermeneutic theory who want to try it.  
Nevertheless, the hermeneutic theories of Dewey, Arendt, and Ricoeur are widely 
accepted and validated across the academy, and those theories offer a grounded and 
logical construction of a hermeneutic pedagogy. The strategies I have developed from 
those theories and implemented with great success in my own composition classrooms 
have convinced me that the development of socially engaged, self-reflective, and 
critically conscious students who are motivated toward civic engagement and action in 
the public sphere may offer an evolutionary new option for addressing the challenges of 
our democracy in the 21st Century. 
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